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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM OP THE DISSERTATION
1. The Problem
In the context of scientific psychology there are
certain problems arising which cannot be resolved satis-
factorily on the psychological level alone; today epistem-
ological and metaphysical implications become the study of
the philosopher* In pre-scientific psychology, however,
these problems were part and parcel of this field of study;
the "soul" remained for centuries the essential considera-
tion of the psychologist, and interest centered around man f s
dreams, his shadow, death, the anatomical location of his
soul, etc* The scientific spirit and method dispelled the
darkness of magic and the supernatural which had surrounded
physics and biology, but the elevation of psychology to the
rank of a "natural science" was postponed until comparatively
recent times.
William James lived and labored in the time when the
ideal of a truly scientific psychology — an objective,
disciplined, unbiased inquiry with definite rules of investi-
gation and systematization— was at long last being considered*
His work at Harvard in experimental and physiological psy-
chology represented his attempt to define the outline of
psychology* s task and bring the scientific ideal into the
realm of reality* His efforts to delineate the respective
'1
2fields of psychology and philosophy were noble, and his
views ahead of his time. His failure to carry out the
ideal in his own writings accounts in part for the consid-
eration of some issues in his psychological works which are
no longer regarded as falling within the province of psy-
chology. The failure, as we shall see, may he attributed
in large measure to his own uncertainty as to the boundaries
of psychology, and the conflict between his strong desire to
make psychology a natural science and his persistent philo-
sophical interests impelling him to reject partial psycho-
logical views as incomplete. The paradoxes and inconsist-
encies which resulted from this wavering between psychologi-
cal and philosophical analyses of certain problems have
important bearing on a proper interpretation of James, as
well as on the question of the relation of psychology to
philosophy in general.
i. Importance of Study
Since James gave different answers to particular prob-
lems in his psychology and in his philosophy, it is important
to determine to what extent his changing views are the result
of his maturing thought, or may be attributed to his vacilla-
tion between psychological and philosophical analyses, imple-
mented by his desire to maintain the separation between the
two, and the failure of this ideal. Furthermore, this disser-
tation will attempt to indicate the influence of his psycho-
<<
'
„
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3logical analyses upon the development of his philosophy,
and the influence of his mature philosophical thought upon
his psychology, necessitating a re-consideration of basic
problems.
ii. Limitations of Study
As originally planned, the dissertation was to include
two chapters dealing with the relative values of psychology
and philosophy, and the relation of psychology to philosophy
today. Since such a study could only consider broad, general
outlines, and ought to comprise a field of concentration of
its own, it was considered better to limit the dissertation
to certain basic problems arising within the context of James*
thought alone, necessarily, however, some attention must be
paid to his views of the interrelations between the two fields
as they have affected the modern boundaries of both. Instead
of devoting special chapters to the consideration of the
above subjects, attention will be given to them throughout
the dissertation in analysing the various problems which are
border-line problems for both fields.
2. Main Sources fcTr Investigation
A study of this kind necessitates research into every
aspect of the thought of James. Consequently all of his
psychological and philosophical writings have been studied;
his letters have been carefully read; his addresses, reviews,
«-
r
4etc. have been examined; the best biographies have been con-
sulted. The interpretative literature on James is extensive,
and an exhaustive perusal of it is impossible, far beyond the
scope of this study. The bibliography does not indicate the
extent of the research accomplished, but contains only those
publications which are relevant to the main purpose of the
dissertation.
i. Psychological and Philosophical Writings
James f s writings on psychology include his Principles
of Psychology
,
his major two-volume work; the one-volume
revision. Psychology ,
(
Briefer Course ) ; and his Varieties of
Religious Experience
,
a psychological treatment of religious
experience, in which, nevertheless, much that is philosophical
is involved. Talks to Teachers on Psychology is less important
for this study, but is important as a contribution to educa-
tional psychology.
His philosophical writings include the famous Will to
Believe
,
Human Immortality, Pragmatism
,
The Meaning of Truth
,
A Pluralistic Universe
,
Some Problems of Philosophy
,
and
Essays on Radical Empiricism. The most important articles
which appeared in psychological and philosophical journals
have been collected and edited by Ralph B. Perry in Collected
Essays and Reviews . The addresses in Memories and Studies
,
published shortly after James* s death, also afford some sig-
nificant material for this study.

5ii. Biographies and letters
No fair picture of the biographical and spiritual
factors which influenced his psychology and philosophy could
be presented without an exhaustive perusal of the two-volume
Letters of William James by his son, Henry. A Small Boy and
Others by James 1 s brother, Henry, and Notes of a Son and
Brother by the same author, contain some interesting material.
C. Hartley Grattan’s The Three Jameses: A Family of Minds ,
and F.O. Matthiessen’ s The James Family , have little that is
not contained in the Letters, but Grattan’s book in particular
is significant for its attempt to analyze James’s thought from
the standpoint of James’s temperamental bias and emotional pref-
erence alone. A.A. Roback’s William James: His Marginalia ,
Personality, and Contributions is an interesting psychological
study, but its rather sweeping conclusions lack sufficient
basis. It is more valuable in indicating the possible influ-
ences upon modern psychology of James’s thought.
iii. Interpretative Literature
Undoubtedly R.B. Perry’s Thought and Character of
William James
,
a two-volume work, remains the "Bible” on
James’s life and thought. It contains additional biograph-
ical material and letters not included in the Letters, plus
extensive interpretation and criticism. The publication in
March, 1948, of this work in one volume, is significant as
an attempt to acquaint a wider audience with the work of James.
«
6Perry* s In the Spirit of William James is a less exhaustive
appraisal of the thought of James, presenting broad lines of
influence rather than specific problems in detail. The Appen-
dix in Perry* s Present Philosophical Tendencies is an excellent
brief summary of James* philosophy, and particularly of his
pragmatism.
J. Seelye Bixler*s Religion in the Philosophy of William
James offers the best interpretation of James *s religious phil-
osophy, and indicates some of the influences upon his thinking
in a very general way.
Dewey* s essays on James in Characters and Events and
Santayana* s studies in Winds of Doctrine
,
Persons and Places
,
and Character and Opinion in the United States are of primary
importance.
These are but a few of the significant books on James
which have been found relevant for this study; these and
others are listed in the bibliography. Heedless to say,
histories of philosophy have been consulted in order to de-
termine James *s place in the general stream of psychological
and philosophical thought, and research has been made in the
general field of the relations existing between psychology
and philosophy in James* s day and the present. The various
psychological and philosophical journals have been studied in
so far as they have presented material relevant for the prob-
lems arising in the text.
1Y
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73. Other Investigations in Field
The importance of this study has been recognized by most
men who have dealt with the problem of James's thought in any
extensive way. Perry has treated the problem in his Thought
and Character of William^James
,
but "has opened up the ground
rather than covered it." (Jordon Allport has indicated in a
2
brief paper many of the border-line problems which constantly
troubled James, resulted in paradoxes, and yet were so fruitful
for his philosophy. So also G.W. Brett, in a paper read before
the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association
3
in 1941, called attention to the influence of James's psycho-
logical exposition on his philosophical conclusions. His
treatment is mainly suggestive, indicating the path such a
study might take, and specific problems which must be covered.
He does not, however, indicate the reverse influence of James's
philosophy upon his psychology.
Hone of the dissertations on James in other universities,
completed or in process, deal with this particular problem,
so far as it has been possible to discover.
1. Letter to writer from J.S. Bixler, Oct. 30, 1941.
2. Allport, Art. (1943),
2
95-120.
3. Paper published in ICWJ, 81-94.
• -f\ .t
.
a4. General Survey of Plan of Dissertation
The problem of the dissertation will be developed
through the following main stages* The chapter devoted to
the consideration of James as a psychologist (Chapter II)
indicates his main psychological doctrines, the many influ-
ences which led him to make psychology his first love, and
particularly the way in which his prevailing philosophical
interests in his earlier days helped to fashion the kind of
psychology presented in his Principles . In a general way,
James's influence upon present psychological developments is
also traced in this chapter.
Chapter III considers the transition-period in James's
life and thought, denoting the biographical, spiritual, and
professional influences which led him to the rejection of
psychology as his life work, and the espousal of philosophy.
Chapter IV attempts to outline the main contributions
of James to philosophy, considering the development of his
epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion, and
suggesting the general influences upon modern philosophical
thought of his analyses and spirit. There is no attempt in
this chapter to indicate relations between his psychology
and philosophy; it is intended to serve as a background
chapter for the study of the controversial problems developed
later.
The fifth chapter reveals the influence of his psychology,
both in substance and in implication, on various vital problems
.r
9of philosophy. The problems are ones in which both psychol-
ogy and philosophy are involved,— Methodology, the Self,
fits unity and identity, its nature, freedom and determinism),
the Mind (Consciousness), and the problem of the One and
Many.
Chapter VI indicates the necessity James felt for
changing his earlier psychological views, by reason of the
different answers given certain problems in his psychology
and in his philosophy. Some of the problems are never re-
solved completely, as we shall see; of some of the inconsist-
encies James himself seems to be totally unaware; others are
faced very squarely, earlier positions revised or rejected,
as his mature thought attempts a synthesis of the two uni-
verses of discourse. In this final chapter the influences
are treated topically as in the previous one.
f
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CHAPTEB II
JAMES AS A PSYCHOLOGIST
As has already teen intimated, psychology in the time
of William James was just beginning the long trail whose
goal was equal standing with physics and biology as a natu-
ral science. Even today it is by no means a rare occurence
to find psychology included in the department of philosophy
in colleges and universities, and not as a separate depart-
ment. In James’s day such a separation was not only rare;
it was seemingly impossible.
James was so constituted temperamentally that he needed
some cause to bring out his best; here then, was his first
great cause. Although his experimental work and the data he
derived from other sources were left unorganized in large part,
yet he contributed to the baby science much that was organized
and adapted by others who reaped the fruits of what he had
sown. His relation to Wundt, Helmholtz, Miinsterberg, and
others considered further on in this chapter, indicates the
great importance of his labors, and his right to be called
one of the founders of modem psychology.
1. Early Interest
Among his early interests, drawing and science were pre-
dominant. The influence of the former, artistic spirit upon
1
his psychology will be considered further on in this chapter.
1. See 6, ii

11
It will suffice here to note that this interest prevailed
for several years and meant study in Paris and, toward the
end of 1860, a return to America to study under the land-
scape and portrait painter, William Hunt. In the summer of
1
1861 James made his decision to give up art as a career.
The interest in scientific things dates from his boy-
hood. His brother noted that he was always "addicted to
experiments"
,
an interest which led him through the natural
sciences to a study of psychology, and eventually to his work
in experimental psychology at Harvard in his years of teach-
ing.
2.
Barrenness of Philosophy
"There is nothing in the early record, so far as avail-
able, apart from the domestic climate, to indicate any dis-
2
position toward philosophy." Care must be taken, however,
to distinguish between philosophy itself and philosophy as
a profession. James directed his barbs at the teaching of
philosophy in his day, and at that type of philosophy which
seemed to him thoroughly barren. An acute analysis of the
state of philosophy, in a letter to the editor of the nation,
3
September 21, 1876, castigates the teaching of philosophy
4
for its "safeness", "lifeless discussions and flabby formulas."
1. See this chapter, 6, ii for possible reasons for this decision.
2. Heniy James, LWJ, I, 19.
3. Partially reprinted in PWJ,57 ff , (Ed.Kallem) ;also LWJ, I, 190.
4. PWJ, 57.
cf
12
The teaching was mainly in the hands of ministers; syllogis-
tic logic, aesthetics, psychology were the main subjects,
while history of philosophy and contemporary movements were
almost totally ignored. This "most important of all college
studies" was a barren field in the hands of teachers and
students who were "bribed beforehand by (their) reverence
1
or dislike for the official answer." Could James turn to
a life-work in a field which presented no challenge, awakened
no lively, critical spirit, brought no perspective, and con-
sidered only problems whose official answer was already laid
down and accepted as truth ? Such Was not for him.
In 1873, James offered a course in physiology and in
anatomy at Harvard. An entry in his diary in the following
year indicates his decision to return to teaching, and his
attitude at that time toward philosophy.
Philosophical activity as a business is not
normal for most men, and not for me... To make
the fom of all possible thought the prevail-
ing material of one's thought breeds hypochon-
dria. Of course, my deepest interest will, as
ever, lie with the most general problems. But. .
.
my strongest moral and intellectual craving is
for some stable reality to lean upon. 2
The stability which was so lacking in his personal life at
this time was found, in part at least, in the concrete facts
of biological science. Prom that relatively secure anchorage
he could philosophize as much as he wanted to; as he wrote to
1. PWJ. 58.
2. Henry James, LWJ, I, 171
1t
•-
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his brother:
I am not a strong enough man to choose
the other and nobler lot in life, but
I can in a less penetrating way work out
a philosophy in the midst of the other
duties* 1
This piece of self-analysis is not strictly true, written
as it was during the years when ill health was his daily
burden. It does, however, indicate that the tuma of mind
which led him to psychology first of all was bom of a person-
al need for something dependable to which his mind could cling*
3. Training under Agassiz
After a brief period of medical training, James joined
the Thayer Expedition to the Amazon in 1865, a trip which
brought him into close contact with Louis Agassiz, Professor
of Natural History in the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard
University, as well as giving him an opportunity to discover
2
for himself what the career of a biologist was like. Despite
his continuing uncertainty about himself, his goal, his life-
work, the trip convinced him that he ought to go on with his
biological studies, and upon his return to America he resumed
his medical training. Agassiz* s passion for facts was a severe-
ly corrective influence upon James* s wandering, groping, un-
systematic nature. He gained the empirical ideal, but at the
same time did not lose his interest in causes, values, and
purposes.
1. Henry James, LWJ, I, 171,172.
2. For an excellent, readable discussion of Agassiz* s life
and influence on James, see Grattan, TTJ, 113-119.
t*
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4* Physiology and Psychology
Throughout all of this period, until about 1865, there
is no evidence that James had any contact with psychology
whatsoever, although it is quite possible that his extensive
reading had acquainted him with the field as it then existed.
i. Medical Training
His medical training had originally been undertaken
with the idea of his becoming a physiologist.
I originally studied medicine in order to
become a physiologist. . • I never had any
philosophical instruction, the first lect-
ure on psychology I ever heard being the
first I ever gave. 1
He felt that his medical training enabled him to "see a
little the inside workings of an important profession, and
to learn from it ... how all the work of human society is
a
performed." But its completion left him convinced of his
ill-fittedness for scientific work. His interest in physiol-
ogy was by no means an absorbing one; he studied it with
respect and curiosity, but he soon began to consider it only
as a means to an end which was taking dim shape in his mind.
I feel a good deal of intellectual hunger
nowadays, and if my health would allow, I
think there is little doubt that I should
make a creditable use of my freedom, in
pretty hard study. I... shall try to make
whatever reading I can do bear on psycho-
logical subjects. 3
1. Perry, TCWJ, I,“2E8T~"
2. H. James, LWJ, I, 154.
3. Ibid.
,
154.
t.
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Two letters written in 1868 reveal that for him, hy that
time, physiology was hut a stepping-stone to the wider field
he believed to he opening in psychology. To Thomas W.Ward,
a close confidant, he spoke of "hovering and dipping about
1
the portals of psychology," Even more apparent is his
feeling in a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, from
Dresden in the same year:
I had hoped, • • that I might he able to get
working at physiology, not that I have any
special interest in its details, hut that
there is work for somebody to do, and I have
a (erroneous suspicion that psychology is
not a l*ordre du jour until some as yet un-
foreseen steps are made in the physiology
of the nervous system). 2
Physiology was not an end in itself ever. Although his pur-
pose in studying it was perhaps never quite clear in James T s
mind initially, later facts seem to hear out his conviction
that the problems of psychology were his real interests, and
physiology could help him to understand the relation of the
form and functions of bodily organs including the nervous
system to mental and bodily activities, Ho psychology could
ever be scientific until these relations were established.
ii. Physiological Psychology
His desire for work in this field was granted when, in
1873, he assumed a position as instructor in natural History,
teaching comparative anatomy and the physiology of vertebrates.
1. terry, TCWJ, I, 286, 287.
2, Perry, TCWJ, I, 512.
J 1 •»
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To these he added in 1876 the first course in physiological
1
psychology and began his psychological laboratory.
It should be noted that his subject was
really physiological psychology, and that...
one may discern a patient surrender to
limitations imposed by the state of his
health on one hand and on the other, a
sound sense of the value of physiology to
psychological investigations and so to
philosophy.
2
His teaching of science was welcomed by James as a "diversion
from those introspective studies which had bred a sort of
3
philosophical hypochondria in me of late." The course in
Physiological Psychology was transferred to the department
of Philosophy in 1877, as "Psychology." His ideal was be-
ginning to be realized in a small way,— an ideal which he
4
had proposed the year before in Hation
,
recommending that
philosophy and science be studied together, philosophers
being required to study physiological psychology.
1. James set apart space for a student laboratory about 1874-
76, probably the first such in America. Mftnsterberg, who
had studied under Wundt and later developed a laboratory
at Freiburgf1887-1892) was brought to Harvard to create
a first-class laboratory in 1892 and funds were then
granted by Harvard for its equipment. Cf. Boring, HEP,
420, 615 ff.
2. H. James, LWJ, I, 165.
3. Ibid
. , 167.
4. Perry, ABWJ, 6. (In a note on Revue Philo sophique, Nation,
22 (1876), 147.)
* < >
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ill. Scientific Ideal
James* s vacillation between many fields of interest was
characteristic of his temperament, and many of his seemingly
dogmatic statements expressing disdain for a particular field
need to be considered in the light of his own moods, his ill
health, and his uncertainty as to the "way his soul should
go." His tastes matured slowly, and many side-roads were
travelled along the way. One thing, however, remained always
dominant— his scientific ideal.
Prom the time of Aristotle until the late nineteenth cen-
tury, psychology was in the main purely speculative, crudely
descriptive, or a mixture of both. Biological influences gave
the first real impetus to its consideration as a scientific
study, leading eventually to its divorce from metaphysical
1
problems. As biological concepts began to work their magic,
the notion of faculties and the old associationistic psychology
began to lose hold.
James was really the first man in America to express the
great necessity for changing the status and subject-matter of
psychology. His rigorous scientific spirit is pointed out by
Perry as clearly manifest as early as 1868, in James* s re-
view of Darwin* s "Variations of Animals and Plants under
Domestication"
,
in which James accuses Darwin of relying on
1. Of. J.S. Moore, PP, 42 ff. for a study of this period in
the history of psychology, and the contrast between rational
and empirical psychology.
rn
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1
"ingenious reasoning*” The same year found him writing to
a friend from Europe, where he had "been conversing with Helm-
holtz and Wilhelm Wundt, "It seems to me that perhaps the
2
time has come for psychology to begin to be a science." His
scientific temper was further directed against those specula-
tive scientists who pretended the authority of science in
3
dealing with ultimate problems.
Growing directly out of his study of the natural sciences,
his own scientific ideal was apparent in his Principles which
appeared in 1890. The mental states with which psychology
dealt were to be explained in terms of psychological origin
and physiological conditions; only in this way could psychology
be of any value in application to other regions of thought and
life.
Finally, in 1892, he wrote his famous essay: "A Plea for
Psychology as a ’Natural Science*":
Psychology... is today hardly more than what
physics was before Galileo, what chemistry was
before Lavoisier,... a mass of phenomenal
1. Perry, ABWJ, 1. (Review in Atlantic Monthly
,
22 (1868 ) ,122-124.
)
2. H. James, LWJ, I, 119.
3. Perry. ABWJ, 4. (Letter to the editor of the Nation
.
19(1874),
437, entitled "The Mood of Science and the Mood of Faith",
and signed "Ignoramus.")

19
description, gossip, myth, including, however,
real material enough to justify one in the hope
that with judgment and good will on the part
of those interested, its study may he so organ-
ized even now as to become worthy of the name
of natural science, 1
All questions of the nature of the physical world, the prob-
lem of immortality, the existence of the soul, the problem
of epistemology were to be referred to the philosopher.
Krapelin*s experiments in abnormal psychology were al-
ready under way in Munich; experimental psychology was pro-
gressing in Russia, Germany, and America. James continued to
lend his growing influence toward the elimination of meta-
physical questions, and making psychology* s aims and field
more scientific and coherent,
nevertheless, we are not to suppose that James made
science an idol, before which all men must bow. He had no
use for a science which had lost its soul, or pretended to
absolute authority in all things. It was partly this feeling
3
that led him beyond psychology into philosophical endeavor.
5. Experimentation
i. Experimental Laboratory
The question of priority in the founding of experimental
psychology is a moot one. Most authorities credit Wundt with
1. W. James, CER, 316. (Reprinted from the Philosophical Review,
1 (1892), 146-153.)
2. See Perry, TCWJ, 1,53 ff. for detailed discussion of James*
s
endeavors in this direction.
3. Discussed in Chapter III, 4, ii.
'.
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the establishment of the first experimental laboratory in
1
1879, It is certainly true that much great work hacl been
done in Germany. Fechner in 1860 had formulated that law of
the relation between intensity of stimuli and intensity of
sensation which, revised by Weber, is a basic law of psycho-
physics. Helmholtz in Berlin was devoting his attention to
the eye, ear, and nervous system. Wundt was studying the
functions of the sense-organs, the nervous system, the parts
of the body relating to mental processes. Yet, in America,
William James was, as we have seen already, offering instruc-
tion in what ought to have been called physiological psychol-
ogy as early as 1875, and had already given his students as
much space as he could allow for conducting experiments in
1876, a year before the Leipzig Institute was established.
Whatever the exact date when experimental psychology "at last
2
received the dignity of a 'local habitation and a name'", it
is safe to say this much — that James was the great propulsive
power in establishing scientific psychology in America, as
Wundt was in Germany, and Pavlov in Russia. The next two
decades saw rapid progress made in Germany under such men as
Stumpf, G.E. Muller, Ebbinghaus, and Kulpe, and in America,
in the hands of G. Stanley Hall, Hugo Munsterberg, James
McKeen Cattell, and Watson.
1. Cf. Hew Standard Encyclopedia
,
25 (1931-1937), 376; Ledger
Wood k s article in DP, 104; Murphy, OAP, Introduction.
2. Murphy, OAP, xv.
Q?<**
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ii. Psychical Research
21
James* s interest in experimental psychology was not an
all-absorbing one. His laboratory work was something he
deemed absolutely essential for a truly scientific psychology,
but it remained a "personal conviction with (him); it never
1
became a personal habit." Temperamentally unsuited as he
was to such work, he was happy to turn all of it over to
Hugo Munsterberg, who was called from the University of
Freiburg to Harvard in 1892 upon James’s recommendation. To
Munsterberg must go the credit for creating a first-class
laboratory at Harvard.
Yet James’s experimental, scientific spirit continued
to make itself apparent in another direction— an interest
which was little understood and often misconstrued in his
life-time* As early as 1869 he had urged the study of test
2
cases of spiritistic occurrences, and throughout the years
which followed this interest in psychical research continued.
His Gifford Lecture series in 1902 embodied his studies in
"morbid psychology and in that parvenu science known as psy-
3
chical research." While the interest was never wholly lost,
it diminished somewhat in later years; to the end of his life,
however, he felt that these studies would ultimately attain
moring, THHF ”'495.
2. Perry, ABWJ, 2. (Review of E. Sargent’s Blanchette; or the
Despair of Science, in Boston Daily Advertiser. March 10,
1869.
)
3. Perry, ISWJ, 17.
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’’the recognition which their labors ... deserve, and...
make, perhaps, the most important contribution of all to
1
the pile*’’ His interest in this direction illustrates
James’s unbiased spirit, his desire to make way for all
the facts, of whatever origin and nature.
6* Interests which influenced his psychology
James’s first and greatest psychological work, his
Principles of Psychology (1890) reiterated his conception
of psychology as a ’’natural science, accepting certain terms
uncritically as her data, and stopping short of metaphysical
8
reconstruction”, and his disdain for those psychologists who
based their theories only on a priori or "quasi-metaphysical”
grounds— an "unwarrantable impertinence in the present state
3
of psychology.”
Hi rs own lack of clarity concerning definite boundary-
lines may be seen in the inclusion of many topics and prob-
lems which are essentially philosophical. Perry’s belief
that the many philosophical names and terminology occurring
throughout the Principles are accounted for "mainly by the
fact that he believed philosophy to be the only means of
attaining the very emancipation of psychology from philosophy
4
which he sought” is, at most, only a partial truth. It seems
1. James, CER, 320.
2. James, PP, I, 137.
3. Ibid., I, 138.
4. Ferry, TCWJ, II, 72.
II
r
'
23
more probable that they are attributable to the condition
of the time, and James 1 s understandable uncertainty as to
definite limits. His psychological study and work was ac-
complished in a day of transition; small wonder if, in writ-
ing a book so revolutionary to clarify psychology's status,
some of the confusion should be found coloring its pages.
In his psychological writings, there may be found many
evidences of definite interests— some personal, some sci-
entific, some philosophical— which helped to shape the kind
of psychology presented by him. In the next few pages we
shall endeavor to indicate some of these interests.
i. Empiricism
Despite the confusion noted above, the Principles
effected a radical change by enthroning the empirical, sci-
entific method in psychology. James was concerned always
with particulars, a fact which markedly influenced his phil-
osophy and his contempt for monism. But by particulars
James meant all particulars, all facts, and he made as much
of exceptions as of the rule. "Empirical" signified the
application of scientific method to any and every fact. The
influence of Agassiz, and his own work in experimentation
had convinced him that methodology in psychology had to be
the positivistic view of natural science, although, as we
shall see, he could not accept all of the limits which were
imposed.
- - ’
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Three methods are justified and essential, said James
—
1
the introspective, even though "difficult and fallible" ;
the experimental, based on direct observation and experiment;
and the comparative, which considers history, social and moral
institutions* As in all sciences, certain assumptions must
be made, certain data accepted uncritically. Consequently,
the views of psychology are not ultimate ones. That the
Principles emphasizes this point so much, and contains so
much that is not strictly psychological, shows James's un-
willingness to remain content with establishing the physio-
logical or psychological data of controversial issues.
ii. Functionalism
Against the structural psychologists, with their em-
phasis on conscious states, James introduced the Darwinian
concept of biological function. Some consider that his great-
est contribution was "his formulation of a modern biological
2
interpretation of mind." The mind is active; it is primarily
3
teleological; it is, as Boring indicates, "an organ with a
4
function in the psycho-physical economy." It was James's
belief from beginning to end that the mind is purposive.
1. James, PP, I, 191.
2. Muelder and Sears, DAP, 313.
3. James, PSY, 4.
4. Boring, HEP, 501.
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1
and real ends are sought. Hot only are real ends sought,
hut there are purposes at work in the world. This idea
found its way into the concept of the self as a ’’fighter
for ends”, of the mind as interested, selective, of life as
ongoing, moving, dynamic.
James cannot, however, he "tagged" as a functionalist
as we know functionalism today; nor is it possible to class-
ify him according to any particular school of thought. It
was his essential genius to break up the ground, point out
the possibilities, allow his fertile imagination to range far
and wide; if the Principles is called the "field potential"
for American psychology in all of its many ramifications,
we may not be far from wrong.
iii. Synthetic vs. elementaristic view
In line with the above, James rejected the atomistic
view of consciousness for the configurationist principle.
German psychology was primarily elementaristic; the mind
was analyzable into a series of discrete elements. To this
view James opposed the "stream of thought" idea. Elementar-
ism was an example of analytic method gone haywire; intro-
spection and observation saw "wholes", not discrete elements.
Here, as in all of its writings, we recognize James’s feeling
1* Cf. Perry’s comment that there was "one germinal idea from
which his whole thought grew". CER, ix.
, \ -
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1
of responsibility for "putting Humpty-Dumpty together again."
likewise we may discern why it has been said that "he began
2
Gestaltpsychologie a quarter of a century before its birth."
The enlargement of psychological data indicated above
was, he felt, fully justified in view of the transition-
period. He felt that he and his generation had been
fed on the chopped stream
of psychology and associationism long enough,
and as if a little vastness, even though it
went with vagueness, as of some moist wind
from far away, ... would be welcome. 3
Psychology needed clear limits, but James wanted a view "au
large."
iv. Artistic interest
At least one of the influences which led James to es-
pouse an "omnibus" psychology was his artistic interest.
Originally James had undertaken the serious study of art
with the intention of pursuing it as his career, but despite
his talent in that direction, his scientific interest won
out, and led him after a year or two to decide that this was
4 5
not to be his vocation. Grattan suggests that the clue
to the abandonment of this career is to be found in his
lack of visualizing power, which James recognized as a
r." Perry, Art. (1943), 123.
2. Boring, HEP, 499.
3. James, PU, 6.
4. See H. James* s USB, 109 ff. concerning this conflict
between the artistic and scientific. Also Kallen's brief
discussion in PWJ, 21 ff.
5. Grattan, TTJ, lll,n.
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serious deficiency:
I am myself a good draughtsman, and have a
very lively interest in pictures, statues,
architecture and decoration, and a keen
sensibility to artistic effect. But I am
an extremely poor visualizer, and find my-
self often unable to reproduce in my mind's
eye pictures which I have most carefully
examined. 1
Whether this is the reason or not, it remains true that
the artistic spirit played a vital role in all of his
thinking and writing. Its influence is seen in his lit-
erary style, in his keenness for detail, and his dramatic
pictures of the panorama of life. He assimilated the
artistic interest to the scientific, so that, although the
scientific won his allegiance, it was a Pyrrhonic victory.
The sensibilities and skill developed in
the studio, with its demands upon fine dis-
criminations of outline and tint, upon or-
dered arrangement of sharply yet not obviously
distinguished items and upon centered wholes,
found themselves brought into play in the
observation and reproduction of biological
specimens and chemical mixtures. James's
training in art became the fertile appercep- 2
tive background for his discipline in science.
Although the ideal of science seemed to be a strict posi-
tivism, James could not allow the panorama of life to be
restricted. So we find him enlarging the concept of experi-
ence, where others would enclose it in tight boundaries.
Facts were not to be found only on the lower levels, but on
the higher levels, too.
1. James PP
2. Kallen, PWJ, Introduction, 21
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v. Ethical interest
The influence of his interest in ethics is clearly
seen in his Principles from which he found it impossible
to omit a depth of moral tone and appeal which led hundreds
of men and women to write to him of what it had "meant” to
1
them to read this book. The ethical approach was to him of
primary significance. Of what value was any psychology or
philosophy which did not consider the motivating powers of
ethical ideals ? Of what importance was any science if it
made no difference to men ? It was this conviction which
led him to stress ethical factors, to devote entire sections
of his psychological works to the significance certain as-
pects of psychology had for hortatory ethics, and to empha-
size emotional and subjective preferences as determining
agents for the ethical life. It was this conviction which
led him to reject a Spencerian evolutionism which denied
the significance of the moral struggle, and to espouse in-
determinism as basic to his psychology and his philosophy,
necessary for personal, moral action.
vi. Religious interest
Throughout all of his life James displayed a lively
interest in religious things. He was not a religious man
in the sense of holding to a particular creed, or realizing
in his own life a peculiar religious experience. We shall
17
-
See""tWJ, I, 300.
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' discuss this more at length in our chapter on his phil-
1
osophy. The Varieties of Religious Experience represents
his attempt to bring the support of scientific psychology
to the field of religious experience. Despite its almost
exclusive emphasis on "morbid” psychology and mystical ex-
periences, it contains much that is significant for religion
and for James f s later philosophy. The empirical point of
view is upheld, and the validity of religious experience
found in its fruits in conduct. The ideal and the real are
dynamically interrelated; there are "no principles (existent)
2
which make no difference in facts."
7. Main Psychological Doctrines
The most significant doctrine in his psychology is that
of the "stream of consciousness". In the text of the disserta-
tion we shall see how this idea influenced his entire phil-
3
osophy. Along with this must be considered what Thorndike
believes to be his most important discovery—the existence
of fringes of mental states and their implications for many
4
of the problems that have troubled mankind.
James considered one of the most significant steps in
psychology to be Frederick Myers* concept of the"subliminal"
in 1886— "extra-marginal and outside of the primary con-
5
sciousness altogether." This doctrine received much
Yl See Chapter IV, 3.
2. James, VRE, 511.
3. See Chapter V,3; also VI, 1.
4. Thorndike, Art. (1943), 87-94.
5. James, VRE, 228.
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attention in the Varieties and in his later philosophical
writings, and united with his focus-fringe idea of conscious-
ness to open the way to new answers for many issues. Here
again we see the extent to which much of James’s work con-
sisted in opening up the field of possibilities. As Grattan
suggests, he could not have foreseen the extent to which
Freud would carry this concept of the unconscious, nor the
opening into psycho-analysis, nor the growth of abnormal
psychology, but its importance is seen and recognized in
his application of it to explain ’’all sorts of psychological
phenomena like psychical happenings, split personality,
multiple personalities, sudden accesses of previously un-
1
tapped energies, and the religious experience,"
James’s theory of emotion was another radical conception.
Although it is not particularly significant for this disserta-
tion, it must be mentioned in any consideration of his main
psychological doctrines. The perception of bodily changes,
said James, is the emotion. Emotions are the result of
bodily changes, and not the cause. Experiments along this
line since James’s time have tended to justify this theory
2
in certain respects, but psychologists are still divided
on the question.
Mention could be made of other important doctrines
—
that of the Self, the Will, the teleological nature of the
T. Grattan, TTJ, 363.
2. Boring, HEP, 502, ff.
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Mind, etc. Since these and other subjects are treated
fully in Chapters V and VI of this dissertation, no further
consideration is necessary here. It is sufficient to note
that almost all of the controversial issues considered later
in his philosophy are to be found "in germ" in the Principles .
8. General Influence
William James had a vast influence, both in America
and abroad. He was, however, better known in Europe as a
psychologist than as a philosopher. It is safe to say that
his influence was not a doctrinal one, but a personal one.
His psychological writings (as also his philosophical ones)
were never pedantic. James put himself into his books,
setting before men the noblest side of his own nature with
the style of an artist and the spirit of a great man.
Convictions and ideas came to him, so to
speak, from the subsoil. He had a pro-
phetic sympathy with the dawning sentiments
of the age, with the moods of the dumb ma-
jority. His scattered words caught fire
in many parts of the world. 1
He observed closely, watched reactions, translated detail
into large conclusions, and with it all managed to infuse
his works with the highest of ethical standards and ideals.
There was a hortatory strain in him that
would not down. And his struggles to
express himself were occasioned as much
by a desire to speak inspiringly as to
1. G. Santayana, WOP, 204
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1
speak clearly, accurately, scientifically.
It may be true that the deletion of many sections with moral
overtones and expressions of his personal douhts concerning
ultimate things might make the Principles truer to his sci-
entific ideal of dispassionateness but it would not make it
a better book, certainly not so influential a one beyond the
boundaries of the profession.
Its philosophical influences are many and varied; a de-
tailed consideration of these will be found in the text.
Hodgson considered the Principles a distinct contribution
2
to philosophy, while Dewey called it "the spiritual pro-
3
genitor of the whole industry", referring to the entire
philosophical movement to which James gave impetus.
We have recognized the two predominant influences in
James 1 s thinking— the scientific ideal and his growing
philosophical interest. Gr.S. Hall deplored his mixture of
science and philosophy, scorned him for "yearning" after a
soul-psychology, and called him an "impressionist in psy-
4
chology." To all who thus criticized him, James* s answer
can be found in a letter to Stumpf, in 1892:
A psychologist* s merit seems to me, in
the present condition of that science,
17 Grattan, 'W, 133.
2. Perry, TCWJ, I, 644.
3. Ibid.
,
644.
4. Matthiessen, JB*, 350.
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to consist much less in the definiteness
of his conclusions than in his suggestiveness
and fertility. 1
Perhaps it was because James was "a collector rather than
2
an interior decorator”
,
and because hiB philosophical world-
view spirit overshadowed the limits set by scientific method,
that his influence had been so widely felt. While he was not
a "school” philosopher, nor can we trace any one school in
psychology today bach to him, nevertheless, we can find some-
thing in almost all schools— introspectionists, psycho-
analytical, behaviorist, Gestalt, Akt, functional— which is
also found in part in James. His influence in helping to
raise psychology to a scientific level cannot be gainsaid;
nor can anyone despise the impetus which he gave to experi-
mental techniques, and the consideration of exceptional men-
tal states. But all of these particular influences are as
nothing compared to the influence of his inquiring spirit,
his fertile imagination, on those who were to develop the
fledgling science.
Without the healthy vitamin which he injected
into it, psychology might have spent itself,
in the early days, on sterile experiments
with chromoscopes and tachistoscopes. 3
Perry calls him one of the "first of the scientific psy-
chologists and one of the last of the philosophical
4
psychologists.” As such he represents better than any
other the transition-period in psychology.
1. Perry, TdWj, 'll, 180.
2. Perry, ISWJ, 80.
3. Roback, WJ, 304.
4. Perry, Art. (1943), 122.
,•
{
1
'
«
'
f t
* «
CHAPTER III
THE CHANGE PROM PSYCHOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY
The problem of the present chapter is decidedly sig-
nificant for any study of James* s thought. His shift in
interest and emphasis from psychology to philosophy has
puzzled students of both fields; hence our initial task is
to ascertain the limits of this transition-period, if such
it be, and the events, interests and ideas in the life and
experience of James which occasioned the transition. Such
a causal analysis may contribute to at least three things:
fl) Understanding of the psychological and philosophical
ideals which James held; (2) Understanding of his conception
of the relative importance of the two fields; (3) Insight
into the relations existing between his psychological and
philosophical interests and analyses.
1. Preliminary Considerations
Certain things must be remembered if an accurate de-
scription of this transition-period is to be given, together
with an adequate idea of the causes found significant. One
is the impossibility of making any sharp distinction between
the two phases of James *s experience . Any attempt at such a
separation must necessarily be arbitrary, as is that of Ur.
Newhall in positing the year 1891 as the conclusion of the
1. J. Newhall, dissertation, 22.
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psychological and the beginning of the philosophical phase.
James did not arrive at a certain point in his thinking at
which he forsook psychology and turned his attention to phil
osophy exclusively. The attempt to divide a life into def-
initely marked phases is convenient for considering some
authors, hut not James. Perry* s attempt to divide his writ-
ings into four phases (his early philosophical thinking; the
Principles of Psychology ; moral, social and religious ques-
tions; and metaphysics) is better than most, but cannot be
adhered to strictly. The changes were only in emphasis; the
1
interests were "synchronous and interrelated”, "oscillatory
2
rather than cyclical." It has been suggested that his in-
terest and thought were occasioned by the subjects which he
taught, e.g. his courses in physiology interesting him in
psychology, this in turn directing his attention to phil-
osophy, and there can be little doubt that this succession
of subjects helped in the determination of his thought. But,
as his son points out:
Whatever may have been the succession of his
college courses, psychology and philosophy
were never divorced from each other, in his
thought or in his writings. 3
His written works always reveal a definite relation between
the two, the psychological method and conclusions checking
and facilitating the philosophical, and the philosophical
1. Perry, TCWJ, I, x.
2. Ibid.
,
I, 449.
3. B!. James
,
LWJ, I, 166.
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conclusions and attitude supplementing and synthesizing the
psychological. The interrelations resulting from this unity
will he our major concern in Chapters V and VI.
Another thing to he remembered is the fact that James
held to the necessity of both studies . Failures and mis-
takes were apparent in both, but the same could be said of
almost any field. In 1876, when his psychological interest
was developing, glimmerings of a need for unity of psychol-
ogy and philosophy appeared in a review entitled "Bain and
1
Renouvier. " At that time and even later on James felt that
Renouvier exemplified the true combination of psychological
method and philosophical synthesis in facing the problems of
experience.
The next thing to be borne in mind is this— that psy-
chology and philosophy were not so distinct in James *8 day
as they are in our own. This has already been indicated in
a previous chapter. As Miss Margaret Munsterberg said, com-
menting on James T s invitation to her father, Hugo Munsterberg,
to join the department of philosophy at Harvard as experimental
psychologist, "Psychology was an organic part of philosophy
2
then." It was not until 1910 that James could write:
At this very moment we are seeing two sciences,
psychology and general biology, drop off from
the parent trunk and take independent root as
specialties. 3
1. W. James, CER, 26-35.
2. lecture. Psychology Seminar, Boston University, October 15,
1941.
3. T7. James, SPP, 88.
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One final thing should be remembered— that his psycho-
logical and phllosophioal interests need always to be related
to his religious interest* Vie shall discuss this more fully
in another chapter, but it must be mentioned here in order to
prepare us for some of the problems which James faces* One of
his greatest works. The Varieties of Religious Experience
,
is
the outgrowth of this relation between all three interests.
2. Home Influences
James 1 s home background constituted a unique part of
his training, and has particular bearing upon the problem
we are seeking to understand*
i* Intellectual atmosphere
The atmosphere of the James home was intellectually
challenging, and each member of the family was invited to
participate in the discussions which were every-day affairs.
Questions of taste, morals, literature, religion, philosophy,
were considered before the growing children, and encourage-
ment given to them to understand and evaluate the vital issues.
Emerson, Thackeray, Carlyle and others were familiar
figures at many of these discussions; and, while James may
not have derived much of his philosophy from them, he gained
much in the style of his thought and writing. He spoke in
!• See Chapter IY, 3; also Chapter II, 6, vi.
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later years of the value which accrued to his experience
1
from exercising his mind in "the art of combative thinking"
as an idea was thrown into the conversational mill by these
famous men. It was in his home that James’s initial phil-
osophical interest was bora.
The James household was distinguished by an atmosphere
of freedom— freedom of speech, decision, activity*. The
influence of this atmosphere made itself felt as the sons
entered the vocational field; abrupt decisions were warned
against, with the reminder that "men’s first calling is to
2
be men." Here then is one thing which ipay well have con-
tributed to the transition from physiology to psychology to
philosophy,— not the vacillation of James, but the influence
of a home training where the pursuit of one’s bent was en-
couraged, and hasty choices discouraged in order that nature
and circumstances might direct the way in their proper time.
Above all else James was a man first; his career is in one
respect the unfolding of his natural interests, but a law of
liberty directed the pursuit of his destiny.
ii. Influence of father
It must be apparent to all that James’s father exerted
an influence upon his son which cannot be ignored or dis-
paraged. James expressed his filial debt to him thus:
1. Perry, TCWJ, I, 172.
2. Ibid ., I, 171.
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For me the humor, the good spirits, the
humanity, the faith in the divine, and
the sense of his right to have a say about
the deepest reasons of the universe, are
what will stay by me. 1
Much that we find in William James may be found in his
father, too. Both men were at times "voices crying in the
wilderness”— the father proclaiming the message which was
met by a general attitude of sympathetic disdain, the son
meeting much the same thing directed against his "will to
believe" and his pragmatism. Both men seemed possessed of
an inward "daemon" urging them on to proclaim a vital truth.
Both men were often beset by a constant feeling of futility.
The same distaste for orthodoxy, institutionalism, ecclesias-
ticism, may be found in William James as is found in his
father's theological writings. Both men were champions of
the weak, and constant assailants of the strong and entrenched.
And, as we have suggested, Henary James liked people, enjoyed
conversation; his son's life and writings reveal the same
yearning after life in all of its richness.
Yet the two were remarkably different, too. James did
not derive his skepticism from his father, who once said,
2
"A skeptical state I have never known for a moment." From
James's early philosophical thinking it is apparent that for
him philosophy began with doubting and was tested by the
3
critical, skeptical spirit. Henry James helped himself to
1. H. James, LWJ, I, 221.
2. H. James, HSB, 235. Cf. Perry,TCWJ,I,146:"He believed in
believing."
3. Cf. Perry TCWJ, I, 150,151 on the intellectual element in
which H. James lived.
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Ms beliefs in an eclectic fasMon, after others had thought
them through; 7/illiam James had to seek Ms beliefs the hard
way, Henry James* s pMlosophy was one of intuition and in-
spiration; Ms son*s thought, wMle it partakes of the intu-
itive, was in the main critical, analytical, the product of
perspiration, brooding, doubting, struggling, led on by the
scientific ideal which Ms father disavowed. But, although
William followed empirical pathway on which Ms father re-
fused to travel, it remains true that his interest in pMl-
osopMcal pursuits may be traced in part to his father*
s
ideals.
3. Illnesses
From 1867 until 1876 James knew extensive periods of
depression and morbidness. TMs was due in part to Ms
longing for something fundamental about wMch he could orient
Ms life, but far more to the illnesses which beset Mm and
exhausted his strength; these illnesses continued to plague
Mm all of Ms life. The pMlosophical tendency was magnified
by the very doubts which tormented Mm and clamored for solu-
tion. His son says of tMs period that it
gave a personal intimacy and intensity to
the deepest problems that pMlosophy and
religion can present to man’s understanding...
Clearly it developed and deepened the bed in
wMch the stream of Ms philosophic life was
to flow. 1
ITST"James", ’ EWJ, I, 85
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At times, his despondency seems almost to have assumed
pathological proportions. His letters during this period,
particularly to Thomas W. Ward, a close friend and confidant,
are those of a man with keen powers of self-analysis, on the
verge of complete panic and fear. In the Varieties there is
graphically pictured the experience of a man in the depths
of despair and gloom,— an experience which James later ad-
2
mitted as his own. Constant ill health, his feeling of aim-
lessness, and his continuing search for orientation led him
increasingly to the consideration of problems of the moral
order first of all. Questions of metaphysical importance
came later, but derived much of their significance for him
from that gloomy period in which he was thrown back upon his
own moral and intellectual resources in fighting despair.
4. General Purposes of His Life
Prom what has already been said, it may be seen that
any condemnation of James for vacillation between many in-
terests or lack of any general purpose, is the result of
superficial study only. The deeper study gives us the pict-
ure of a man whose life was filled with many purposes, many
decisions to be made, many things to be done. He yearned
for security, intellectually and spiritually, and kept moving
constantly to find the answers to his problems. Those who
1* H. James, LWJ, I, 119, 127; see also 132.
2. Ltr. to Monsieur Abauzit in LWJ, I, 149 note.
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knew him best point out that many seeming paradoxes in his
1
life are there because he attempted to live to the full, to
understand and appreciate everything. Life was interesting,
rich, replete with surprises. Santayana, one of his very
famous pupils, wrote of him:
He kept his mind and heart open to all that
might seem, to polite minds, odd, personal,
or visionary in religion and philosophy* He
gave a sincerely respectful hearing to senti-
mentalists, mystics, spiritualists, wizards,
cranks, quacks, and impostors... He thought,
with his usual modesty, that any of these
might have something to teach him. 2
But, in considering the purposes of his life we must
go deeper. What did James feel that he had to do ? What
did he find to be the essential purpose of his life ? What,
for him,were the most important problems ? All of these
things were inextricably bound up in the solving of the prob-
lems of his own life. What could he believe which would give
him the assurance with which to face life ? The whole ques-
tion of man's relation to the universe boiled down to "James's
place in the universe*" The problem was by no means an ab-
stract one for him; panic, fear, insecurity gripped him as
he sought the answer to his problem* It was this which gave
to his writings so much that is gripping and inspiring, and
which makes his books remain alive today despite the abandon-
ment of most of his doctrines*
1* "It is the amount of life that a man feels that makes you
value his mind." Ltr* to his brother, June 3,1876, in LWJ,
I, 185.
2. Santayana, WOD, 205.
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The problem of determinism and free-will had haunted
him. It was at this point that he faced a blank wall. Sci-
ence asserted complete determinism
,
and if the mechanistic
conception of life was true, then he must surrender his will
to it.
I'm swamped in an empirical philosophy.
I feel that we are Nature through and
through, that we are wholly conditioned,
that not a wiggle of our will happens save
as the result of physical laws; and yet,
notwithstanding, we are en rappo rt with
reason. —How to conceive it Y $ho knows?
... It is not that we are all nature, but
some point which is reason, but that all
is nature and all is reason, too. We shall
see, damn it, we shall see....
1
His rescue came with the second reading of Renouvier's
Essais
,
in which Renouvier defined free will as the ability
to sustain thought because I so choose to, when I might have
other thoughts. The act is free, a "moral act, a crisis of
the soul. Nothing necessitates it. We therefore become free
2
by acting as if we are free.” James's notebook entry on
April 30, 1870, raised his Ebenezer to this gleam of light.
No illusion. My first act of free will
shall be to believe in free will... I will
posit life (the real, the good Jin the self-
governing resistance of the ego to the world.
Life shall be built in doing and suffering and
creating. 3
Although years were to elapse before he had lifted himself
1. Ltr. to Thomas W. Ward in 1869, LWJ,
2. Allan, ROP, 153.
3. H. James, LWJ, I, 148.
I, 152
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completely out of the pit, this one experience was akin to
his religious conversion* His gratitude to Renouvier was
heart-felt:
Gr&ce a vous, je possede pour la premiere fois
une conception intelligible et raisonnable de
la Libert^* Je m f y suis rang^” a peu prfcs* Sur
d'autres points de votre philosophic il me
reste encore des doutes, mais je puis dire
que par elle je commence a renal tre 'S la vie
morale; et croyez, monsieur, que ce n T est pas
une petite chose* 1
It was what he needed— a right to believe, to see some
meaning in life which went beyond the mechanistic conception
of it which science had presented. "The mechanistic doctrine
could not be proved, and his own will to believe pulled him
2
out of the pit." It not only saved him, but renewed his in-
terest in philosophy not as an abstract study, but as a living
issue* For this reason, too, it may be that his Principles
of Psychology deals so extensively with philosophical issues;
he had gained a conviction that science did not hold all of
the answers to life. His melioristic position grew out of
this conviction; so, also, we find him disregarding the bound-
aries between psychology and philosophy in his doctrine of
belief, allowing for emotional preferences; and his central
purpose in life became a gospel of belief which resulted in
a gospel of action*
1. Ibid., I, 163, 164.
2. Mead, Art. (1930), 224
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5. Difficulties Attending Psychology
The difficulties attending the psychological field were
for James almost innumerable. It took him ten years to write
the Principles ; and as he recognized the tremendous amount of
work which remained to be done before a really authoritative
manual could be compiled, he decided that his one contribution
to the field would have to suffice.
Infinitely more numerous are the difficulties
of the task than the means of their solution.
Every chapter bristles with obstructions that
refer one to the next ten years for their
mitigation. 1
He lacked the time and strength to devote to the work essential.
2
Another factor already discussed in Chapter II had its
bearing on the transition-period— his natural dislike for
experimental work, which he always postponed in favor of other,
3
more interesting things. But more important still was the
failure of the psychological ideal. The more he labored in
the field, the more he realized that psychology was still in
4
an "ante-scientific condition", "like physics before Galileo's
5
time— not a single elementary law yet caught a glimpse of."
Even in his own thinking, the ideal was not quite clear. He
seems to have wavered between his desire to make psychology
a natural science, and an equally strong desire to make of it
1. H. James, LWJ, I, 231.
2. Chapter II, 5, ii.
3. H. James, LWJ, 301.
4. Ibid., 296.
5. Ibid., II, i n.
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1
what Perry calls an "omnibus psychology." His real con-
cern was that psychology become truly scientific, and not
2
merely ape the manners and methods of science; yet, although
he called for a "strictly positivistic" science, his posi-
tivism was exceedingly liberal, excluding no facts of experi-
ence, no insights, and refusing to be limited by the particular
psycho-physics of his day. He deplored a merely descriptive
3
psychology, as was G.T. Ladd T s feeling that exploration into
causes was far more fruitful. He criticized Spencer for deal-
4
ing with philosophical problems in his psychology, and yet
his own philosophical interests and attitude permeated his
own psychology and led him to theorize about those problems
with which no natural science ought to deal. It is our be-
lief that James never clearly defined for himself the rela-
tions between psychology and philosophy, and much of his
disgust with the condition of psychology in his time was the
result of his experience in the field and the lack of clarity
even in his own mind about definite boundaries. To this may
be added the fact that in psychology he does not seem to have
found the solution to his basic demand for spiritual and in-
tellectual security.
The limitations of psychology with regard to methodology
5
offer another reason for his espousal of the philosophical field.
I'."' "terry, I'SWT,"' VS,' 79.
'
2. W. James, PP, I, vi; also PSY, 1,2.
3. W. James, CER, 344-345.
4. Ibid., 45, 46.
5. The question of methodology receives fuller consideration
in Chapter Y, 1.
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Purely descriptive psychology was a sterile endeavor; far
more than mere analysis was necessary. How far then would
he go ? It is certain that we cannot, on the basis of the
record, number him among the positivists in any real way;
he would find the restrictions of modern positivism stifling
and stultifying. He would align himself with Locke, Berkeley
and Hume in asserting the dangers of a priori speculation, but
reject any narrow concept of experience and of scientific
method* "He accepted any method, principle, or technique for
its positive fruits, but repudiated its negations, prohibi-
1
tions, and orthodoxies." His refusal to be limited by any
methodology which was untrue to the wide range of experience
resulted in his pragmatism, and the pragmatic method. It is
worthy of note that the Harvard Commission which in 1947 con-
sidered the role of psychology in a university has recognized
the necessity for enlarging methodology, for "freedom to ex-
plore, to examine new sources for hypothesis or interpreta-
2
tion," certainly in line with James's demand for fer-
tility in investigation.
We have reached now the very heart of the problem— the
reasons for the transition from psychology to philosophy.
For, along with the limitations of methodology and other
factors influencing James, none is so important as his con-
cept of the relative values of the two fields, and his idea
1. Perry, Art. (1943), 124
2. PPIU, 5, 6.
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of the roles which they respectively have to play. It may
well be best to consider his attitude and reasons in order,
summarizing the important factors which led James beyond psy-
chology into philosophy.
(1) Sense-experience is not the only source of knowledge.
The tendency to discard introspection completely, or to dis-
miss its findings because so fallible and lacking in object-
ivity, James deplored. Introspective findings were, of course,
fallible, but nevertheless facts of our experience, subject
to interpretation and evaluation in the light of other find-
ings.
Something is before us; we do our best to
tell what it is, but in spite of our good
will we may go astray, and give a descrip-
tion more applicable to some other sort of
thing. The only safeguard is in the final
consensus of our farther knowledge about the
thing in question, later views correcting
earlier ones, until at last the harmony of
a consistent system is reached. 1
James’s "omnibus psychology” threw open the door to all facts.
Furthermore, in his time, the claims of moral and religious
experience were inveighed against as valid indications of
ultimate reality. These, too, James considered as facts of
experience, and defended the rights of inner experience
2
against such a falsification of the empirical ideal.
(2) The pretensions of science to exactness, accuracy
of prediction, which were beginning to imbue not only the
1. W. James, PP, I, 192.
2. Cf. VHE, 4, 15, 21; also 489 ff
.-
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average man but intellectual leaders with the notion that
science was an Absolute, were held by James to be mere pre-
tensions, and not an infallible "open sesame*" He detested
any closed system, philosophical or scientific. In his essay
on "The 77ill to Believe" he was thinking of this sort of
thing, "* Seine* in the form of abstraction, priggishness
,
1 2
lording it over all." like Lecomte du Houy today, he de-
plored the enthronement of science as a god, and considered
the interests of scientists as "most incomplete and their pro-
3
fessional bigotry immense."
(3) The findings of psychology lack sufficient importance
and significance, particularly in view of the ultimate prob-
lems which were for James becoming all-important. The condi-
tion of psychology in his time was sufficient to convince him
that he could not be satisfied with it as a life-interest.
Furthermore, he continually felt that natural scientists tended
to consider their own universe of discourse as the only important
one, if not the only one * To James such an attitude was a
distortion of reality, and an abstraction from the truly sig-
nificant and important. In other words, his movement out of
psychology was really the movement of psychology itself beyond
the field of James *s main ability and interest.
(4) Psychological observations necessarily have meta-
physical implications. For the purposes of psychology, for
1. LWJ, II, £08. cf. also WB, x.
2. Du Houy, HD, 36, 248 ff.
3. H. James, LWJ, II, 270.
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example, it is well to postulate complete determinism, but
the introspective and moral facts could not thus be dis-
missed by method. All facts must be considered, and this
means the study of its relation to all other fields, and then
a re-evaluation of one's psychological conclusions in view of
the whole. Philosophy moves along with life; psychology is
just one segment of the whole. The many entanglements with
metaphysics which are met in the latter cannot be dropped
and forgotten completely, and psychology set up as a world of
its own, because they do make a difference to mankind. In
James's time, psychology was beginning to look to physiology
more and more for its explanations, but still looked beyond
1
to metaphysics and epistemology for its deeper meanings.
James thoroughly upheld this view. The ideal of modem psy-
chology is remote from the ideal of James at this point, as
is very readily apparent. The value of psychology as a nat-
ural science is not to be denied; but the extent to which psy-
chology considers its area as a true and accurate description
of reality as a whole calls to mind James's warning against
such a view as dogmatic and abstract. And the extent to which
psychology forgets the facts of consciousness, and resorts
more and more to physiology alone for its explanations of
psychological phenomena, indicates an unhealthy extreme in
which psychology as a separate science is a farce, has become
2
a branch of physiology. James sought answers to vital
1* Cf* 17 . James, CUR, 69 ff
.
2. Cf. the definitions of psychology and the concept of its
work as outlined in the report of the Harvard Commission,
PPIU.
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problems in psychology; he found it wandering in a laby-
rinthian maze of uncertainty, and attempted to set it on an
avenue which had certain definite limitations. He never for
a moment believed that the avenue was a dead-end street, or
that it represented the whole of life and reality. It did
not solve his problems, but it did open the way to wider
vistas which could be, and ought to be, explored under the
guidance of scientific method and procedure. The problems
were far more important than the field in which they were to
be solved.
In 1896 he wrote to Stumpf from Cambridge:
I feel as I had bought the right to say
good-bye to psychology for the present,
and turn myself to more speculative di-
rections. 1
Three years later:
I find myself growing less psychological—
I have nowadays a perfect horror of experi-
mental psychology for which fortunately
Munsterberg is exclusively responsible
—
and more metaphysical. I have certain
glimmerings of new ideas, but they are hard
to make clear, and nothing will ever come
of them probably. 2
The "new ideas" were epistemological and metaphysical ones,
3
which seemed to him "more original and important." His
interests were more and more in favor of the "higher views
4
of life," and less in favor of psychology, for which, as
1. Perry, TCWj, II, 190.
2. Ibid., 193.
3. H. James, LWJ, II, 331, 332.
4. Perry, TCWJ, II, 195.
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1
he later admitted to Dickinson Miller, he "never cared much,"
2
He was haunted by a "cosmic nostalgia" which led him into
the philosophical field.
6, Rationalistic superstition
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
Uhd grim des lebens goldener Baum. 3
Goethe's famous lines, which James often heard Agassiz
quote, constitute in brief James's own attitude toward ab-
stract theory. It was perhaps his empiricism which prevented
him initially from espousing a study which seemed either a
mere sanction of common sense, as was the case with popular
4
philosophy, or a sterile, empty area of abstractions, bear-
ing little or no relation to experience. His review of Lewes'
Basis of Mind (1877) revealed his attitude toward such phil-
osophies:
The mind can no more feed on pure first
principles than the body can live on pure
nitrogen and carbon. Only the axiomatic
media are fertile and lead to particular
discoveries. It is a bad sign when a
thinker keeps falling back on abstractions
so pure that all must applaud them, but so
broad that they form quite as good a shelter
for one doctrine as for another. 5
1. H. James, LWJ, II, 331.
2. Perry, TCWJ, I, 450.
3. H. James, LWJ, I, 54. Quoting Goethe.
4. Cf. W. James, CER, 4,6; see also 25.
5. Ibid.
,
41.
’
.
- v
*
53
In 1892, when his tendency was away from psychology and
toward philosophy, he remarked again upon the aimlessness
of disputations about first principles when more attention
ought to be given to the harvest of "enormous booty of
1
natural laws."
Robaok aptly describes the resolve in James’s mind to
slay the dragon of Absolutism and rescue the virtuous damsel
2
(pluralism) from abstraction. It was this attitude that
played a great part in developing his interest in philosophy,
and shaped the kind of philosophy which he ultimately fash-
ioned. James always needed a cause; this was a great one.
Life was not being adequately interpreted by the philosophy
of his day which was sterile, abstract, having nothing to do
with everyday experience. Rationalism offered a religion,
to be sure, but the kind of religion to which "actual things
3
are blank", and left men cold. This, then, may be said to
constitute his final reason for his espousal of philosophy
—
his reaction against rationalism and his feeling that he
might do something toward presenting a truer picture of
reality. His reaction against rationalism took him to ex-
tremes very often, as, for example, his attitude toward
4
Hegel.
1. Ibid., 323. "My own volumes are indeed full of such
recrimination and dispute."
2. Roback, WJ, 314.
3. W. James, PRA, 32.
4. Hegel is characterized as sterile, "too fundamentally
rotten and charlatanish to last long." (LWJ, I ,208) .His re-
vision of the Principles contains few references to Hegel,
and thereis no reason £o believe that his ire was directed
more against the Heo-Hegelians than Hegel himself
.
(Cf. LWJ,
I, 205; ibid., I, 305. )
,
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Agassiz had taught him the "difference between all
possible abstractionists and all livers in the light of the
1
world's fulness." To Bergson, however, must go most of the
credit for freeing him from the chains of absolutism and
2
the "monistic superstition" under which he had grown up.
The dilemma between intellectualistic logic and the irration-
ality of life as revealed in experience perplexed James for
years. He felt that it was Bergson who had finally slain the
dragon, decisively proved that conceptual logic falsifies ex-
perience, can give no account of possibility or impossibility
in the world of fact. "Instead of being interpreters of
3
reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality altogether."
From the worship of the universal, the unchangeable, the abso-
lute, James turned to the worship of the particular, the
changing, the pulsing movement of the real.
Philosophy should seek this kind of living
understanding of the movement of reality,
not follow science in vainly patching to-
gether fragments of its dead results. 4
7. General Conclusions
We may conclude from the above that no attempt can be
made to divorce James's psychology from his philosophy arbi-
trarily; he pursued both throughout his life. His own problems
1. W. James, MS, 14.
2. W. James, SPP, 165 n. Renouvier's influence is marked here
as well.
3. W. James, PTJ, 245.
4. Ibid., 264.
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and personality led him to philosophical fields which in-
terested and challenged him far more than the restricted
avenue of psychology. Despite his distrust of a priori
reasoning, his continuing and wholesome regard for empirical
evidence, the laborious work and the inadequate results which
1
were often ’’disappointing and trivial”, his concern for the
larger metaphysical issues was constantly present. His brother,
£ 3
Henry, and R. B. Perry both feel that philosophy was always
his deeper vocation and inclination. The latter says," One
often has the feeling that psychology was his legal wife and
4
philosophy his preferred mistress." In his diary in 1873,
James had written: "Philosophy I will. .. regard as my voca-
5
tion", and we may be sure that, even then, he was convinced
of the ulterior task of philosophy beyond science. He traveled
a long road, so that, when he was at a time of life when most
men would be resting on their laurels or relaxing after their
endeavors, James was eagerly delving into new problems, or
attempting the pursuit of old problems for which psychology
could give him no satisfactory answer. Charles W. Eliot de-
scribed him in his role of a student at Harvard as possessing
a kind of cosmopolitanism of thought and experience, but always
6
making "unsystematic excursions" which seemed to negate the
1. James, LWJ, II, 54. Cf. his letter to Howison,1895:
"Philosophical literature will often seem to me the hollowest
thing." (LWJ, II, 23.)
2. H. James, LWJ, I, 166.
3. Perry, TCWJ, II, 37.
4. Ibid., 37,38.
5. Ibid., I, 335.
6. H. James, LWJ, I, 31,32.
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purely scientific interest, but gave promise of philosoph-
ical endeavor. These excursions became now James’s one
absorbing interest as he became convinced that philosophy
was in for a new day, whose results would concern all men
1
vitally, and would help him personally to make the universe
his own.
1# Ho philosophy which did not make some difference somewhere
to the experience of man was worthwhile. James’s emphasis
in philosophy is always on results, the relation of ultimate
problems to practical experience.
Cf. Chapter IV, (2), (3) in introductory section.
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CHAPTER IV
JAMES AS A PHILOSOPHER
This chapter will consider James’s philosophy as it
developed from his earliest speculative interests to his
final mature thought. ITone of the interrelations between
his psychology and philosophy are to be considered here,
since the purpose of the chapter is to present a background
study of his philosophical convictions in order that we may
be prepared for the two final chapters in which the interrela-
tions are suggested and dealt with in a topical way. To be
sure some of his psychology will find its place in this chap-
ter, since we have already suggested the impossibility of
ever divorcing the two entirely in James f s treatment of prob-
lems; but our main effort is directed toward establishing his
philosophic thinking in its proper setting, and understanding
the process of its development. In so doing, the following
factors must be recognized:
(1) James’s philosophical system-building suffered not
only because of his own unsystematic nature, the result of
his lack of formal schooling, but also because of a purely
economic factor. The needs of his family and the insufficient
salary given him at Harvard to meet these necessities com-
pelled him to accept invitations for public lectures. The
preparation for these exhausted time, energy, and strength
which might have been spent in rounding out his own philosophy.
r.
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That these lectures "meant" something to people, brought
philosophy out of its "ivory tower" and into the lives of
men, must he admitted— that in itself was all to the good.
But it is possible that the time devoted to them may have
rendered some of his best years almost barren of hard meta-
physical thinking.
(2) Another factor which must be borne in mind, for it
exercised a forceful influence on his philosophy, is James's
concern for the admission of the facts of sentiment, emotional
1
preferences, subjective needs in establishing men's convictions.
In 1888, writing to Santayana, then a student, James said:
Neither do I expect absolute illumination
from human philosophizing. At most you can
get arguments either to reinforce or to pro-
tect certain emotional influences. 2
Histories of philosophy, he was convinced, prove one thing,
namely, that men find themselves at home in different parts
of the world, and essentially find reasons for what they first
of all believe and do.
(3) His disinclination— which at times amounted to an
aversion— to systems of philosophy which became "valleys of
dry bones", must also be remembered. Just as his psychology
was not an attempt to establish definite rules, methods, re-
sults, but one of fertility, so his philosophy was, as Perry
indicates, not an attempt to secure universality, coherence.
1. See discussion of this in Chapter VI, 4, iii.
2. Perry, TCWJ, I, 403.
<'
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definiteness, or any other such intellectual
end, "but to see the world as it is in all its
fulness. 1
Santayana strikes close to the heart of the problem when he
suggests that James "detested any system of the universe that
professed to enclose everything; we must never set up bound-
£
aries that exclude romantic surprises." This is not to sug-
gest that James objected to "including" everything; he was
wholeheartedly in favor of this, but against tightly closed
systems which set up barriers against the possibility of new
and enlarging truth.
In a time when biological influences were beginning to
make themselves more strongly felt in psychology and philosophy,
when Bergson was warring against fixed concepts ,Bowne (despite
his training in the sciences of mathematics and physics) attack-
ing the method of "rigor and vigor", James went to war against
a vicious intellectualism which falsified life. With this in
mind it is easier to understand his article on "Philosophy and
3
Philosophical Teaching in the United States" in which he in-
veighed against professionalism and that kind of thinking
4
"in terms of the shop-tradition"
,
characteristic of philoso-
phers, which failed to establish any connection with human
nature. Doctrines alone meant nothing if they were merely
affirmed; James wanted to understand their meaning for life.
1. Perry, TCWJ, I, 459.
£• Santayana, PAP, 242.
3. Partially reprinted in Kallen (ed. ) PWJ, 57 ff. Also,LWJ,I,
190 ff.
4. W. James, PU, 17.
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Something very deep in the constitution of
James T s mind impelled him to search out the
meanings of these principles, and to trans-
late them into terms of actual experience. 1
Hence we shall find his own philosophy no rigid system, nor
an attempt at the creation of a formal, deductive scheme, but
a growing, developing and living one.
His attitude towards fixed systems is also closely united
with that other factor which we have mentioned— his conviction
that sentiments have much to do with philosophies. Ho system
2
was worthy simply becuae it possessed self-consistency • Systems,
indeed, are separate faiths, "instruments of the human enter-
3
prise", attempts to answer the question "Why?" posed by men
everywhere, and not Just abstract, scholastic problems. We
shall see this attitude resulting in his pragmatism. Santayana,
discussing this attitude of James, puts it extremely well.
Ideas and rules that may have been occasionally
useful it (intellectualism) put in the place of
the full-blooded irrational movement of life
which had called them into being, and these ab-
stractions, so soon obsolete, it strove to fix
and to worship forever. Thus all creeds and
theories and all formal precepts sink in the
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 213.
2. Cf. Russell, HWP, 613: "A philosophy which is not self-
consistent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which
is self-consistent can very well be wholly false."
3. Artiole by Eallen, "Remembering William James", in ICWJ, 13.
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estimation of the pragmatist to a local
and temporary grammar of action, a grammar
that must he changed slowly by time, and
may be changed quickly by genius. 1
(4) We must not expect, then, to be able to tag James
as belonging to any particular system. It is entirely possible
to take separate texts and prove him to be a positivist, sub-
jectivist, personalist, materialist, idealist. To all such
attempts James would undoubtedly say as he once did to a stud-
ent whose Ph. D. thesis had attempted to construct a Jamesian
philosophy out of separate utterances of his at different times,
places, universes of discourse:
The whole Ph# D# industry of building up
an author T s meaning out of separate texts
leads nowhere, unless you have first grasped ghis centre of vision by an act of imagination.
It may well be that our final conclusions will have to be
qualified always, that contradictions and inconsistencies will
have to take their place with apparently certain doctrines, if
we would do justice to the thought of James. The most we can
hope for, in the absence of any completed metaphysical system,
is to indicate plainly where emphases appear to favor certain
trends and lines of development. It will be difficult to
find a "centre of vision", for James wandered, in Allport's
words, "from text to text, as if driven now by his own tough-
3
mindedness, and now by his own tender-mindedness.
"
1# Santayana, WOD, 206.
2# H. James, 1WJ, II, 355.
3. Allport, Art. (1943), 99
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(5) One final factor remains to "be noted— his pre-
occupation with religion and religious things which affected
his whole philosophy. Perhaps James emphasizes the emotional
and subjective factors so much because he realized how greatly
they affected the trend of his own thinking. His convictions
about free-will, the value of persons, God, design, purpose,
something doing in the world, were over-beliefs. If science
could not disprove them, they were to be upheld, and a place
found for them in any philosophical system. If logic could
find no place for them without becoming involved in self-
contradictions, so much the worse for logic. 77e shall find
that reason is finally rejected as capable of apprehending
reality in all of its fulness, and by reason here we mean
intellectualistic logic; so, too, it is hopeless to expect
it to create any system which will adequately express its
nature. Formal deductions of categories, formal metaphysics,
are to be abandoned for criticism and induction, allowing for
1
growing truth.
James’s preoccupation with religion, and his conviction
that philosophy is secondary to feeling, is markedly influential
in making his philosophy at bottom one of intuition or mystic
insight. His very empiricism. Bush notes, is enlarged to in-
clude all data,
full of imagination, and of metaphysical
reminiscence, full of poetic spontaneity,
of religious devoutness, and of concessions
to human expectations. 2
IT'Cf. TKS,"“44'5-447.
2. Bush, Art. (1925), 515.
.T
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Bearing these factors in mind, we now turn to the con-
sideration of James* s philosophic thought as he attempted to
solve the problems of epistemology, metaphysics, and philo-
sophy of religion.
1.
Epistemology
In a letter to G.H. Palmer, April 2, 1900, James char-
acterized epistemology as possessing a "portentous name, and
small result, in my opinion, but a substantive discipline
which ought, par le temps qui court
,
to be treated with due
formality.” It is not a problem for psychology which assumes
that knowledge is possible, and postulates a thorough-going
dualism between the mind knowing and the thing known. The
question of an Erkenntnistheorie falls within the jurisdiction
of the philosopher. James recognized the importance of the
psychological data for the interpretations of the epistemolo-
gist. He was also cognizant of the fact that one*s epistemo-
logical and philosophical analyses often necessitate a re-
vision of one*s psychological data. This is particularly
2
true of his own thought, as we shall see.
i. Origin of Knowledge
Taking his stand against Hegel, Royce, and other
1 . H . James , LWJ , II , 1 21
•
2. See Chapter 71 , 1.
3. Cf. LWJ, 205,305, for James’s apology for his extreme words
about Hegel and his statement that he was speaking mainly
of the Hegelians.
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absolutists and rationalists who upheld reason as the source
of all genuine knowledge, James aligned himself with the em-
piricists. Despite his emphasis on the front-door-way of
1
experience, however, he did not restrict knowledge to the
outer senses alone, but enlarged his data to include non-
2
sensory data of human experience. Perry makes a valuable
observation and delineation concerning James T s concept of
experience— a distinction about which James is not too clear,
but is definitely there* Experience on the one hand " conveys
or discloses ,” and on the other hand, is "given or imposed . "
3
Sensation not only presents the vast array of facts which is
life, but it hits man, is thrust upon him, includes "both
4
revelations and givenness." Consequently, we find two types
of empiricism in James: the intuitive, "in which experience
is revelation and thought is foresight," and the practical,
"in which experience is givenness, and thought is an experi-
5
ment or planned operation." Prom the latter type of empiri-
cism James derived his pragmatic theory which we shall examine
shortly.
1. W. James, PP,II, 628; see also this chapter (IVO iv,2.
2. Cf. Brightman, ITP, 69 n, concerning the widest sense of
experience.
3. Perry, ISWJ, 47.
4. Ibid., 49.
5. Ibid., 50.
:,
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ii. Kinds of Knowledge
An empirical epistemology must differentiate between the
kinds of knowledge which are possible. Taking the analysis
of John Grote, James divided knowledge into two kinds: (1)
Knowledge-by-acquaintance; and (2) Knowledge about (as
Russell calls it, "knowledge by description.”) One can be
thoroughly confused by his treatment of these two kinds of
knowledge in his psychology and in his later works. His psy-
chology declares that sensation differs from perception
only in the extreme simplicity of its object
or content. Its object, being a simple quality,
is sensibly homogeneous ; and its function...
of mere acquaintance with this homogeneous
seeming fact. Perception's function, on the
other hand, is that of knowing something about
the fact. 1
In both, we perceive the object as an immediately present
outward reality, thus differing from conception or thought
where objects are not so perceived. The differences between
the two are almost entirely reducible to the absence or the
presence of fringes or overtones, "knowledge about" involving
knowledge of a thing
1
s relations, and "knowledge by acquaintance"
indicating the bare impression the thing makes, while we are
aware of its relations in a "penumbral nascent way of a fringe’
2
of unarticulated affinities about it."
1. W. James, PSY, 14.
2. W. James, PP, I, 259
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Actually the distinction is between immediate knowledge
which involves sensation and perception, and conceptual or
1
representative knowledge. A pure sensation is an abstrac-
tion, seldom realized by itself, save possibly in the first
sensation of the new-born babe; but the "one big, blooming
2
buzzing Confusion" of that first sensation has all of the
categories of the understanding contained in it; actually
then, all we can say about the difference between sensations
and perceptions is that the former are "first things in the
3
way of consciousness." Perception involves sensational pro-
cesses and appreceptive processes. Perhaps the largest part
4
enters, not from the object itself but "out of our own head."
Every percept is a Gestalt, an integral, unified, conscious
5
whole. As the apperceptive mass becomes richer and more in-
clusive, so, too, the perception becomes richer, more adequate,
replete with detail.
Knowledge by acquaintance is for James the basis of all
our knowledge, in the sense that sense data are immediate; but,
"even the simplest sense datum to a certain extent is infected
6
with description and mediation."
7
Mere acquaintance is meaningless, "dumb" knowledge.
1. Cf. W. James, MT, 46,49 n.
2. W. James, PSY, 16.
3. Ibid., 12.
4. W. James, PP, I, 100. Cf. also Wood, AK, 53.
5. W. James, PSY, 23.
6. Brightman, ITP, 85.
7. W. James, MT, 38.
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Had we no concepts, we should live simply
'getting' each successive moment of experi-
ence, as the sessile sea-anemone on its
rock receives whatever nourishment the wash
of the waves may bring* 1
As man develops his rational powers, he tends more and more
to substitute concepts for percepts. However, there are two
things that must not be forgotten:
(1) Concepts are secondary, and not primary. The worlds
of logic, mathematics , etc. are derived from perceptual experi-
ences, long-forgotten by us. Man has found given "ideal rela-
2
tions", "lines of order", and from these have been constructed
these systems. All of our concepts of beauty, justice, truth
have been constructed in the context of practical, perceptual
experience.
The great difference between percepts and
concepts is that percepts are continuous,
and concepts are discrete. Hot discrete in
their being
,
for conception as an act is part
of the flux of feeling, but discrete from each
other in their several meanings. 3
(2) Concepts cannot be valid substitutes for the reality
which they represent, unless they possess the potentiality or
capacity to direct the attention to that reality. Expressing
4
a more lenient attitude toward concepts in a later discussion,
James admits that conceptual knowledge may be a self-sufficing
revelation, but its main significance still lies in its relations
1. V/. James, SPP, 64.
2. Ibid., 200; Cf. also 67 ff
. ; PP , ii, Ch.28.
3. Ibid., 48.
4. See MT, 42; also, SPP, 52,53.
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to particulars; in and for itself it is essentially worthless.
The meaning of a concept may always be found
in some sensible particular which it directly
designates, then in some particular difference
which its being true will make. 1
Percepts, termini, sensible things, mere matters-of-acquaint-
ance are the only realities we know directly. Sensations are
the " terminus a quo
,
and terminus ad quern of the mind. To find
such sensational termini should be our aim with all our higher
2
thought.
"
We begin to catch glimmers in this treatment of percept
and concept of James's later epistemology and metaphysics. We
can recognize already that, for James, the safest and surest
kind of knowledge is sense-perception; concepts and ideas in
themselves are "of no cognitive value, since they are essen-
3
tially instrumental, they are always on trial," to be tested
by direct experience. We shall not be surprised to find then
that the emphasis throughout his philosophy will be on feeling,
action, intuition, and a certain mystical tinge will color his
metaphysical conclusions.
iii. Structure of the Knowledge-Situation
Epistemological realism dominated James's dynamic view
of nature and of truth. Objects exist as they are apprehended,
4
and are exactly as they seem to be when we experience them.
1. W. James
,
SPP
,
60.
2. W. James, MT, 39.
3. Perry, PPT, Appendix, 364.
4. See Montague, WR, 31-35 for discussion of this problem.
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He 'believed in objective reality so strongly that he took it
up bodily and made it his eventual philosophy.
The reality known exists independently of
the knower's idea, and as conceived, if
the conception be a true one, 1
Along with the dominant part that objective reality plays in
his philosophy, we shall sea that it is always subordinate to
personality, serving as an instrument which persons can use
to realize values, and to create truths.
Epistemological dualism is apparent in most of his writ-
ings, Psychology assumes the dualism of subject and object.
Subject and object are not identical; there is always a gap,
with objective reference beyond the self in the knowledge-
£
situation. This dualism is upheld by James as late as 1904,
when his doctrine of pure experience was formulated; in the
light of the final philosophical position to which he came,
it ought to have been changed. The consideration of this
question must be postponed to our final chapter, for it in-
volves the influence of his philosophy on this earlier epis-
temological position.
iv. Problem of Truth
The problem of truth is the central problem of the epistemo-
3
logical search. In knowing we have a psychological process,
1. Ltr. to Strong, 1907; Perry, TCWJ, II, 536.
2. See PSY, 15; MT
,
43-50; 103; 127.
3. As Ledger Wood says in his article on "Epistemology" in Runes,
DP, 96, "In any case it is the problem which brings the enquiry
to the threshold of metaphysics." The above discussion of
epistemology follows in part Wood*s form in this article.
!
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an attitude taken toward an apparently well-grounded state
of affairs. Truth is usually held to he different from knowl-
edge in that it is independent of my mind; one may have truth
without knowledge, untested or established by relations. James's
concept is radically different in many respects. We are thus
led to his pragmatism, which is actually the heart of James's
epistemology.
(1) Pragmatism
James felt that his pragmatism would mark a turning point
1
in the history of epistemology and philosophy. Glimmerings of
it are to be found in his psychology— his emphasis on ends,
selection, interest, conduct. It represents his empiricism
pushed to its final legitimate conclusions, his choice between
agnosticism and absolutism.
It must be remembered that pragmatism is two things in
James, — a method and a criterion of truth.
(i) Method
The pragmatic method stemmed from Pierce's influence
upon James in an article entitled "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear", published in 1878, and largely unnoticed until James
called attention to it in a lecture in California in 1898.
As a method it had been used in part at least by philosophers
in the past— Socrates, Aristotle, Locke, Berkeley, Hume.
1. See MT, viii
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As an experimentalist principle it emphasizes the instrumental
nature of theories in the pursuit of truth. Papini emphasized
1
James’s own statement that pragmatism was "a method only” by
advocating it as the "corridor-theory"
,
a way for getting at
the practical consequences of all doctrines. In the words
of Ostwald, the Leipzig chemist:
In what respects would the world he different
if this alternative or that were true? If I
can find nothing that would become different,
then the alternative has no sense. 2
It is thus a method for determining truth by its fruits, and
a canon of meaning, the meaning it possesses for life and
conduct, and for individuals.
There is no difference in abstract truth
that doesn’t express itself in a difference
in concrete fact and in conduct consequent
upon that fact. 3
The emphasis was placed then on the relation of truth to in-
dividuals, whose answers to questions of truth determined
their conduct, as opposed to the belief in the possibility
of ever attaining absolute truth independent of the limita-
tions of experience.
The goal of knowledge for the modem scientist
remained the same, though the method had
changed. . .The history of modem philosophy is
the record of the difficulties which have
arisen as men have progressively discovered
that the former Absolute was incompatible
1. W. James, PRA, 53
2. Ibid., 48.
3. Ibid,, 50.
.’
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with this new (mathematical) method.
The pragmatic method does not stand for any particular re-
sults; it aims only at concreteness, adequacy, action, as
2
against absolutes, closed systems, abstractions.
It agrees with nominalism... in always
appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism
in emphasizing practical results; with posi-
tivism in its disdain for verbal solutions,
useless questions, and metaphysical abstrac-
tions. 3
(ii) Criterion of Truth
It was when James made of pragmatism more than a method
and a canon of meaning, that he ran into trouble. Since, he
said, we may find truth in the pragmatic way, why may we not
go further and say that this way is all that constitutes truth ?
Truth, then, is not something toward which we move, but "can
exist only in act, or in the shape of an opinion held by some
4
thinker really to be found." The will is thus predominant,
as it was in his psychology. "We live our way into our think-
ing", as Whitey Williams expresses it, "rather than think our
5
way into our living." Santayana says of it:
Intelligence... is no miraculous, idle faculty,
by which we mirror passively any or everything
that happens to be true, reduplicating the world
to no purpose. Intelligence has its roots and
1. Guelder and Sears, DAP, 311.
2. Cf. PRA, 51.
3. Ibid., 53,54.
4. W. James, WB, 199.
5. Quoted in Hocking, TOP, 144.
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its isBue in the context of events: ; it is
one kind of practical adjustment, an experi-
mental act, a form of vital tension. 1
Truth is a property which an idea bears, no absolute from
which have been deduced the truths we now hold. What we
call truths now are simply the discoveries of remote ances-
tors which have proved to be living and fruitful in experi-
2
ence and so have lasted. Experience then is the touchstone;
and all new truths are funded in it, and to be referred back
to it.
In order that we may obtain a clearer picture of what
this means, shall we consider some of the elements involved
in this concept of truth:
fl) It is a theory of consequences. An idea is called
3
true by the way in which it works. The insight here is a
necessary one, developed in James* s reaction against abso-
lutism. Abstract truth might as well not be true if it stands
for itself, and bears no living relation to someone *s experi-
ence somewhere. Truth must be verifiable and usable. As a
method, pragmatism may thus point the way to further truth.
4
As a criterion of truth, pragmatism is a failure.
(2) There are indications in James that he was conscious
of the limitations of pragmatism as a criterion of truth, and
of the dangers to which it led when pressed to its logical
1. Santayana, tVOD, 206.
2. Cf. W. James, PHA, i69 ff.
3. W. James, WB, xii; SPP, 209.
4. For criticism, the reader is referred to the summary at
the end of this discussion of the pragmatic theory.
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conclusions. His critics have emphasized the one side which
he admittedly stressed, hut there are more than mere sugges-
tions that the pragmatic theory was a part (though a most in-
tegral part) of a higher criterion, although James nowhere
definitely says so. Witness the fact that the pragmatist is
objectively controlled by the "whole body of funded truths
squeezed from the past and the coercion of the world of sense
1
about him," from calling something true when it is not true.
The satisfactoriness of an idea "has to be measured by a mul-
8
titude of standards." The satisfaction is concrete, but it
includes belief in other minds, in independent physical things,
in past events, in eternal logical relations; our satisfaction
is only a possibly true guide; it is solely a guide for us .
Furthermore, compare statements like the following: "One
portion of our belief reacting on another so as to yield the
3
most satisfactory total state of mind"; "truth verified by
4
the long run", in one sense created, but in another discovered.
5
It "must not contradict other realities"; and, while we can
not keep the notion of the better and true apart, "what is
better for us to believe is true unless the belief clashes
6
incidentally with some other vital benefits."
1. W. James, PBA,
2. W. James, MT, 56.
3. Ibid., 88.
4. Ibid., 89.
5. Ibid., 101.
6. PRA, 77. (Italics mine).
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Furthermore, consequences are not merely physical ones;
1
intellectual, mental consequences are stressed; and the em-
phasis is on "consistency among judgments, objects, and habits
2
of reacting, in the mind’s own experienceable world." The
true theory is one that "will be reversed by nothing that
later turns up in your action's fruit; it will harmonize...
3
with the entire drift of experience." Concepts will be
4
true when they "harmoniously connect." The emphasis is on
the long-range point of view, and not on the immediate.
If the whole drift of thinking continues to
confirm it, that is what he means by its
being true. 5
g
That act is best which "makes for the best whole." To
take a particular truth, the "truth of rSod’ has to run the
7
gauntlet of all our other truths," and our "final opinion
about God can be settled after all the truths have straightened
8
themselves out together."
1. MT, 52 n. Also PRA, 212,213: "Better either intellectually
or practically."
2. Ibid., 97.
3. W. James, WB, 105, 106.
4. W. James, SPP, 67. Cf. PP, Chap. 28.
5. W. James, WB, 17.
6. W. James, WB, 205. Cf. also 107: "The experience of the
entire human race must make the verification, and... all
the evidence will not be in till the final integration of
things .
"
7. W. James, PRA, 109.
8. W. James, PRA, 109. Compare this with his "Will to Believe"
as a supplementation of reason, not as a total rejection of
it.
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What do such statements indicate ? They would seem to
suggest a higher criterion of truth, for one thing— coherence,
possibly— in which pragmatism shall take its place as a very
important factor. It is not surprising to find James conclud-
ing that
to admit, as we pragmatists do, that we are
liable to correction (even though we may not
expect it) involves the use of an ideal stand-
ard... ITo relativist who ever actually walked
on earth has denied the regulative character
of the notion of absolute truth. What is
challenged by relativists is the pretense...
to have found for certain at any given moment
what the shape of that truth is. 1
That there is absolute truth is the only absolute truth of
which we can be certain. For the absolutist there can be
no truth without any absolute truth. This Constitutive’
2
ideal becomes 'regulative* in James's system; absolute
truth represents an "ideal set of relations towards which
all opinions may in the long run of experience be expected
3
to converge."
If we are to conceive of pragmatism as a criterion of
truth, as James would have us to do, and not as a part of
a higher criterion, as evidenced by the above passages, then
we must admit that pragmatism is a failure. The workability
of truth may well be a consequence and a quality of truth,
but is not its essential nature. The mental and moral activity
1. MT, 264, 265, 266
2. Cf. TCWJ, II, 493
3. W. James, MT, 267
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involved in recognizing truth does not therefore indicate
that the universality of truth is consequently invalid.
Pragmatism at its "best is a mistaking of
the circumference for the center, and thus
presents a partial and inadequate idea of
truth. It does not rise to the level of
certainty... as William T. Harris said of
the understanding
,
as contrasted with
reason, * it applies the criterion, 'Use!
1
It does not know beauty
,
or indeed anything
which is for itself ; it only knows what is
good for something else. 1
The difficulty with the pragmatic account of truth is that
while it points to the practical aspects of truth as relevant
to the situation, and consequently utilitarian, it is completely
ambiguous as to the ends served. The ambiguity of the word
2 3
"work", and of the well-known "practical", "expedient", and
4
"satisfactory", can never be fully clarified, and will doubt-
less always mean different things to different people. Further-
more, we must point out that the usefulness of a concept does
not necessarily mean the truth of that concept. It is true
that we use concept for our own purposes in various ways, but,
as Whitehead suggests, "The concept may be true in all of its
classifications, but its usefulness for one is uselessness for
5
the other." Truth and usefulness are different things.
It has been pointed out by most of James T s critics that
the notion of consequences as the essential content of truth
1. Buckham, Art7 (1942 ) , 138.
2. W. James, MT, 212.
3. W. James, PRA, 222.
4. Ibid., 58.
5. Whitehead, SMW, 202.
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1
or error is thoroughly self-contradictory. Wholly contra-
dictory ideas may have practical consequences, and would force
2
us to say that both were true. Furthermore, the same belief
may have antagonistic results, as, for example, the Japanese
belief in their status as immortal sons of heaven leading to a
fairly stable state, submission to law and authority, and also
to insane madness and cruelty. Or we can point to the practi-
cal results of war, Sovietism, democracy; all of them cannot
be true. The ends which are to be served are given too little
emphasis.
This brings us to the charge of relativism with which
James was continually being bombarded. Statements like "the
3
true... is only the expedient in the way of thinking", "the
true (is so) in proportion as it gratifies the individual’s
desire to assimilate the novel in his experience to his beliefs
4
in stock," imply such a relativism. It was precisely at this
point that James erred in over-emphasizing emotional, sub-
jective needs and preferences. He was always guilty of ex-
aggeration when enthused with a subject; in fairness to him,
it must be said that his eagerness for relating knowledge to
conduct, for considering the cravings of the ego, is partly
to blame for under-emphasizing all other criteria of truth
and enthroning one, practical results. Truth is more than
1. See Brightman, I!tP, 30-58; Hocking, TOP, Chs. IX, X.
2. Brightman, ITP, 56.
3. W. James, PRA, 222.
4. W. James, SPP, 208.
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mere verifiability; verification only shows that an idea was
1
in the beginning either true or false. And any dependence
of truth upon individuals who must do the verifying meanB that
truth is entirely relative. Verification is made by relating
the supposed truth to facts, not to our own subjective desires
and needs.
Summarizing briefly James’s pragmatic theory, then, we may
conclude that, as a method, it is worthwhile, as it was in Ms
time, in vitalizing pure intellectualism and abstractionism. It
emphasizes the living nature of truth, and the part that indi-
viduals can play in helping to discover and even to create new
facts. As a philosophy, it is a gospel of possibility and
potentiality, which contributed to Ms fideism, his meliorism,
and his pluralism. It stresses the close ties existing be-
tween emotion and knowledge, between knowledge and conduct.
On the other hand, it overemphasizes the theory of con-
sequences as a test of truth. It falsely converts " all true
2
propositions work” to "all propositions that work are true",
an unjustifiable conclusion. There are many indications that
James actually referred to a higher criterion of consistency
or coherence for Ms final judgment concerning truth.
(2) Radical Empiricism
At the heart of James’s later epistemology is to be found
1* Cf* Ilewhall’s dissertation on "The Influence of William James
on G. Wobbermin’s "Psych, and PM1 of Religion", 119,125.
Dr* Newhall pointedly suggests that James's allowance for
growing truth is at the cost of a gross misuse of conception.
2. Cf. Hocking, TOP, 164 ff. for an excellent treatment of
James's pragmatism, and cogent criticisms of the general
pragmatist position.
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hie doctrine of radical empiricism. As Perzy suggests, James
felt increasingly that this theory was "more fundamental and
1
important than 'pragmatism 1 •" This theory involves essentially
the givenness of relations, in opposition to sensationalism.
Every examiner of the sensible life in
conereto must see that relations of every
sort, of time, space, difference, likeness,
change, rate, cause, and what not, are just
as integral members of the sensational flux
as terms are
,
and that conjunctive relations
are just as true members of the flux as dis-
junctive relations are. 2
Knowledge is not limited to sense experience alone; the concept
of experience is widened to include ©ognitional
,
valuational,
and emotional factors as well.
Taken up into his metaphysics later, epistemological monism
3
was the inevitable conclusion. In the Principles
,
however,
there is no indication that James held to anything other than
a dualism. The difficulty, as Brett points out, is with the
word "experience". James restricted the word to mean "processes
which influence the mind by the front-door-way of simple habits
4
and association" — the door-way of the five senses, in con-
trast with the back-door-way by which we acquire all of our
tendencies, susceptibilities, etc., and those things which
constitute our higher moral, intellectual, and aesthetic life.
These latter "ideal and inward relations amongst the objects
of our thought... can in no intelligible sense whatever be
1. W. James, ERE, Pref. , iv,v.
2. W. James, PU, 279, 280.
3. See Chapter VI, 1, i.
4. W. James, PP, II, 622.
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1
interpreted as reproductions of the order of outer experience."
2
The key is found, as Brett suggests, in emergent evolution.
Somewhere in the initial stage of growth the mind began to
feel its own activity, faced the intractable, incoherent mass
of brute fact and brought the elements into form. The rela-
tions which are to be found between the conceptions of the
mind are not necessarily existent, but
hypothetical constructions, empty forms,
waiting to be filled by that ultimate ir-
rationality which is the world of real
events. 4
The mind aots on experience, and is free so to do. Conscious-
ness is selective, active, in judging, subsuming, predicating.
This is not James* s final view. His later philosophy of
pure experience, in which his doctrine of radical empiricism
played a dominant part, meant changes in his epistemology,
although it is doubtful whether he ever made the necessary
5
modifications. At this point in his thinking, there is a
definite concession to idealism, in contrast to the dominant
strain of epistemological realism, in suggesting that relations
are mental, intuitively necessary or a priori truths expressing
6
relations between mental terms.
1. W. James, PP, II, 639.
2. ICWJ, 86, 87.
3. Cf. PP, II, 638.
4. ICWJ, 88.
5. See Chapter VI, 1, i.
6. See PP, II, 677. Also Brett’s article in ICWJ, 81-94 for a
general treatment of this problem, not in relation to James *3
epistemology particularly, but to epistemology in general.
I.
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2. Metaphysics
1
We shall discuss James 1 s metaphysical thought in its
three definite emphases: (1) Pluralism; (2) Humanism; and
(3) Philosophy of Pure Experience. This is not to suggest
that the three are separate. There are problems involved in
attempting to frame James *s metaphysical position, but it is
certain that his humanism is a theistic, pluralistic one, and
that his philosophy of pure experience is pluralistic, what-
ever we shall find that to mean.
i. Pluralism
It is evident from James* s wri tings and letters that a
pluralistic universe was always for him the only kind worth
having, meeting all of the demands of rationality— intellect-
ual, aesthetic, moral, and practical. Monism had been rejected
because of its abstractness, its treatment of the real problems
of freedom, evil, error, its attempt to parade itself as logical,
2
when "it must remain only mystically expressed.” Between this
and scientific evolutionism were to be found men like Martineau,
Ladd, and Bowne, who, according to James, lacked prestige, and
whose philosophies were destitute of "victorious and aggressive
3
note." It was the heart of his conviction that the world is
in the making; it is a dangerous, risky world, in which real
victories and real defeats are to be discovered.
Tl James *s first course in metaphysics was given in 1890.
Cf. Perry, TCWJ, II, 101.
2. Ltr. to Benjamin Blood, 1897; Perry, TCWJ, II, 234.
3. W. James, PRA, 18.
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The pluralism which he advocated may be described as
1
a pluralistic monism. Admittedly this is not a clear con-
cept, and yet that seems to be his position. The universe is
one of free substances or monads acting directly on one another,
and human substance is identified with divine substance, though
not in the absolutist manner. While the absolutist says that
the self is realized in the all-form only, and becomes fully
divine only in the form of totality, pluralism says that there
may never be such an all-form;
The substance of reality may never get
totally collected;... some of it may re-
main outside of the largest combination
of it ever made, and a distributive form
of reality, the each-form, is logically
as acceptable and empirically as probable
as the all-form. 2
3
It is thus a theistic, finitistic, and tychistic world, offer-
ing a middle pathway between a universe which is absolutely
rational and one absolutely irrational. Its parts may be re-
4
lated externally like a "federal republic," a loosely-con-
nected synechistic world. Since there is no absolute unity,
but only a principle of nextness between parts, things may
arise by chance. Originally James had held to a view of
chance as occurring like a bolt from nowhere,but this was
superseded by a concept of novelties arising in a gradual way.
1. Cf. following section on James 's philosophy of pure experi-
ence for further treatment of this subject; see also Chap-
ter VI, 4.
2. W. James, PU, 34.
3. Ltr. to Francois Pillon, LWJ, II, 203, 204: "It is theistic,
but not essentially so. It rejects all doctrines of the
Absolute! It is finitist, etc."
4. W. James, PU, 321.
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"It may grow out of what preceded it, and ... so belongs to
1
the context in which it arises." In this radically empirical
view of the universe, conjunctive as well as disjunctive rela-
tions are to be found.
The world is One just so far as its parts
• hang together by definite connexion, • •
•
many just so far as any definite connexion
fails to obtain.
2
ii. Humanism
In such a pluralism, James found a place for his emphasis
on individuality, personality, and personal activity. The in-
dividual is not in such a world swallowed up, but retains his
freedom to act, and to make some difference in things. James
3
liked to call his pragmatism "humanism", and it is evident that
it stands for two definite convictions:
. (1) It indicates the power of individual man in helping
to create new facts, to relate the ideal to the real. The
human contribution to reality cannot be dismissed or forgotten.
In our cognitive as well as in our active
life we are creative. ?/e add, both to the
subject and predicate part of reality. The
world stands really malleable, waiting to
receive its final touch at our hands. Like
the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human vio- 4
lence willingly. Man engenders truths upon it.
1. terry, TCWJ, II, 412. Cf. also PU, 391, 392n; SPP, Chs.12,13.
("In a world where connections are not logically necessary,
they may nevertheless adventitiously 1 come 1 ." Prom a syllabus
for his course in Metaphysics, TOWJ, 11,382.) Cf. further
"without losing its identity, a thing can either take up or
drop another thing." PU, 328, 323.
2. W. James, PEA, 156. (His later philosophy of pure experience
asserted an immanence of monads, Cf. VI, 3.)
3. Ltr. to Schiller, LWJ, II, 271.
4. W. James, PEA, 257.
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This is a world of possibilities, of choice, centering about
the free wills of individuals, upon whom it depends for the
solution to many of its contradictions and the realization of
its potentialities. Instead of a ready-made world, we have a
1
man-made reality*
(2) It is furthermore, a humanism which is theistic for
James.
I myself read humanism theistically and
pluralistically. If there be a God, he is
no absolute all-experiencer
,
but simply the 2
experiencer of widest actual conscious span.
God himself is finite, one of the "eaches", primus inter pares .
It is at this point that James's humanism and theism is closest
to personalism, particularly to those concepts of it which em-
phasize the finiteness of God, and the co-operation of persons
with Him in the work of the kingdom. If, however, others found
no reason to believe in final causes or in the purposes of a
finite God, James offered a humanism which is in itself a re-
ligion*
We can still make the enjoyment of our brothers
stand us in the stead of a final cause.
Individuals can add to the welfare of the
race in a variety of ways. 3
iii. Philosophy of Pure Experience
The key to metaphysical reality, according to James's
1. Cf. Riley, AT, 319.
2. W. James, MT, 125.
3. H. James, LWJ, I, 130
*r
1
. 1
«
-
,
'
*
t
*
f
'
86
of pure experience, is to be found in continuity, which is
the essential aspect of conscious experience. Reality is a
fluent, qualitative, experience-continuum, from which the mind
selects what is relevant for its purposes, and in which all of
the ancient paradoxes which have so troubled men are finally
resolved.
This ultimate reality remains as mystical as the One of
absolutism which he had condemned as inarticulable and unsci-
1
entific. How shall it be related to his pluralism ? He calls
his philosophy a pluralistic philosophy of pure experience,
and yet this position would seem to be a monism. It is a
monism, but a very critical monism, in which a multiplicity
of moments of experiences form the one, just as consciousness
is one, although many items are found within it. It is a monism
which is a collection of units, of eaches, possessing All-forms
and each-forms, God Himself being one of the eaches.
We must leave the many problems to which this philosophy
2
gives rise for consideration in another chapter; there it will
be seen that the key lies not only in continuity, but possibly
in that concept of emergent evolution which Brett discovered
as the key to the final chapter of James* s Principles .
One question, of course, immediately arises which may not
be postponed: of what sort is this reality— mental .material
,
neutral ? Williams is convinced that James never reached a
1* Gf. James*s letter to Blood, in 1897; TCWJ, II, 234.
2. See Chapter V, 3,4; VI, 2,4.
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1
final decision "between phenomenalism, hylozoism, panpsychism.
Perry at times states emphatically that the on-going stream
of experience is neutral; at others he admits that the answer
2
was never formulated "by James.
Our choice lies "between a mental and a neutral view.
Matthiessen
1
s contention that his final philosophy is a natural
-
3
istic pantheism is accompanied "by no facts; the evidence does
not indicate that such is the ultimate solution. At times
James appears to "be arguing for a neutral reality. His designa-
tion of it as "pure”, meaning prior to the distinctions which
arise on the conscious level, particularly "between subject and
object, would point in the general direction of a stream of
ultimate reality which is prior to consciousness and the self,
the larger area in which both are to be defined.
It is Dr. Ilewhall 1 s conviction that this ultimate reality
is "an extensive conscious experience with which human beings
4
are co-conscious." Certainly many of the statements made by
James would lead us so to conclude. In Some Problems of
5
Philosophy he appears to be arguing for a reality all of the
same character, mental, within which are to be found a plural-
ism of individuals, persons, things, free to choose. In his
analysis of the stream he points out that conscious states both
1. Article in ICWJ, 117.
2. Cf. Perry, TCWJ,II, 603 ff
.
,
595, 764 ff.
3. See Matthiessen, JP, 138.
4. Hewhall, Diss. 195. Cf. also 184; PRA, 300.
5. W. James, 102 ff.
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are and are not the same as anotherxxT my experience differs
subjectively from another's, although it may he the same ob-
jectively. In this experience-continutun there are no objects
transcending consciousness, as in the Principles
,
and objective
reality and the stream of consciousness are coincident. Perry
says that "this coincidence he evidently identified with ideal-
ism, thus again revealing his wavering adherence to his own
doctrine of 'pure' experience as a 'neutral' realm,— capable
of assuming the role of consciousness, but not necessarily or
1
inherently conscious." The last paragraph of Some Problems
of Philosophy discussing his theory of causation, would seem
to necessitate an espousal of a panpsyehistic form.
The concrete perceptual flux, taken just as
it comes, offers in our own activity-situations
perfectly comprehensible instances of causal
agency. 2
If these experiences are taken as types of actual causation,
then we are required to ascribe to physical cause also an in-
wardly experiential nature.
A notebook entry on February 11, 1908, states that the
"constitution of reality which I am making for is of psychic
3
type." His dislike for the term "idealism" stemmed from his
distrust of all absolute idealism; he found himself in sym-
pathy with the more empirical idealism of Berkeley and Hume.
4
For this reason he termed his radical empiricism "spiritual."
17 Terry, TCWJ, 'll, 595.
'
2. W. James, SPP, 218.
3. Perry, TCWJ, II, 764.
4. W. James, PRA, 93; also PH, 23, 31.
.'
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The preponderant weight of evidence seems to lie in
favor of a mental stream of reality, and not the neutral
stream which has been taken up by the neo-realists. It is
essential to note here, however, that this evidence is by no
means conclusive, and merely points in the general direction
of James f s ultimate metaphysical goal. It is quite possible
that he might have accepted a personalistic position had he
lived; this, too, is purely in the realm of conjecture, Lowe
believes that it was "personally possible, not logically possi-
1
ble." The logically possible and impossible, however, were
for James factors to be considered only when more important
factors were out of the way.
3, Philosophy of Religion
Although James wrote no one book describing his philosophy
of religion, it is possible to trace the development of such
a philosophy in his writings. Ernst Troeltsch "credited him
with offering the 'first through-going contribution from
2
America to the philosophy of religion.*” The contributions
are to be found in his letters and writings, and particularly
in the Varieties of Religious Experience
,
A Pluralistic Uni-
verse. and The Will to Believe.
1. Article in ICWJ, 175. Perry also points out that the self
dominates the Principles and the VRE, and persons are always
valued. However, it is his conviction that the self fofc
James is never an ultimate principle, but a result. Cf.
TCWJ, I, 549; PRA, 90-92.
2. Buckham, Art. (1942), 130. Quoting Ernst Troeltsch, "Empiricism
and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion," Harv. The ol. Rev .
5(1912), 401, 402.
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Experience is the starting-point in dealing with re-
ligion, as with all problems.
In a world in which no religious feeling
had ever existed, I doubt whether any
philosophic theology could ever have been
framed. 1
James is not concerned with creeds, but with the essential
life of religion, with
the feelings, acts, and experiences of
individual men in their solitude, so far
as they apprehend themselves to stand in
relation to whatever they may consider the
divine. 2
We shall find that for James religion is essentially a private
and personal concern. Although he could never for a moment be
convicted of being anti-social or non-social, the emphasis was
always on the individual to the exclusion of the social. This
was his emphasis in the Varieties, which, despite James
1
s con-
3
tention that it contained "all facts and no philosophy", pre-
sented certain definite philosophical trends. His consideration
of various religions led him to conclude that, whereas some re-
ligions made little or nothing of the social, all were agreed
on two things— something is wrong with the individual, and
there is some source of salvation for the individual in a con-
nection with the higher powers of the universe. Morality is
1. W. James, VK3, 431.
2. Ibid., 31.
3. Ltr. to Miss Frances Morse, 1900; LWJ, II, 127.
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a thing entirely distinct from religion in its essential
1
essence* The latter is the individual’s "willingness to
close (his) mouth and be as nothing in the floods and water-
£
spouts of God."
It is regrettable that James under-emphasized the social
element so much. Even if the religious experience is to mean
nothing but a psychological, subjective feeling substantiated
by no objective certitude, the experience is not isolated from
the rest of experience, and must affect it in some fashion.
Religion means more than what a man does with his solitude; it
must mean what the man does in society with what has happened
to him in his solitude. In his later writings James does begin
to emphasize the social element, stressing co-operation for
the kingdom or brotherhood which it is the will of God to usher
in, and postulating a humanism for those who fail to find evi-
dence for a theistic world.
One thing further may be noted before we attempt to trace
the development of James’s philosophy of religion, and that is
the relationship of philosophy to religion. It is contended
in the Varieties that philosophy is secondary to the religious
3
experience, and that the major philosophical task is to
"redeem religion from unwholesome privacy. . .and extract from
1. Morality is a consequence; the pragmatic test is "by their
fruits ye shall know them", it is not the essence of religion.
2. W. James, VRE, 47.
3. Ibid., 431.
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the privacies of religious experience some general facts
which can he defined in formulas upon which everybody may
1
agree." We shall expect to find that the emphasis will al-
ways he on feeling, and not reason. Reason "lets the real
2
essence of religion evaporate in intellectual terms." Reason
can only interpret the facts of religious experience, and set
forth the hypothetical, probable character of the ultimate
metaphysical propositions about it; it can postulate, set up
hypotheses, not dogmas, and criticize them on the basis of
further evidence available, but because it is reason, it can
not hope to present the religious experience as it is. Beyond
all that it can do is something more, untouched and untouchable
by the intellect.
The development of James’s philosophy takes us from the
concept of the Varieties through the fideism of the Will to
Believe and his general pragmatism to the conclusions of A
Pluralistic Universe . Some of his later conclusions are to
be found implicit in his earlier writing, and it is doubtful
whether the development occurred through definite stages of
increasing insight into the problems concerned, or through
1. W. James, VRE, 432, 433.
2. W. James, ERE, 492n. "See how the ancient spirit of Methodism
evaporates under those wonderfully able rationalistic book-
lets... of a philosopher like Professor Bowne."
3. James is objecting to dogmatic theology and absolutistic
philosophy. Philosophy’s task in relation to religion is to
abandon absolutism and devote herself to the establishment
of a science of religion .
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definite changing viewpoints. On the whole, we may assert
that the line of progress combines some of both.
i. Early Point of View
It is evident that all his life James was preoccupied
with the problems of religion, and concerned about the the-
istic view of the world, although he never had a really person-
1
al experience of God. The problems surrounding such belief
were many* Evil was factual; he could not bring himself to
2
"gloss it over", or "blink it out of sight." Any account of
God must take this into account, and not make it a merely spec-
ulative problem as the absolutists did. Furthermore, the per-
ceptual flux reveals real changes, novelties, risks, dangers,
defeats, victories, and God must be squared with these things.
The desires of men, too, must be considered for these are also
facts of experience,— not only men^ desires, but their values,
hopes, and fears. All of these things were involved in any
concept of a theistic or non-theistic world. The traditional
arguments for God held little weight for James. The main ques-
tion was: Does experience as a whole point to any kind of a
God ? So he said in his Principles :
1* Of* H* James, LWJ, II, 214.
2. Ibid., I, 158.
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The perfect object of belief would be a God
or ’Soul of the World’, represented both
optimistically and moralist!cally (if such
a combination could be* ) 1
(1) God as a Stimulus to Action
The Will to Believe gives us part of his answer. The
concept of God is essential to human action.
Infra- theis tic conceptions, materialism,
and agnosticism, are irrational because
they are inadequate stimuli to man’s
practical nature.
2
Belief in God is practically rational, justified by its prom-
ise, its giving of relief to men and meeting of inward needs.
The main value of such a God is in releasing human energies,
giving enlarging perspectives and expanding horizons. In
other words, the idea of a God is to be held for the psycho-
logical certitude which it brings to men like James who were
forced to declare at some time or other in their experience:
The nudity of the Eosmos has got beyond
anything I have as yet experienced. I have
not succeeded in finding any companion yet,
and I feel the want of some outward stimulus
to my Soul. 3
Against such a materialism which degrades sensibly higher
things into sensibly lower ones, positing a gigantic "X" for
an ultimate principle, James found "tons of affirmation" 4
1. W. James, PP, II, 317.
2. W. James, WB, 134.
3. H. James, LWJ, I, 125.
4. Ltr. to O.W.Holmes, Jr. in 1866; LWJ, I, 82.
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not in scientific proofs and arguments, "but in our ideal
hopes and desires. This sort of thing sets the pace for what
1
we shall find true of all the facts of religion.
His pragmatism is closely connected with this "will to
believe," As Bixler notes:
Pragmatism!;a interests and emphasis are pre-
eminently those of religious faith; its atti-
tude is pre-eminently that of the will to
believe, .. fit! clearly has much more in
common with the religious view, where the
objects of belief must always remain un-
knowable, than with the scientific view
where the correspondence-relation may be
the chief thing of importance. Religion
will always require postulates, faith, the
will to believe, and pragmatism’s fitness
for this type of thinking is significant
evidence for the fundamental character in
James’s philosophy, 2
This is not to forget the relation of reason to will, to
live options. We shall find in our next chapter that will
supplements reason, but never supplants it.
Pragmatism extends to the notion of God; it has a practical
3
value in guaranteeing an ideal order. Furthermore, God is to
4
be used, not understood. Mysticism is also practical, for it
is in the individual’s communion with the ideal that "new
force comes into the world, and new departures are made here
5
below." God’s presence does make a difference in fact,
whether it be in the realm of nature or of personality.
1. See section on ""Fideism” further on in this chapter for a
fuller treatment of the "will to believe."
2. Bixler, RPWJ, 99.
3. W. James, PRA, 106.
4. W. James, VRE, 517.
5. Ibid., 521.
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(2) God a 8 a Saving Power
In the Varieties a very different concept of God is pre-
sented. The emphasis is no longer on man so much as on God;
man is the receptive one, and God is all-important, producing
results. Religion is still very much an individual affair,
hut the concept of God is one of saving power. The theism in
the Varieties is still confusing and inchoate, for James was
far more interested in establishing the validity of religious
experience than in formulating a philosophy of religion, or
presenting a coherent account of the nature of God. Here he
defines as divine "any object that is godlike, such a primal
reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly
1 2
and gravely." "God is real since He produces real effects."
There are, of course, other hypotheses concerning the
nature of God, but most of these are developed more thoroughly
in his later writings.
ii. Later Point of View
The essential feature of James's final point of view is
that of a finite God. In a letter to Thomas Davidson in 1882,
James had written:
In saying that God exists, all I imply is
that ray purposes are cared for by a mind
so powerful as on the whole to control the
drift of the universe. • .The difficulties of
theism. • .have always seemed to me to flow
from the gratuitous dogma Of God being the
all-inclusive reality. 3
1. w. James, VRE
,
38.
2. Ibid., 517.
3. Quoted in Bixler, RPWJ, 125-127.
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It has been further suggested in the Varieties :
All that the facts require is that the power
should he both other and larger than our
conscious selves. 1
It is in the Pluralistic Universe that we find the loftiest
conception of religion, the happier synthesis of God*s and
man's energies, God and man co-operating in realizing the
ideals of man, and achieving the purposes of God. In this
book, too, we find the most explicit statement of theistic
finitism.
2
God is finite, either in knowledge, power or both. The
omnipotent and omniscient God of theology is a "disease of
3
the philosophy- shop." God is instead a part of a pluralistic
system, "one helper, primus inter pares
,
in the midst of all
4
the shapers of the world
1
s great faith ." We are integral
parts of God, not external creations; yet God "works in an
5
external environment, has limits and has enemies." Hence He
6
is responsible for only as much as he knows and can achieve.
If we supplement this concept of God with other earlier
statements, we are introduced to the picture of a God who must
7
be conceived under the form of mental personality, who "him-
self. . • may draw vital strength and increase of very being
8
from our fidelity," and in turn influences "personal centres
9
of energy of the various subjects." James included almost
1. \v. James, VRE, 525.
2. W. James, PU, 311.
3. H. James, LWJ, II, 269.
4. W. James, PRA, 298.
5. W. James, PU, 124.
6. H. James, LWJ, II, 269.
7. Cf. WB, 122: "A power. . .which means(right) and ...recognizes us.
8. W. James, WB, 61.
9. W. James, VRE, 507.
I,
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all of the arguments of thOBe who have seen the inadequacy
of an infinite God to explain the world as we know it,
—
the
presence of natural evil, the problem of freedom, the necessity
of moral achievement; and he added that God must be approach-
able— and if approachable, then limited. Personality is left
1
inviolate and individuality sacred; evil becomes a practical
problem; the irrational elements in the world are explicable.
Religion then becomes an adventure of faith, in which men stake
their lives on the possibility, not the guarantee, of eventual
triumph; it is "a universe of spiritual relations surrounding
the earthly practical ones, not merely relations of ’value 1
,
2
but agencies and their activities.”
The capacity of the strenuous road lies so
deep down among our natural human possibil-
ities that even if there were no metaphysical
or traditional grounds for believing in a God,
men would postulate one simply as a pretext
for living hard... Our attitude toward concrete
evils is entirely different in a world where,
we joyously face tragedy for an infinite de-
mander’s sake. 3
Closely allied to this concept of the finite God is that
concept which had always attracted him,— Frederick Myers’ post-
4
ulate of the "subliminal self." Abnormal and supernormal facts
suggest the possibility of a superior consciousness, and relig-
ious experiences (particularly of the nature of those described
in the Varieties ) point to the "continuity of our consciousness
TT Of. WB, l'9'S,-2*?0'.
2. H. James, 1WJ, II, 213.
3. W. James, SPP, 213.
4. See MS, 154 ff. for James’ discussion of Myers.
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1
" Our primary conscious
At its lowest it is only the depository of
our forgotten memories; at its highest we
do not know what it is at all. 2
But it may be that we are co-conscious with a higher conscious-
3
ness, which works with men, and yet is outside of man. Necessa-
rily such a postulate carries us into the realm of over-beliefs,
despite the ovexwhelming testimony of religious experience. But
to reject it on that account would mean
a dogmatic disbelief in any extant conscious-
ness higher than that of the ’normal 1 human
mind; and this in the teeth of the extraordinary
vivacity of man's psychological commerce with
something ideal that feels as if it were also
actual... and in the teeth of such analogies
as Fechner uses to show that there may be
other-consciousness than man's. If other, then
why not higher and bigger ? Why may we not be
in the universe as our dogs and cats are in
our drawing-rooms and libraries ? It's a will
to believe on both sides. 4
In the realm of over-beliefs, one may pass over to a Trans-
cendental Idealism, and talk of an Absolute Mind with which
we fuse, or we may adopt the Christian point of view of Cod
5
as a distinct deity who acts on us. The latter is adopted
by James, united with his concept of the finiteness of God,
to become a definite panpsychism.
1 .
2
.
3.
4.
5.
w. James, PU, 299, 300.
w. James, WB, 321.
Cf. THE
,
499.
H. James, LWJ
,
II, 269.
CF. LWJ, I, 149, 150.
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ill. Fideism
Religion is essentially a courageous adventure of faith,
and requires the will to believe. But all of our over-beliefs
take us beyond facts, and some Justification for such a step
ought to be attempted, James’s Will to Believe (1897) was
such an attempt. Essentially fideism is an attempt to analyze
1
psychologically the process by which men acquire their beliefs.
It was written for purely academic audiences, for those who
worshipped science and scientific method so blindly and adoring-
£
ly that their ’’native capacity for faith” had been paralyzed.
My paper wasn’t addressed to mankind at large,
but to a limited set of studious persons,
badly under the ban Just now of certain au-
thorities whose simple-minded faith in
’naturalism
1
also is sorely in need of an
airing. 3
What does fideism say then ? It is strikingly similar
to Kant’s view of the "practical reason’’, although its emphasis
is mainly upon subjective, emotional values. It begins with
the premise that our beliefs are not always the result of necess-
ary logic, but of our sentiments. Purely intellectual or logical
4
analyses constitute a "monstrous abridgement of life." What
we call the rationality of the world is our own feeling of
rationality and this is indicated in the way it affects our lives,
awakens our impulses, satisfies our demands. Therefore, in a
1. Schiller pointed this out in answer to critics. Cf.TCWJ ,11 , £41.
£. W. James, WB,x.Also ,LWJ,II ,£08: "In my essay the evil shape was
a vision of ’science’ in the form of abstraction, priggishness,
lording it over all."
3. H. James
,
LWJ
,
II
,
50.
4. W. James, WB, 69.
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world where there are opposing views of life, we have the
right to take that one which "makes the world seem more
1
rational", i.e. which satisfies our own vital needs the
best.
This is by no means to suggest that all options are to
be decided in this way, for many of them can be decided on
intellectual grounds alone. It does say that where intellect-
ual grounds do not justify conclusions, then we may believe
or will. Life exceeds logic, and "extreme intellectual scru-
2
pulosity paralyzes action." We have the right to give a
3
"provisional answer... made on subjective grounds" alone to
those concepts of the world which offer the most promise, and
4
open up possibilities. Our faith is an hypothesis, to be
5
tested by the entire drift of our thinking, — a statement
of belief with qualifications. It will be called a true be-
lief when it will be "reversed by nothing that later turns up
in your action's fruit; it will harmonize ... with the entire
6
drift of experience." James is not arguing for a belief
despite the evidence to the contrary.
I quite agree that what mankind most lacks
is criticism and caution, not faith. Its
cardinal weakness is to let belief follow
1. W. James, MT, ix.
2. Ibid., 210.
3. Ibid., x.
4. Cf. WB, 95 ff.
5. Cf. WB, 17.
6. WB, 105, 106.
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recklessly upon lively conception,
especially when the conception has in-
stinctive liking at its hack. 1
What he was contending is that sometimes a step beyond the
evidence is essential for a more rational system; but the
step should combine not only courage but "courage weighted
2
with responsibility".
The will to believe is reasonable under certain condi-
tions. Moral questions in particular cannot have their solu-
tion postponed while we wait for sensible proof; our over-
belief is a risk, but a necessary one, for the suspension of
our judgment may mean the loss of some truth. And, in some
cases, faith itself creates its own verification, the effect
of our belief and action thereon helping to bring about the
facts which verify it, as, e.g.
,
our belief in a social good,
where faith in one another creates the good, or with love,
which actually brings about love.
Fideism then involves the following:
fl) An emphasis on the value of emotional, subjective
preferences in forming our beliefs, in the absence of in-
tellectual solutions. Reality is vitally connected with our
3
emotional, active life, and while our beliefs derive mostly
from sensations, our emotional powers have much to do with
them. Ho philosopher can pretend, says James, that
1. W. James, WB, Pref
.
,x.
2. Ibid., xi.
3. Cf. PP, II, 296, 297.
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any philosophy can be, or ever has been,
constructed without the help of personal
preference, belief, or divination, 1
(8) An emphasis on the fact that reality is in a vital
sense dependent on individuals, amenable to their purposes,
an instrument for the creation of new facts. We make the
2
world we are in at live, optional points; indiscriminate
faith is not implied, but the will to believe comes in when
an issue is before us that is lively, momentous and forced;
(3) A defence of the right to believe, and even the ne-
cessity to believe where the evidence is incomplete. Acts
of indecision may actually be negative decisions. James
opens the mind to all possibilities, rejects the will-not-to-
know when it is reasonable to act upon the data which are at
hand.
(4) A denial that we can thus believe in contradictories
or untruths merely because we want to believe in them.
In concreto
,
the freedom to believe can only
cover living options which the intellect of
the individual cannot by itself resolve; and
living options never seem absurdities to him
who has them to consider. 3
Belief is not truth; it is a voluntary act governed by motives
and reasons, but it is necessary to verify it before it is
counted true.
(5) A conviction that the highest ideals of the race are
involved in fideism. Ideas, beliefs, rule the world, and are
1. W. James, WB, 93.
2. Cf. PP, II, 578, 579.
3. W. James, 29.
-,
, ,
.
.
;
c
'
.
'
,
9 «
» *
1C4
the propulsive powers behind the creation of new facts, the
realization of potentialities. The ideals and over-beliefs
of men prove to be the most valuable and important things
about him.
Fideism is thus essentially an attempt to legitimate
1
religious convictions. Macintosh says of it
We have no right to live as if there were a
God, except as far as we honestly can, even
for the sake of winning a promised subjective
certitude. The will to believe becomes the
right to believe only when it has done jus-
tice to the 'duty to doubt'. 2
This is certainly not fair to James, whatever may have been
the extremes to which others have pushed his doctrine. He
doubted extremely, and his philosophy reflects his appeal to
experience for the evidence available. He constantly opposed
a flagrantly false faith or optimism which rested on insecure
foundations, and went beyond the evidence when he felt that
such a step was necessary for a more rational system, and the
evidence, while still inadequate, pointed toward truth in a
certain direction— a truth which was of vital concern to man.
4. Influence on Subsequent Philosophy
Tracing particular influences would be a task far beyond
the scope of this dissertation, and would lead us as well into
T. James's faith-ladder partly corresponds with Karl Groos'
practical absolutism and Vaihinger's "As-if" theory.
2. Macintosh, PK, 312.
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reserved for our final chapters. The general influence of
James is perhaps most important.
(1) His influence does not lie in passing on through
philosophers or students a particular philosophy, James's
influence is more in the shape of an attitude, an outlook,
a vision which led to fruitfulness, ventures in untried path-
ways, suggestiveness of new roads that might he opening.
While there are very few Jamesians, in the
sense of direct descent, the world is full
of mixed Jamesians, who acknowledge their
common relationship to him, without feeling
any bond to one another. 1
One can hardly pick up a book on philosophy, psychology, or
religion, hear a sermon, listen to a lecture, without seeing
or hearing at least once the name of James. Whatever the
contradictions and inconsistencies in his philosophy, he made
an impact upon men, and some difference in the world.
If we turn to particular schools of thought, we can trace
his doctrines in such widely divergent areas as neo-realism,
behaviorism, naturalistic humanism, panpsychistic supernatural
-
ism, instrumentalism, logical positivism. We find more emphasis
being placed on empirical philosophies, on individuals, persons,
values, ends. The psychology and philosophy of religion owe
much to his empirical observations. The emotional and volition-
al factors of human experience are being given fuller considera-
tion by most philosophers. Why should this be ? Hot because
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 668
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James was always right— he was not. But because he did open
up some of the locked doors of philosophy, and demanded that
they be made relevant to human experience. It may be said
for certain that James would not recognize some of his chil-
dren in the lines of development which they have followed,
but he would welcome all of them into the open arena, rather
than have them stagnate in their own private chambers.
(2) Philosophy in general is indebted to James for tak-
ing philosophy out of the classroom atmosphere and presenting
its problems as living issues for the man in the street. Al-
though his lectures to the public were mainly necessitated by
economic reasons, failing to allow him sufficient time for
the formulation of his metaphysics, what was philosophy’s loss
in one way was gain in another, for he made philosophy relevant
to the problems of men. He emphasized the fact that no truth
which is purely abstract is worthwhile from the standpoint of
human experience. In his letter to the Hation on the problem
of teaching philosophy, he advocated as its chief value” a
1
wider openness of mind and a more flexible way of thinking."
8
Although that ideal may still be largely unrealized, the part
that James played is by no means small in changing it from
3
"dogmatic edification" to the awakening of the minds of men
who are men, and not machines.
1. H. James, LWJ, I, 190.
2. Cf. Barzun’s TA; Blanchard et al,PAE; Miller, Art. (1947),
538 ff.
3. Of. Perry, TCWJ, I, 462.
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(3) One of James's problems has since his time become
1
the central issue of philosophy and of our day. Within the
last few years, technological advances have threatened con-
siderable changes in the practical life of the world, but also
in the intellectual life. The influence of positivism in
philosophy and sociology, of "operationalism" in the sciences
of symbolism in logical circles has tended to reduce life to
mechanism. We need more than ever James's interest in real
things, his challenge to enthrone life above logic, if logic
stultifies life. We need furthermore his concern for ethical
and moral ideals, for moral and spiritual achievement, in a
world where we have far outstripped our moral resources in
advancing the scientific achievements which have become our
gods.
(4) Finally we must recognize that James's emphasis on
growing truth is vital, as against absolutism and dogmatism.
He felt himself to be a continual seeker after truth, and
seldom one who had found enough truth to assert it dogmatically,
necessarily he over-emphasized many doctrines, partly in his
zeal for them, partly because of his inclination to hyperbole,
and partly because he wished to press them to their logical
and legitimate conclusions in order that their final validity
or invalidity might be established. But his contribution to
philosophy as a whole, and to the philosophy of religion in
1. I am indebted to Perry in part for this comment. Cf. ISWJ,
122 ff.
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particular, is Ms appeal to experience, to facts, postu-
lating beliefs for criticism and examination in every possi-
ble way before asserting their adequacy in explaining the
facts of experience and interpreting them. James* s favorite
Biblical verse aptly describes Ms own search after truth,
and Ms emphasis on experience combining revelations and
possibilities for novelties in the creation of which he
might have a part: "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and
I will speak to thee."
, ,
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CHAPTER V
INFLUENCE OP JAMES* S PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSES
UPOH HIS PHILOSOPHICAL CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we are concerned with the direct influ-
ences which the psychological analyses of James had on his
philosophical conclusions, as well as with his attempts to
answer questions as a philosopher which he had discovered he
could not answer in the psychological frame of reference.
Before turning our attention to the "border-line problems
which he considers, it is necessary to note two things:
(1) The use of the word "influence" needs clarification.
In establishing definite influences of one man*s thought on
another, difficulties often arise because we confuse "influ-
ences" with "analogies." The difficulty remains in dealing
with the influence of the thought of one man in one universe
of discourse upon his thought in another universe of discourse,
although it is not so great. James was one man, not an ab-
normal, split personality. He pursued psychology and philos-
ophy together throughout most of his life, although philosophy
always seemed to him the more vital consideration. We are
justified in assuming that what he thinks in one frame of
reference cannot ever be entirely divorced from what he thinks
in a larger frame of reference. Por him psychology was one
field in which he attempted to solve his problems, and there
he found certain facts, set up hypotheses, reached some tentative
rr
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conclusions. In this field he did not consider some prob-
lems because they went beyond the boundaries of natural sci-
ence; yet the problems remained, and the field itself kept
moving and pointing beyond to the larger field of philosophy.
In this larger universe of discourse the facts and hypotheses
of psychology constitute one portion of the field of study,
to be considered in relation to the facts of other sciences,
other facts of experience. We may conclude that his psycho-
logical studies take their rightful place in the larger field,
affecting, modifying, acting upon his philosophical views of
the whole, impelling him in certain directions, cognizant of
the observations of psychology.
(2) One other fact remains to be noted. James was neither
unconscious of, nor too concerned about, the charges of in-
consistency and self-contradiction which were continually
levelled against him. He knew he was unsystematic, and recog-
nized that many of his statements were paradoxical and down-
right contradictory. The British psychologist and philosopher,
James Ward, said of the Principles :
I should apply to you the words of Goethe:
'Es sind zwei Menschen in dieser Brust’, u.s.w.
I shall some day perhaps play off James the
psychologist against James the metaphysician,
moralist, and human. 1
It is not our intention to "play off" the phases in this way,
although such a task would be relatively simple, and we might
be led to conclude that James was writing for effect alone, or
1". terry, TdWJ, II, 99. (Ltr. on Nov. 10, 1892.)
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was deliberately vague because he had no sound position to
uphold, or that he was incapable of achieving a stable view
because of his temporary attachment and enthusiasm for many
views. On the contrary, it is the conviction of this disserta-
tion that James, the man, followed his inner strivings into
devious, strange pathways in his search for the truth— none
were deemed too insignificant or despised. "Honesty of re-
port", says Allport, "was to him a virtue far higher than
1
consistency." Philosophy has always needed men like James
to remind them that self-consistency or inner coherence of
any system which is procured at the expense of life, removed
from the "livingness" of things to an academic garden, is not
worthwhile. life presents its paradoxes; James's report of
his wanderings in its pathways contains those paradoxes. His
lack of any final synthesis was due in part to his own limita-
tions, to the conditions of some of the psychology and philoso-
2
phy of his time, and to the comparative brevity of time which
he had to work out a complete metaphysical system. He was,
however, conscious of the many inconsistencies, and had already
begun to tackle some of them in the last few years of his life.
!• Methodology
The problem of methodology is the first one which necessi-
tates our consideration, and here the influence of his psychology
1. Allport, Art, (1943)? 114.
2, See Chapter III, 5 on "Difficulties Attending Psychology; II,
2, on the "Barrenness of Philosophy."
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upon his philosophy is marked. He could, as a psychologist,
adhere to the methodological postulate of determinism, for
example, and to a psychophysical parallelism. But he was un-
satisfied; the problems remained insoluble on the merely psy-
chological level. So he was faced with a choice— the method
of science, or a more embracing method for his philosophy.
Which could give him the answer to his problems ?
i. Empirical Method
We have already pointed out the emphasis of the empirical,
scientific method in his psychology, and his battle against
1
conscious or unconscious vagueness. Despite the infinitely
vaster field with which philosophy was concerned, he fought
for the same attention to particulars, facts. ”lTo one sees
farther into a generalization than his own knowledge of de-
2
tails extends.”
It is over this problem of methodology that the forces
of rationalism were engaged by him. Its method of explaining
3
parts by wholes too often lost the parts in abstraction, al-
though this was less true of a man like Royce whom James re-
spected highly as a man and as a philosopher. The extreme
to which his dislike for rationalism led him is evidenced by
his espousal of Bergson’s attitude toward intellectualistic
1# See Chapter II, 4, iii; also 6, i.
2. Ltr. to his father from Brazil, 1865.1WJ, I, 65.
3. Cf. LWJ, II, 268.
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1
logic. It was "vicious", "pure pedantry"; ”it impoverished
2
and verbalized everything, and tied up nature in red tape."
Even in the classroom he refused to indulge in formal logical
analyses or purely intellectual analyses, and this same atti-
tude is evident in his writings on philosophy.
When you come down to the facts, what do
your harmonious and integral systems prove
to be in the concrete ? Always things burst
by the growing content of experience. Dramatic
unities; laws of versification; ecclesiastical
systems; scholastic doctrines. Bah l ...
Those who do insist that the ideal and the
real are dynamically continuous are those by
whom the world is to be saved. 3
Yet a strict, positivistic empiricism was also an un-
healthy extreme. His scientific esteem for facts did not
blind him to the fact that the limitations and restrictions
of positivism could not do justice to the objective facts
studied. In their reaction against the dangers of a priori
speculation, the positivists unjustifiably narrowed the field
of experience, and of science. They divorced from the practical,
and made no allowance for the emotional, subjective preferences
4
which were facts of experience. He castigated such a position
5
as "uncanny, unheimlich"
,
and it suffocated him. What men
1. W. James, PU, 110.
2. Santayana, WOD, 206.
3. IWJ, II, 123.
4. Cf. this chapter, 4, i.
5. Perry, TCWJ, I, 449.
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need is
a philosophy that will not only exercise
your powers of intellectual abstraction,
hut that will make some positive connexion
with this actual world of finite lives.
1
Psychology itself could not satisfy the demands of experience,
2
as we have seen. It was not the only universe of discourse,
hut only one segment of the whole of life; philosophy moved
along with life, and only in this larger field could one find
one*s problems resolved in view of the whole.
Yet neither a strict empiricism which limited all possible
knowledge to sense-experience, nor rationalism were acceptable.
Both were rejected in favor of the pragmatic method .
ii. Pragmatic Method
We have already traced the development of James 1 s pragma-
tism as a method and as a criterion of truth. As a method,
pragmatism represented James* s attempt to do justice both to
scientific method and to experience. It differs from Dewey *s
pragmatism which does not grant non-sensory data a part in
pointing the way toward possible truth. It was empiricism
pushed to its logical conclusions, but not a crude empiricism;
it made way for all of the facts, just as his "omnibus" psy-
chology had attempted to do.
Experience is the starting point, but contary to British
empiricism with its retrospective outlook, the pragmatic view
1. W. James, PHA, 20.
2. Cf. Ill, 5.
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is a forward-looking one, "looking away from first things,
principles, categories ,•• • and..* looking towards last
1
things, fruits, consequences, facts." We obtain knowledge
by beginning with facts, and forming our ideas in accordance
with our facts, or from our experience. The logic of prag-
matism is inductive.
Truth is no static thing, to be fallen upon or dis-
covered; it is always a dynamic, growing thing, always re-
lated to life. In this pragmatic method, consequently, we
find the relation between logic and ethics. Our notions are
interpreted according to practical results. Each notion is
2
interpreted "by tracing its respective practical consequences.
Its aim is not that of any particular results; it simply at-
tempts to show that our theories and concepts are instruments,
that truth is alive. Giovanni Papini, the Italian pragmatist
who later went over to the fold of the Catholic Church, ad-
vocated the pragmatic method as a "corridor-theory"
,
an apt
description of a method which led to the consideration of
all doctrines, a corridor off which opened many rooms repre-
senting varying views, to be tested according to their re-
sults and their fruits.
The pragmatic method was used continually throughout
his philosophy in considering basic problems. It is seen in
1. W. James, PRA, 55.
2. Ibid., 45.
,, .
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1
his treatment of religion in the Varieties ; it is basic
to his treatment of the problem of determinism and in-
2
determinism; it is applied to the proof of pluralism and
3
the disproof of monism; it is reflected in his constant
concern for moral and ethical considerations and demands
throughout his writings; and it became the foundation-stone
for his famous "Will to Believe" and the concept of the
faith-ladder.
iii. Radical Empiricism
James at first thought that pragmatism was an essential
4
step to be taken in the acceptance of radical empiricism.
Later, he seemed to feel that there was no "logical connexion"
5
between the two. Some similarity certainly dees exist. In
the dynamic stream which is life, we find growth, progress,
development. In all of our interpretations of life we find
that the practical categories are dominant, and the emphasis
is on consequences. Pragmatism finds its ultimate truth in
experience alone; the method of radical empiricism supple-
ments the former by making experience the final metaphysical
reality. The latter is his essential philosophic method.
1. W. James, VRE, 11 ff; 324; 435; 509; 512-14.
2. See this chapter, 2, iii.
3* W. James, PU, 111 ff.
4. Cf* MT, xii. Ideas must work in concrete experience, and
the idea-object relation is not outside temporal experience.
5. W. James, Itr. to Theodore Flournoy, in 1907, in LWJ, II,
267.
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1
This method is first suggested in his psychology,
where it "became the final answer to Hume’s disconnectedness
of sensations, and the mental atomists. The empiricists in
philosophy had failed to make their case "because they had
been unable to see that relations are as much facts of ex-
perience as are things. Experience had thus been depleted
of its richness, and the psychological phase of James
1
s
philosophy of experience had consisted of enlarging the data,
2
revealing experience with all of its values, fertility, wealth.
Radical empiricism consists of the postulate that only" things
definable in terms drawn from experience" shall be philosoph-
ical subject-matter. But it recognizes, as the atomist did
not, that conjunctive as well as disjunctive relations are
directly experienced; and it concludes that parts of experi-
ence "hold together from next to next by relations that are
3
themselves parts of experience." It is radical in demand-
ing that all experience — emotional, valuational, cognitive
factors — be considered, and not merely the data of sense-
experience.
The influence of this methodology on the development of
his philosophy is marked. It led him to a philosophy which
began with parts, and emphasized individuals. Our conscious
1. See Chapter II, 6, iii; also PP, I, 245 ff.
2. Cf. Perry, ISWJ, 76, for his analysis of the development
of James’s metaphysics of experience.
3. W. James, MT, xiii, 195; also ERE, 44.
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experience has multiplicity as well as unity, and so must
reality he represented. The whole is not an abstraction,
hut a collection of alogical and logical factors. Empiricism
has overemphasized the discontinuity of a universe which ad-
mittedly appears chaotic, irrational, with little connection;
rationalism has always overemphasized the unity of things,
and the discontinuity has been underemphasized. Only radical
empiricism attempts the synthesis. There is no need for a
higher unifying agency for relating things. The pluralistic
world is a synechistic one, whose parts are related loosely,
hut are still related.
His philosophy of pure experience was also a result of
his radical empirical method. Existence is a datum, a brute
1 2
fact. Reality is an "experience-continuum."
The bottom of being is left logically opaque
to us, a datum in the strict sense of the
word, something which we simply come upon
and find, and about which (if we wish to act)
we should pause and wonder as little as
possible. In this confession lies the
lasting truth of empiricism. 3
iv. Priority of Will, Feeling, Reason
The whole question of how we may best know the world is
opened up at this point. Do we know the world through will,
feeling, or reason ? How are the three related ? This question
1. Cf. Berkeley’s concept of existence which except as presence
to consciousness, is meaningless. Hence nothing can be said
to exist but minds and ideas.
2. W. James, MT, 152.
3. W, James, CER,128.
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is one which Is fundamental to the understanding of James’s
thought, but one which is difficult to answer categorically,
in view of his often paradoxical statements, and the fact
that he seldom defines the terms when he is using them in
different universes of discourse. Bertooci’s article on
1
"William James’s Psychology of Will: An Evaluation" has
been of considerable help in appraising James’s views of
the problems involved.
fl) Will and Peeling
Perhaps it was James’s rescue from morbid hypochondria
and from Spencerian mechanism, more than any other factors,
which contributed to the supreme place given in his psychology
and philosophy to the will. The emphasis throughout his writ-
ings is on action as is witnessed in his concern about ends,
the self as a "fighter for ends," his pragmatism with its
appeal to results, and his pluralism with its challenge to
co-operate with God in the fight against evil. His essay on
"Reflex Action and Theism" reiterates his conviction that the
will dominates conception and feeling. "Perception and think-
2
ing are only there for behavior’s sake."
His attention, in dealing with the problem of the will
in his psychology, is directed mainly toward the moral struggle.
1. Bertocci, Art. (1946), 2-13.
2. W. James, WB, 114.
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where the effort of the will seems to be most clear. His
formula for ideal or moral action emphasizes the fact that
the essential nature of the will is "action in the line of
1
the greatest resistance." I (representing the ideal impulse)
by itself is less than P (representing propensities of the
instinctive or habitual kind). But in the moral struggle we
find that I plus E (effort of will) is greater than P. The
impression we gain from introspection is that such an effort
"does not seem to form an integral part of the I,...(but)
2
appears adventitious and indeterminate."
Bertocci makes a necessary distinction here between two
senses of the word "will"— will-activity and will-power.
The former is the felt activity of the will in bringing its
effort to bear on one alternative rather than another; the
latter is the power of the will in realizing its end or ob-
jective. The efficacy of the will depends "not only on the
intrinsic existence of will-activity, but on the power of
the psychical energies such as emotions and antagonistic
3
associations at play in the mental field."
In dealing with this problem of the will f s activity,
James concludes that sometimes "the bare idea of a movements
4
sensible effects is sufficient mental cue " to the problem;
1. w. James
,
PP, II. 549
2. w. James, PP, II. 549
3. Bertocci Art . (1946)
4. w. James PP, II. 522
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in other words, in the majority of instances simple ideo-
motor action gives us our answer. We are aware of nothing
between the idea and the act, and the movement "follows un-
1
hesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the mind."
In the absence of conflicting ideas, consciousness , (by its
2 3
very nature impulsive, providing it is sufficiently intense)
is a forerunner of activity without any hiatus between the
thought and the movement.
Movement is the natural effect of feeling,
irrespective of what the quality of the
feeling may be. It is so in reflex action,
it is so in emotional life, it is so in
the voluntary life.
4
"Peeling" for James in his psychology seems to mean the trans-
itive parts of the stream of consciousness as opposed to the
5
substantive parts, and not merely pleasure or pain. In the
above cases mentioned, where no deliberate action is involved,
it would appear that the various fields of feeling mutually
oppose each other, and the stronger feeling wins out, and
action results. But there are some cases when deliberate
action is required and involved. The feeling-forces are
blocked; time passes, and no solution is reached. Then we
are said to decide for ourselves, to introduce a voluntary
fiat of our own, adding the effort of the will to one or the
1. W. James, PP, II, 522.
2. Ibid., 526.
3. Ibid., 535.
4. Ibid., 527.
5. Ibid., I, 243 ff.
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other alternatives. This flat cannot be merely a part of
the feeling-field itself; it is, as James says, our own willful
act inclining the beam, adding a ’’creative contribution of
1
something instead of a reason which does a reason* s work,” —
2
a ’’subjective experience sui generis .’’
When we come to the consideration of his philosophy,
James* s emphasis on feeling is exceedingly strong. Here, how-
ever, James tends to mean by feeling an immediate intuitive
experience, embracing sensations, feelings of emotion, desire,
etc. In the Will to Believe we find the theory that we feel
first, and then find reasons. ’’The sentiment of rationality”
emphasizes the feelings and emotional, subjective preferences
of men in leading up to the truth, or determining views of
life. The Varieties opens up the entire question of faith
and reason, and reveals that James was completely tied up in
the whole theory of feeling as intuitive experience. Feeling
3 4
is deeper than intellect, the "deeper source of religion”;
religion is no secondary product, but a way of feeling or
action with its own independent evidence. There is a "plus
,
a thisness
,
which feeling alone can answer for." The sym-
pathy which James displays toward all forms of mysticism,
stemming perhaps in part from his filial devotion to his father.
1. W. James, PP, II, 534.
2. Ibid., 568.
3. W. James, VEE, 422.
4. Ibid., 431.
5. Ibid., 455.
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a Swedenborgian, is always apparent. "Faith," James used
to tell his students," branches off from the high-road before
1
reason begins." The personal evidence for God lies in im-
2
mediate, inner experiences, although this truth must run the
gauntlet of all other truths.
In his chapter on "Pragmatism and Religion" James con-
cludes that it
is our faith and not our logic that decides
such questions— the human imagination which
lives in a moralistic and epic kind of uni-
verse and avoids the two extremes of crude
naturalism on the one hand, and transcendental
absolutism on the other. 3
Emotions, feelings in this sense, need to be given their
proper place as motivating factors determining life. Hence
it is not surprising to find James developing a metaphysics
along Bergsonian lines, a view of reality as a perceptual flux,
which i£ feeling. The intellect cannot grasp its nature; how
else then can it be known save by intuition, a feeling of its
pulsating, throbbing life ? Hor is it surprising to find in
his Pluralistic Universe so much that is mystical, including
4
the consideration of an earth-soul and multi-verses. It is
this sort of thing which leads Perry to conclude that for
James as the philosopher feeling is "more primordial than reason
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 327.
2. W. James, PRA, 109.
3. Ibid., 273 ff.
4. Riley says James
1
s logic of irrationalism "should rather be
called a reversion to a type of transcendentalism." For a
discussion of James f s philosophy from the standpoint of his
temperament alone, see AT, 308-320.
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1
and of equal authority", and to style his metaphysics as
2
one of vision, insight, mysticism, intuition.
(2) Will and Reason
In the Principles James deals with reasons as the "con-
3
ceiving or theorizing faculty— the mind’s middle department.”
Thinking or reasoning is not regarded at all with contempt,
hut it performs a limited service. Conceptions are instru-
ments enabling us to come to grips with life. The "conceiver
4
is a creature with partial purposes and private ends." Belief,
reasoning, conceiving, all of these are "grounded in non-
5
rational needs (and) subject to non-rational conditions."
In relation to thinking, the will involves two factors
—
6
attention and consent to an idea of a certain action. Experi-
ence is not merely given or imposed upon man, but is something
7
"I agree to attend to."
Although attention is the first and fundamental
thing in volition, express consent to the
reality of what is~aytended to is often an
additional and quite distinct phenomenon in-
volved. 8
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 327.
2. Ibid., II, 581, 582.
3. W. James, WB, 1X7.
4. W. James, PP, I, 482. Cf. WB, 117— This faculty functions
for ends which "are set by the emotional and practical sub-
jectivity altogether."
5. Heidbreder, SP, 183, 184.
6. W. James, PP, II, 561 ff.
7. Ibid., 402.
8. Ibid., 568.
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Bertoool re-interprets James* s formula to read:
Thinking the idea (I) of action, if it
can be made to persevere beyond the point
at which the individual would be tempted
to let go, will increase its power over P,
or opposing factors in personality.
1
The will is then neither desire nor feeling; nor is it
intellect. Thoughts exist, sometimes supervening upon each
other with ease, at other times with effort; introspective
scrutiny reveals this fact.
I do not fully understand how we come to our
unshakable belief that thinking exists as a
special kind of immaterial process alongside
the material processes of the world. It is
certain, however, that only by postulating
such thinking can we make things currently
intelligible. 2
The above then has considered the function of reason for
the psychologist, and the relation of that reason to will .whose
main task is to attend and consent to ideas and sometimes add-
ing its own weight to thinking in the absence of sufficient
reasons for deciding between alternatives. For the philosopher,
however, reason is more than mere conceiving and theorizing.
It has been posited as an ultimate criterion by which our think-
ing can be judged, our belief validated, and knowledge attained.
With this view James went just so far, and no farther. As we
have seen, feeling supplements logic for him. Let it be re-
membered that James does not object to interpretative reason.
1. Bertooci, Art. (1946), 9
2. W. James, PP, II, 571.
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On the contrary, reason has to Interpret, construct, compare,
criticize; but these operations are "operations after the
1
fact," It is logical reason which James is objecting to
—
the attempt to construct systems out of the resources of that
alone, or drawing "rigorous inference from non-sub jective
2
facts*" James went back to the stream of consciousness at
this point, and intelligence was found to be inadequate to
the notion of the importance of selection, interest, choice.
Concepts arrest the flux of life; they can still be used as
teleological instruments, but they cannot help but falsify
the nature of reality which is dynamic, changing, and living.
In place of logical reason, then, James enthrones the ideas
of intuition, perception, pragmatism, practice, pursuing private
ends. Both Bergson and James went to the extreme in their
attempt to do justice to the flowingness of reality, and to
make war against a false abstractionism; but for James, at
least, thought has a very important part to play. While it
does not make reality, without it reality might lack something;
in one sense it finds, but in another sense it creates. It is
only a bad conceptualism which takes its analysis for truth
against which James is directing his wrath.
1* W. James, THE, 433*
2. Ibid., 438.
3. W. James, MT, 95.
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(3) Conclusions
Recalling James's repudiation of any attempt to divide
the mind into separate compartments, and his conviction that
experience is a continuing stream which cannot be artificially
split, what shall we say then concerning the relations of will,
feeling, reason ? We can say this much— that man is a whole
self, engaging in various activities, V/ill is a sui generis
experience, although it always functions in relation to other
1
abilities of the self, and for this reason has been denied by
many psychologists as a unique activity. The self is a unity
involving many activities. In the feeling- stream, ideo-motor
activities figure largely, and the will need not be called into
play. It is essential in cases of indecision, where the feeling-
forces are blocked. In relation to thinking, the will's func-
tion is to attend and consent to an idea. ''Volition is a psy-
chic or moral fact pure and simple, and is absolutely completed
2
when the stable state of the idea is there.” Thinking is gov-
erned by non-rational factors, but on that account need not be
considered worthless.
The will continues to play a very important part in the
philosophy of James, as we have noted. Interpretative reason
plays an important part as well in criticizing and evaluating
the facts of experience, but logical reason is rejected as a
valid guide to reality. The necessity of abstractions in order
1. Cf. PP, II, 563, 564.
2. Ibid., II, 560.
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to think at all is recognized; percepts have to be trans-
lated into concepts. But concepts are not universally valid,
their function being to guide us back to the perceptual flux,
and to action there. In this sense, it performs a true service,
but it cannot express or grasp life’s dynamic nature. In
1
penetrating to the heart of reality feeling supplements logic,
but does not supplant will. Like Bergson, intuition, faith,
mysticism, are exalted above the intellect. But James is anti-
Verstand, not anti-Begriff
,
in the Hegelian sense. Both men
seem fairly close to the spirit of Bowne’s transcendental em-
piricism, in their desire to escape from the rigor and vigor
of Aristotelian logic, from the attempt to put experience into
neat little compartments and categories which reveal nothing
of the real nature of reality. It is perhaps truer to say
that feeling is a completion of reason, and not a rejection of
it.
2. The Problem of the Self
James’s preoccupation with ultimate problems in his
Principles of Psychology is nowhfcre more apparent than in his
treatment of the problem of the self. His starting-point , of
course, had to be the purely phenomenal study, the considera-
tion of psychological difficulties involved in attempting to
study the continuity of experiences, e.g.
,
the breaks in con-
sciousness and dissociation of personality; but he was constantly
1. It is knowledge of a sort—"dumb conviction", "divination" , etc.
WBm 93. Perry indicates that his notion of intuitive rapport
passes into a sympathetic" theory of cognition" (TCWJ, II ,700)
;
we ’’know the world by becoming like it, by going its gait."
(ICWJ,115, art. by D. C.Williams )
.
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being led beyond the boundaries of psychology for further
explanation. Two main questions posed themselves initially:
fl) The supposed activity of the self; and (2) The problem of
the integration and unity displayed by persons.
i. The Activity of the Self
Speaking as a psychologist, dependent on observation and
introspection, James is forced to admit that the only feeling
of activity to be found is that of physical activity. The
activity of the self cannot be directly and scientifically
observed, but is something which is only inferred from subse-
quent reflection. . All that the psychologist can say is that
such activity may be nothing but a set of movements in the
1
body, in the head, or between the head and the throat. In
his Essays on Radical Empiricism he again broaches this problem:
So far as we are persons 1
,
and contrasted
and opposed to an 1 environment*
,
movements
in our body figure as our activities, and I
am unable to find any other activities that
are ours in this strictly personal sense.
2
Statements such as these would seem to point to a behavioristic
3
concept of the self, as John laird believes. The difficulty
lies partly with James's own writings, and partly with his in-
terpreters. James ij3 ambiguous, and is not at all explicit in
the Principles as to when he is speaking within the frame of
reference of psychology, and when he is going consciously or
1. Cf. PP, I, 299-305.
2. W. James, ERE, 170.
3. Laird, POS, 11.

130
unconsciously beyond that frame of reference into philosophy.
Sometimes, too, he treats a theory so enthusiastically that
we are led to believe this is his final answer, only to find
him taking up the problem again later on from other stand-
points. The fault lies also with those who htave interpreted
James as systematic, and have attempted to find a place for
the varying views presented in some Jamesian system of psy-
chology and philosophy. It seems to be evident from all that
we have discovered so far that no such attempt can be made if
we are to progress very far toward understanding him. If, then,
we remember here that, while psychological observation finds
no peculiar self-activity, nevertheless, the fact that we do
1
have that sense of activity is and remains a fact, to be con-
sidered in the whole-view of things. If scientific methodology
cannot find a place for it, and rationalism distorts it, it
will yet be explained, for above and beyond mere bodily move-
2
ments, there is a ’’something more.’’ What this ’’more” is
—
further physiological processes or subjectivity— was a problem
which James could not answer in the psychological frame of
reference.
ii. The Unity of the Self
In his Principles James registers his conviction that
the associationists were wrong in their concept of consciousness.
1. W. James, PSY, 181.
2. W. James, PP, I, 299
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we are never aware of separate and distinct states. Hume f s
bundle of different perceptions, a collection of diverse ele-
ments, is rejected as any fair concept of the self. Kant’s
transendental ego, says James, is simply Hume’s bundle tied
with a transcendental string. The concept of the soul is a
superfluous theory, explaining nothing, ignotum per ignotius .
And yet some unifying principle is necessary, and the position
which James adopts is derived from his central psychological
doctrine of the ’’stream of consciousness.” The unity of the
self is to be found there.
The stream of thought... presents to the self
empirically, and contains among its own
aspects or phases all those functions and
distinctions which are ordinarily supposed
^
to require a ’soul* or a ’transcendental ego.'
The passing Thought is the only Thinker, and we need no non-
phenomenal Thinker to express the facts. Each Thought is
2
"born an owner and dies owned." The unity of the Self is due
to "relations of appropriation in experience which transmit
3
the feeling of ownership from one moment to the next", and
this cumulative experience is the only explanation necessary
to account for unity, and for individual characters.
iii. The Self as "Fighter for Ends"
It would be possible to stop right here and say that James
was almost, if not quite, a complete behaviorist, as laird says
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 77, 78.
2. W. James, PP, I, 339.
3. Heidbreder, SP, 180.
'.
'
.
« y.
1 '
*
*
-
,
132
he is. Psychological analysis, however, is not the whole,
and there are further statements to he considered which point
to the self as an indispensable concept in psychology. These
we may summarize in considering the self as a "fighter for
ends#" This concept of the self is seen in his chapter on
"Attention", on "Discrimination and Comparison", on "Conception”
and "Reasoning," and exerts an influence throughout the whole
of his psychology and his philosophy. The self is a teleolog-
ical unity, an interested, selecting agency. It attends to
objects in the stream of consciousness; it points to the way
in which ends are attained, and the means for attaining them;
conception is a teleological instrument, a way of signifying
1
particular things.
Real ends appear for the first time upon the
world
1
s stage. The conception of conscious-
ness as a purely cognitive form of being...
is thoroughly anti-psychological. . .Every
actually existing consciousness seems to
itself at any rate to be a fighter for ends
,
of which many, but for its presence
,
would
not be ends at all. 2
Furthermore, it is the "personal self rather than the thought
(which) might be treated as the immediate datum of psychology.
The universal fact is not T feelings and thoughts exist* but
3
’I think* and *1 feel*#" It is little wonder that Mary Calkins
should feel a debt of gratitude to James, and indicate the
4
derivation of her own self-psychology from James.
1# See PP, II, 335# "Classification and conception are purely
teleological weapons of mind."
2. Ibid#, I, 141.
I.’ Art^cfe Sfn
P
Surcifs6n, HPA, I, 31.
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This teleological character of the self is as Perry
suggests, the "germinal idea in James's psychology, epistemol-
1
ogy, ©to." The important concept in his psychology is not
the adaptation of the organism to its environment, hut the
adaptation of experience to the self. Ends are constantly
being sought; some of them are, of course, from our bio-
logical nature,— hunger, food, sex, etc. But there are higher
ends sought as well, as is manifest in man's concern about
values, about religion, about God. Perhaps it is at this point
that Royce made his strongest imprint on James's thinking.
James always wrote with Royce 's views and arguments in mind;
it is significant that values, ends, purposes, which occupy
chief place in the metaphysics of Royce are given central con-
sideration in James's thought as well.
The concept of the self, then, as a free, purposive agent,
whose interests determine what ends shall be sought, and what
ends shall be won, represents the other side of the picture. It
is the one which is seen in his pragmatism, with its emphasis on
consequences, on ends in view. It is manifest in his ethical
and moral demands, and in his concept of the essential task of
reason.
But we need not stop here. Eor the emphasis on individuality
and personality is found everywhere in his works. In his Prin-
ciples we are told that reality in a certain sense means a
relation to our emotional and active life. "The fons et origo
2
of all reality ...is thus... ourselves." In a very real way
r. 77. James, CER, 43n.
2. W. James, PP, II, 296, 297.
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reality depends on us, and we can, by acting as though a
1
thing were real, bring it about so that it will become real.
The Varieties of Religious Experience reiterates the signifi-
cance and importance of persons, and ends by challenging co-
workers of the faith to fight for real ends. The same atti-
tude and emphasis is found in his presentation of pluralism,
in which persons are of supreme importance, each individual
a unique self, and the universe even described as a "collec-
£
tion of selves.” The Will to Believe, particularly in the
3
essay on the "Moral Philosopher and Moral Life", stresses
the fact that only in persons do we speak of values. Values
are realized in persons only. "Nothing can be good or right
except so far as some consciousness feels it to be good or
4
thinks it to be right." The words "good", "bad", "obligation",
etc. mean no absolute natures independent of personal support,
but are "objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold
or incharge in Being, apart from the existence of actually
5
living minds."
It is no small matter to achieve a sound and fair view
of James's concept of the self, in view of the ambiguities.
The problem of the identity of the self, and his "ownership"
solution is returned to in the Pluralistic Universe
,
where he
dallies with Peohner's hypothesis of the compounding of con-
6
sciousness. And there is a definite correlation between the
1. W. James, PP, II, 321.
2. W. James, VKE, 15.
3. See W. James, WB, 192 ff.
4. Ibid., 193.
5. Ibid., 197.
6. W. James, PU, Chapters IV and V.
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phenomenal description of the self as united in passing
thought, and the view of the article "Does Consciousness
1
Exist ?", which denies consciousness as an entity and admits
thought alone, as a function of knowing, with no aboriginal
2
quality of being in them. Yet, in the passage already in-
dicated in his Essays on Radical Empiricism
,
where he seems
to identify spiritual activity and bodily activity, he is
quick to suggest that he is not sure about their being no
spiritual activity, but only that the activity of thoughts
and feelings do terminate always in activity of the body,
3
whose activities are capable of being observed; "the in-
dividualized self ... I believe to be the only thing properly
called self."
The great weight of evidence, particularly in the Vari-
eties and the Pluralistic Universe, seems to be in favor of
3
a kind of panpsychism . It is rather astonishing to find James,
having espoused the empirical method for his philosophy, in-
cluding so much that we would pronounce unempirical, but which,
5
to him, is always "of an experiential nature." His interest
in psychic research had acquainted him with all sorts of curious,
strange phenomena and his intense interest in Myers’ doctrine
of the "subliminal self", which opened up the way to so many
solutions to his problems, paved the way for his panpsychism.
1. See section on Mind, this dissertation, Ch. IV, 3, ii.
2. See section on Mind, IV, 3.
3. W. James, EKE, i69 n, 170 n.
4. Cf. IV, 2, i,iii on James’s pluralism, and 3,iii on his
philosophy of pure experience.
5. U. James, EKE, 88, 89.
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The Varieties speaks of normal consciousnesses, surrounded
1
by "potential forms of consciousness entirely different*"
The lecture on Human Immortality presents a case for the
2
"transmission theory" of consciousness, based again on the
notion of a "continuity of our consciousness with a mother-
3
sea." How can the many selves of which this world is com-
posed retain their individuality in such a world ? This was
James's real problem, the consideration of which must be post-
poned to our consideration of his changing views of conscious-
ness. Wendell Bush strikes close to the heart of one of the
very troublesome factors in James's thought in suggesting that
his final rejection of intellectualistic logic may have come
about as a result of his discovery that logic denied him "that
relation of the many individuals whose conscious life is above
4
the threshold to the mother-sea of life."
If we are correct in thus presenting the possible out-
comes of James's psychology and philosophy, we must postulate
a world of selves, individual, active, free, whose conscious-
nesses are continuous with a much wider cosmic consciousness.
In order to save himself from an absolutistic monism, he
assumed that these consciousnesses have external environments,
5
and are consequently finite. If, however, we relate this to
the philosophy of pure experience, we must admit that the self
1. W. James, VKE, 378.
2. See this chapter, section 3, iii.
3. W. James, HI, 27.
4. Bush, Art. (1925), 325.
5. See discussion of this in Chapter IV, 3, ii.
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is no ultimate principle, but a result of a multitude of
moments of experiences, and this must also be true of that
wider, finite self, itself a result, a higher grade of the
unity of experiences; pure experience itself is more funda-
mental, prior to thoughts and things, James defines "experi-
ence" as follows:
The entire process of phenomena of present
data considered in their raw immediacy, be-
fore reflective thought has analyzed them
into subjective and objective aspects or
ingredients. It is the summum genus of
which everything must have been a part
before we can speak of it at all,
1
The word" experience" must then be kept neutral, indeterminate.
If it is viewed with either subjective or objective shades of
meaning, then "question-begging occurs, and discussion grows
t
impossible."
iv. The Self as Free
We have already suggested the great significance which
3
the problem of indeterminism and determinism held for James.
It was not abstract, merely speculative problem, but an issue
over which he sweated and toiled, for the answer meant his own
personal salvation or despair. Consequently, it is no great
surprise to find this question being brought up for considera-
tion in his great psychological work, in the chapter on "Atten-
tion" and again on the "Will," Aside from being a vital issue
1. James's article on "Experience" in Baldwin,DPP, I, 360.
2. Ibid., DPP, I, 361.
3. See Chapter III, 4.
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for practical life, fat least as far as James was concerned;
for many it might not "be a stone for stumbling) it was a basic
problem for metaphysics, determining whether our "picture of
the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism, monism, to-
wards spiritualism, freedom, pluralism,— or else the other
1
way.
"
Psychologically considered, the question of free-will
centers about the problem of the amount of attention or con-
sent which can be put forth at any time by the willing self.
"Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions
2
of the object, or are they not ?" As we have seen, his answer
indicates that the fiat is not itself a part of the feeling-
force, but a unique, sui generis activity. Actually psychol-
ogy can give no real answer to the problem; we cannot ever
determine whether more or less attention might have been given
3
to any idea. But psychology can tell us several things. We
have a sense of being free, of deliberately tilting the scales
in a certain way when we bring our wills to bear on a problem
or decision. We possess a feeling of effort which seems to
enter into the situation "whenever a rarer and more ideal im-
pulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinctive
4
and habitual kind." It seems to add itself to the weight of
1* W. James, PP, I, 448.
2. Ibid., II, 571.
3. Ibid., 572.
4. W. James, PP, II, 543.
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logical reasons, or offers itself a creative contribution
instead, of a reason. The picture then is a dualistic one,
1
consciousness, "in its very nature impulsive", bringing its
effort to bear upon rival motor ideas.
The question is not one, however, that can be solved on
psychological grounds alone. The last word of psychology is
ignorance, For the purposes of psychology we can operate with
2
a methodological postulate of complete determinism. But when
the psychologist forgets or omits the consideration of moral
facts and perspectives,, he cannot forget that he is abstract-
ing from a total view.
The psychologist and the moralist may both
abstract for certain purposes from this total
situation, but neither should forget the other,
and neither can forget the other, if truth is
the main concern and not the postulates of
ethical or of psychological ’science.'
When scientific and moral postulates war with each other, then,
4
James says, our only course is "voluntary choice." In the
absence of scientific proof, all that we can do is to show the
lack of coercive deterministic arguments.
Science must be constantly reminded that her
purposes, and that the order of causation
which she has use for and is therefore right
in postulating, may be envelopped in a wider
order, on which she has no claims at all. 5
1. W. James, PP, II, 526.
2. Allport, decries this easy way out. If indeterminism is a
fact, then it must be accounted for, or else experience is
distorted. See Art.(1943)
2
,
107.
3. Bertocci, Art. (1946), 5.
4. W. James, PP, II, 573.
5. Ibid., II, 576.
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Even the quickening of one idea, though it may he considered
a small thing in the eyes of the psychologist, may he "morally
1
and historically momentous." Hot only morality hut religion
depend on the effort we can make, and introspective scrutiny
reveals that fiat which is a unique activity, and seems to
2
belong to the "substantive thing which we are." As Bertocci
points out, we ought to speak of the freedom of the self, not
of the will, for willing is only one activity in which the
self is engaged, the activity of choice.
For James indeterminism is a fact. He indicates his
3
strong disposition toward belief in some spiritual activity,
and his antipathy toward the effect-theory of effort (effort
4
as an inert accompaniment, and not an active element in life)
because it is unscientific, resting its case on an argument
from analogy of a material phenomenon where no consciousness
appears to exist to cases where it is an essential feature.
5
The presence of feeling and effort is a fact of experience,
and as such must be taken into account.
Indetettainism is upheld mainly on ethical and practical
grounds. Furthermore, the logical predicament of believing
so strongly in free will in a deterministic world is itself
a problem. We are likewise compelled to believe that all bad
1. W. James, PP, II, 577.
2. Ibid., 577.
3. Ibid., I, 454.
4. Ibid., I, 452.
5. Ibid., 454.
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and evil are decreed eternally, or that those things we
consider had are not really bad at all, although we still
1
feel regret. Regret cannot be understood in a deterministic
£
world; it requires a world of possibilities .
Furthermore, indeterminism is essential for any sound
ethics, and for any true individualism. It makes the problem
of evil and error not a speculative one, but a practical one.
Determinism can only give us an Absolute which is never free
from such problems.
fit) makes moral issues dead or purely
speculative or abstract. • • Indeterminism
is the only way to break the world into
good parts and into bad, and to stand by
the former as against the latter. 3
Pragmatically this postulate of freedom works. It puts man
on a highway which leads to independent, creative action.
The philosophy of pluralism provides the medium in which
free will takes its rightful place. Pluralism accepts evil as
a fact, and asks man to cope with it. It provides for the
facts, and for the moral will. It is entirely consistent with
a world of change, activity, novelty, possibility. For all of
these reasons, and because it brings a freshness and courage to
life, man has
the privilege, on moral grounds, to go
beyond pure reason and its realm of de-
terminism, to affirm on the basis of
practical reason the reality of free
personality. 4
1. W. James, EFM, 161 ff
. ,
175 ff.
2. Ibid,, 175.
3. Ltr, to Hodgson, 1885, in 1WJ, I, 245.
4. Gamertsfelder and Evans, FOP, 562.
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In Ms pMlo sophy, the problem of free-will of roan is seen
to involve the whole question of causation, novelty, the
infinite. James was aware of the many contradictions in-
volved in these problems; logic gave no hope for the solu-
tion to this problem. Struggling with the possibility of
a spiritual force operating in the world, he suggested the
possibility of a consciousness of wider time-span than ours
(Royce's influence again), whose will is the agent, and whose
purpose is the action completed. Is this to be the answer,
or that of "elementary short-span actions summing themselves
1
T blindly
1
?” Is there, in other words, real striving, per-
severing, sustaining effort at the heart of things ? Certainly
the world seems to reveal such activities. The world is"really
growing in these activities of ours. And where we predicate
activities elsewhere, have we a right to suppose aught different
2
in kind from this ?"
In going beyond logic for life and with life, James found
the solution to his problem. The perceptual flux reveals it-
self as free, changing. The world is not "one unbending unit
3
of fact.” It is a pluralistic system of additive relations,
a world of novelties, of possibilities* The future is not a
mere repetition of the past. Concepts "maltreat fact", and
only in going beyond logic, and accepting experience as it
comes can we see the problem of free-will in its proper place.
lV W. James, ER&, lV9.
2. W. James, SPP, 215.
3. W. James, v7B, 151.
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This dualistic, interactionistic view of his psychology
is finally rejected in his later philosophy. For a considera-
tion of this part of the problem of indeterminism, the reader
1
is referred to the next chapter.
3* The Problem of Mind (Consciousness
)
It is difficult and almost impossible to separate the
problem of the mind from that of the self. Yet it has been
deemed necessary to effect the distinction in this disserta-
tion in view of the different problems arising in each, and
the difficulties and ambiguities involved in both problems as
considered by James. Here we shall consider mind in its generic
sense, contrasted with matter or material substance, placing
less emphasis on mind as it perceives, wills, reasons, pur-
poses, etc.
The treatment of this problem of the mind or consciousness
2
follows a different path from the one taken by both Perry and
3
Lowe. Their development of the problem through three phases of
James
1
s thought— the psychological, phenomenal! s ti c , and meta-
physical— is worthwhile for a whole-view, but for the purposes
of this dissertation divisions must be made which will more
clearly indicate the psychological and the philosophical in-
fluence. For this reason, the problem is developed through
the psychological phase here, and influences pointed out which
1. See Chapter VI, section 3.
2. Perry, ISWJ, 94 ff. Also TCWJ, particularly Appendix ,11,750,
ff.
3. Lowe, ICWJ, 157 ff. Art. on "William James T s Pluralistic
Metaphysics of Experience."
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are significant for his philosophical conceptions, both of
consciousness and the mind-body relation. Since, however,
his later philosophy meant definite changes in his earlier
psychological opinions. Chapter VI will continue the con-
sideration of the problems.
i. Emphasis on Personal Form
It is the conviction repeated throughout the Principles
that the subject matter of psychology is "consciousness."
The personal self is the immediate datum, and the phenomenon
1
of consciousness cannot be questioned. GonseiousBess is a
stream, personal, changing, continuous, free, purposive.
Locke, Herbert, even the great Kant, had been fooled by anal-
ysis into believing that there are sensations upon which
thought has never acted. Against this view, James presented
a concept of consciousness without simple sensory elements.
Modem psychology has confirmed James T s contention — conscious-
ness is ordered, appears in structures, and there are no really
pure sensations in a real consciousness. The fixed immutable
ideas of Locke are an absurdity.
A permanently existing ’Idea' which makes
its appearance before the footlights of
consciousness at periodic intervals is
as mythological an entity as the Jaajt of
Spades. 2
1. Cf. W. James, WB, 14, 15
2. W. James, PSY, 157.
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This stream of thought has substantive and transitive
parts— the former occupied by sensory images which are held
before the mind for some time, the latter filled with original
feelings of identity, relation, pastness, etc. In this manner
both sensationalists and intellectualists are refuted— the
former who denied all relations in and out of the mind, and
the latter who had to call in a Something, Actus Purus
,
devoid
of feeling, in which relations may be known. This radical em-
pirical doctrine exercised a marked influence on James's con-
cept of consciousness.
ii. Changing Views of Consciousness
Consistent with his radical empiricism, James rejected
initially a concept of consciousness which had appealed to him.
1
His attraction for the mind-stuff theory could not be main-
tained in view of this new concept of psychology. Association
and the compounding of consciousness, in short, were unintelli-
8
gible. States of mind only appear to be compound because they
may know many things together, but no "blending" or "complica-
tion" or "mental chemistry" or "psychical synthesis" which
"supposes a resultant consciousness to float off from the con-
3
stituents per se " can be admitted. States of mind exist as
"single new facts, independent and integral, not compounded
of psychic atoms," — a pure Gestalt, unity of consciousness,
self.
r.” 6tf. £5, f, 145-182.
2. Ibid., I, 158.
3. Ibid., 159.
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For the same reason he was led initially to reject a
panpsychism which had always held a strong appeal for him.
His keen desire for an immanent God is readily seen in his
statements concerning religion; yet his rejection of the mind-
stuff theory forfeited his right to accept the psychology or
1
metaphysics like Fechner's "based on the unity of higher levels
of consciousness compounded out of the plurality of lower con-
2
scious levels. I!ind, as he had insisted in his psychology,
is a unity by itself, and it does not grow by taking unto it-
self many units. ITor can God "be merely a compound of terres-
trial minds.
I cannot get over the dialectical difficulty
of seeing how a wide-span consciousness can
"be entitatively constituted of smaller (.con-
sciousnesses. 3
The struggle over this problem, resulting in a rejection of
the psychological conviction, is detailed in our next chap-
ter. We shall limit ourselves here to depicting the psycho-
logical influences which led to, and limited, his changing
views; the philosophical considerations, of course, are the
most far-reaching, and important.
The influence of his psychology of the stream of con-
sciousness and of his radical empirical method is marked once
again in the view of 1904, which denied the existence of con-
sciousness as an entity, and admitted it only as a relation
1. Cf. W. James, tU, Chapters IV and V.
2. Cf. Perry's treatment in TCWJ, II, 587 ff.
3. Ibid., II, 588. Letter to Schiller.
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and a function. The relational view accounts for the mind
1
at its perceptual level. The same experience can figure
twice, in a mental context and a physical context, and even
more in different mental contexts. Relations are given within
the stream of consciousness; his psychology had enlarged the
data to include these original feelings. Row in this meta-
physical stage, James asserts that the physical and mental
orders overlap in common phenomena or pure experience. The
relation "between things is a matter of direct experience, and
consciousness is an "external relation”, a "peculiar rela-
2
tionship among the terms of experience." The distinction
"between consciousness and content is a confusion. Conscious-
ness is a near relation "between parts of the content. There
is no self, no ego which cannot thus "be resolved into what
Miller calls "the co-experience and non-co-experience of the
content." In searching for the self as a psychologist
,
James
had always found only more contnet; never had he been able to
find a mental act as an object for observation or contempla-
tion. Did consciousness then actually exist ? Since it
could not be found as a stuff, he concluded that in the con-
crete it is composed of the same stuff as are things, and is
never an object from without.
1. Me are indebted to Morris for distinguishing between the
relational and functional views in STM, 287 ff. Perry does
not so distinguish.
2. Perry, ISWJ, 94.
3. Article on "A Debt to James" in ICWJ, 29 0
I,
.
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All data of perception must consist of
the self-same independent physical things
of which the real world is composed; when
’experienced,' these have merely entered
into certain transitory and unessential
relations to other things of the same kind,
and there is no mental image. . .intervening
between the percipient organism and its ob-
jects. 1
The concept of the passing thought as the thinker, intro-
duced in his psychology to explain the unity of the self,
is thus enlarged to its metaphysical conclusions:
Since the acquisition of conscious quality
on the part of an experience depends upon
the context coming to it, it follows that
the sum total of all experiences, having no
context, can not strictly be called con-
sciousness at all. It is a thought
,
and
Absolute, a ’pure’ experience on an enormous
scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable
into thought and thing. 2
The instrumental nature of mind which was one of James's
noteworthy contributions to psychological thought is manifested
here in his formulation of the functional theory of conscious-
ness. Mind is not only a relation; it is a function. A con-
cept is not something discrete (this, of course, before his
break with logic) but a percept which has become a substitute
for other percepts to which it leads, or which it signifies.
Morris is right in suggesting that James was never a thorough-
going functionalist, certainly not in the sense in which the
word is known today.
1. Lovejoy, HAD, 7, 8
2. W* Jame s
,
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Two further influences remain to be noted— that of
the stream of consciousness idea on his concept of pure ex-
perience, and of its personal form on his panpsychism. First,
the conversion, of the stream of consciousness to a meta-
physical use. This is clearly seen in his theory of pure
experience, ultimate reality as a continuity, a stream in which
are drops ; or pulses of experience. Perry calls this James f s
compenetratlon view. The world is a "selection in the making,
amidst a superabundance of the unselected." Both James's
empiricism and his panpsychism are apparent here— his radical
empiricism enlarged to a metaphysical position, and his pan-
psychistic inclinations making of pure experience a something-
we-know-not-what
,
prior to all thoughts and things, a fundamental
reality before which we can only bow in mystery.
The emphasis on personal form and on persons as individuals,
plus his concept of the focus-fringe situation in the stream of
consciousness also possesses its implications for his meta-
physics. In our own experience, we always have consciousness
of a meaning, an awareness of a total, a feeling of a plus or
"more". This suggests the possibility of a cosmic conscious-
ness constituting the "more" on the farther side of our experi-
ence, with which we are co-conscious. In this relationship,
both God and persons remain as finite individuals, exerting
B
influences upon each other.
1. Perry, ISWJ, 108.
2. See for further discussion of this 2,ii, this chapter, and
Chapter VI.
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ill. The Mind-Body Relation
The problem of the mind-body relation was one of the
first philosophical problems with which James was concerned.
As early as 1878, we find him expressing his keen interest in
this controversial issue. He did not artificially divide the
problem as some psychologists and philosophers do— the former
paying attention to the sense-organs only, the nervous system,
the results of observation, the latter neglecting any considera-
tion of physiological data. Nor did he ever feel that the psy-
chologist could successfully evade the problem, despite his
restricted field. This is not, however, to say that James
believed the word of psychology to be the last word on the
issue; the philosopher alone can deal with its ultimate nature.
In the Principles are to be found both psychological and phil-
osophical analyses of the problem.
James had rejected the soul-theory as devoid of any ex-
planation.
Its successive thoughts are the only in-
telligible and verifiable things about it,
and definitely to ascertain the correlation
of these with brain-processes is as much as
psychology can empirically do. 1
As a psychologist he was first led to the automaton theory.
Z
Both Allport and Perry suggest that he tentatively accepted
this view of consciousness as an epiphenomenon which "super-
3
venes, (but) does not intervene." This statement needs to be
1. W. James, PP, I, 350„ff.
2. Allport, Art. (1943)
,
97.
3. Perry, TCWJ, II, 25.
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qualified somewhat, in view of the difficulty of determining
whether James is merely analyzing within the psychological
frame of reference, or speaking within the philosophical frame.
Speaking of the reflex theory of mind years before the Prin-
ciples was published, he suggests that this theory does not
indicate that consciousness has no independent status.
I am not sure that all physiologists see
that it commits them to regarding the mind
as an essentially teleological mechanism.
I mean by this that the conceiving or
theorizing faculty... functions exclusively
for the sake of ends that do not exist at
all in the world of impressions we receive
by way of our senses, but are set by our
emotional and practical subjectivity al-
together. 1
ITo automaton theory can truly explain or indicate the essence
of consciousness as a purposive agent. In a letter to Strong
(1889) he expressed his distrust of the theory: "I feel very
reluctant to deny all causality to consciousness with so little
8
positive proof." That physiological study did not hold the
final answer he was sure, for it remained true that subjective
method has "suggested all our interpretations of the facts of
3
brain-physiology.
"
4
His attention to the will
,
to attention and effort as
definite spiritual forces, plus his conviction that the self
5
is a "fighter for ends", resulted in his espousal of inter-
6
actionism. Mind is efficacious, no mirror or tabula rasa.
1. W. James, YB, 117. "Reflex Action and Theism" (1881 )
.
2. Perry, TCWJ, II, 26.
3. Ibid., II, 28.
4. James, PP, I, 452,454; II, 562-564. (See this dissertation,
Chapter Y, 1, iv).
5. Ibid., I, 141. (See this dissertation, Ch. Y, 2, iii).
6. Cf. ledger Wood T s article on "Mind-Body Problem"in Runes ,DP ,198.
(See this dissertation, CH.Y, 3, iii.)
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All levels of life reveal the part played by discrimination
and choice.
We reach the possible conclusion that con-
sciousness affirms and exercises the organ-
ism^ interest
,
and regulates the action of
the brain accordingly. In other words, the
function of the upper brain can only be
understood teleologically, and ’teleology'
is an exclusively conscious function.
1
The mind, in its selective, attentive work, is "no mere im-
2
potent and paralytic spectator of life’s game."
The docttine of a mental fiat, which we have already dis-
cussed in considering the problem of the will, emphasizes this
dualistic, interactionistic solution of the mind-body problem.
The evidence throughout his psychology seems to be all in
favor of this view, and we may say that, in the psychological
frame of reference, James favored it above others.
Perry contends that psychophysical parallelism is his
final answer to the problem. On the contrary, it represents
once again James’s attempt to avoid unsafe hypotheses in psy-
chology, to be non-metaphysical. He called it a "provisional
3
halting-place", and it is evident that he is intending to say,
"As a psychologist
,
I can go so far and no farther. If I stop
within the limits of my field, I find much evidence for inter-
action, but not enough to postulate it as a scientific theory.
The most that we can postulate is that consciousness seems to
1. From Mind, 4(1879), 7 n. in TCWJ, II, 31,32.
2. W. James, PSY, 104.
3 . 17 • Jame s
,
PP
, 1 , 178.
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have h rain-processes as a condition of its existence, and
a 'blank unmediated correspondence, term for term, of the
succession of states of consciousness with the succession
.,1
of total brain-processes. * This position, however, is only
for the purposes of psychology, just as determinsim is a
postulate for its purposes, to be corrected or revised in
2
view of what philosophy has to say.”
The material-monad theory offers a solution of the prob-
3
lem which James called "possibly right." It postulates an
individual consciousness belonging to each brain cell, with
one arch-cell to which our consciousness is attached. This
arch-cell may be physically modified by changes in the other
cells, and conscious correlates accompany these physical
changes. Metaphysically taken, of course, this view goes back
to some eternal, primordial atom, and its consciousness, and
James considered the theory too remote and unreal despite its
lack of self-contradiction.
Further philosophical considerations led to radical
changes in his psychological treatment of the mind-body prob-
4
lem. We may summarize his psychological convictions by say-
ing that a psychophysical parallelism is his methodological
postulate, but not his final solution.
1* W. James, PP, I, 182.
2. Allport says that James still "accepted the implications
of physiological determinism scrupulously"- Art. (1943), 2 98.
3. W. James, PP, I, 179 ff.
4. See Chapter VI, section 2.
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4, The Problem of the One and Many
While the mind-body relation was the one which occupied
James* s attention initially, it is not the one which he con-
sidered basic. For him the problem of the One and Many was
always the central philosophical issue. If, he said, one knows
whether a man is a monist or a pluralist, one will know most of
1
his opinions. Hence his proposed Metaphysics was to bear the
title "The Many and the One," and his contention was to be
that manyness precedes unity, that the worship of unity by
monists is not what philosophy seeks, but a totality which is
neither unity nor variety alone.
The World is One just so far as its parts
hang together by definite connexion,...
many just so far as any definite connexion
fails to obtain. 2
We are concerned here with the discovery of definite psy-
chological influences upon the formulation of James's plural-
istic philosophy. Already throughout the text of the disserta-
tion some have been noted incidentally. We may suggest in
summary the following definite influences:
i. Influence of empirical attitude
We should expect to find James's concern for facts, for
Z
particulars, for individuals, markedly influencing his final
1. Hence his analysis of "philosophy into two groups, the tough-
and tender-minded, rationalists and empiricists, and the
various beliefs which each holds. His own system allowed no
such classification; h£ straddled both sides of the fence,
being voluntaristic, optimistic, religious, when, according
to the categories he laid down he ought to have been fatal-
istic, pessimistic, irreligious. James could never be cata-
logued neatly.
2. W. James, PRA, 156.
3. CF. WB. 68.
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philosophical position, and this is the case. His psycho-
logical studies had suggested no such unity as the monists
sought and worshipped; on the contrary, they seemed to suggest
that the world is composed of a variety of different individ-
uals. His main problem in establishing his pluralism was that
of rescuing individuation from the mother-sea of consciousness;
this he accomplished by rejecting logic as an adequate inter-
pretation of the facts of experience. The unity of the world
is that of continuity, the same ’’absolute nextness of one part
to another, which we find in the minutest portions of our inner
1
experience." Individuals, despite being co-conscious with a
wider cosmic consciousness, remain distinct, separate individ-
uals. Life in its fulness reveals this picture of the world;
logic cannot be trusted to represent it truly.
His empirical attitude is further seen in his treatment
of the problem of evil. Ho attempts were made to rationalize
the facts, or explain them away. The facts of evil were simply
there, and as such to be accounted for in some way. In monism
he found no solution; pluralism offered him a world in which
the problem was no mere abstract one, but a practical one,
about which something could be done in the universe by co-
operating with a finite God, and in human life by meeting moral
2
demands
•
1. Perry, TC7TC," II', "380.
2. How strange it is to hear Grattan say then: "His cult of opti-
mistic action led him to strip his mind and writings of all
feelings or reflection, of density, of complexity, of living
perilously in the dark, etc." (TTJ, 147). One is tempted to ask.
Is he writing about 7/illiam James ? Surely the picture we get
is of a man aware of tragedies, failures, but daring to rise
above them by courageous faith.
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His radical empiricism was likewise influential on his
pluralistic conception of the universe. Against Hume and
against the rationalists, this position found relations in
experience, and asserted that the only immediate source of
our knowledge is the multiplicity of our own conscious ex-
perience. Metaphysically taken, this method led to a plural-
istic world of pure experience, with many moments of experi-
ences connected by relations which are also experienced. Having
been helped by Bergson to clarify the notions of novelty, cause
and effect, etc., by recognizing that concepts falsify reality,
he pursued his radical empiricism to its metaphysical conclu-
sion— reality changing, pulsating, alive, and an experience-
continuum which was no absolute unity, but a loose collection
of parts of experience.
ii. Perception of Reality"
Closely allied to the above is the influence of James's
perceptual view of reality. The chapter on this topic in the
1
Principles presents his conviction that belief, will, reality
are all tied up together. The word "reality" is psychologically
interpreted to mean "sense of reality," reality depending upon
persons in the last analysis. Existence is completely neutral,
in a certain sense, until we lay hold of it and make of it an
instrument to realize our dreams, or to banish our fears; then
it becomes real. That this leads to a philosophy of freedom
1. See W. James, PP, II, 383 ff
...
^
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Is readily apparent, Ho eternally changeless world is ours,
hut
many worlds, coexistent and overlapping,
each one centered about an individual will
and constructed out of such material as the
individual chooses to appropriate for his
own use. 1
Brett points out the emphasis given in James 's psychology to
objects of sensation, their vividness, etc. as exciting primary
2
belief. Concepts are instruments, only real as they lead back
to the perceptual flux, to action and changes in the world. And
James
1
s emphasis on the perceptual view of reality led finally
to his idea that the fullness of reality is contained in the
perceptual flux itself. Mathematics
,
logic, aesthetics, ethics
are all realms of reality, but "perceptual reality involves and
3
contains all these ideal systems and vastly more besides."
Taken in one way this reality appears to be one, but it is a
oneness of continuity only, a oneness of many distinct units.
Pluralism takes perceptual experience at its face value.
iii. Emotional Preferences
As his concept of reality is grounded in the psychological
theory of the stream of consciousness, so do we find his con-
cept of pluralism likewise grounded in James’s own temperamental
1. Article by Brett on "The Psychology of William James, etc."
in ICWJ, 90.
2. Article by Brett in ICWJ, 89 ff.
3. W. James, SPP, 102.
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needs. James allowed large place in all of Ms thought
for subjective, emotional preferences. Spencerian evolution-
ism was rejected because of its dogmatism and iron-clad monism,
but mainly because it allowed no room for the subjective and
the emotional. The Will to Believe and his Pragmatism play up
the part which temperaments play in the acceptance or rejection
2
of doctrines or beliefs. It is not true that James is a solip-
sist, or is advocating a very narrow individualism, for, as we
have seen, truth is finally made not by the individual but by
society, and is to be tested always in the light of all other
truths. If we read Ms essay on "A Certain Blindness in Human
Beings " we find more than a piece of sentimentalism. It
indicates James* s native tolerance, Ms suggestion that, by
reason of our native inability to enter into the lives of
others in any real way, we ought to be more hospitable to
"all sorts and conditions of men."
Two tMngs are then suggested of Ms pluralism here: (1)
His own emotional preference for a pluralistic universe, rich
in particulars, guaranteeing freedom, God, purpose, and promise,
3
and Ms own "temperamental bias for the loose and fluid." (2)
His belief that, because of men’s sentiments, and the part
that they play in determining beliefs, no possible world-view
1* Grattan, like Riley, attempts to describe James’s pMlosophy
from the interpretative standpoint of temperamental bias
alone, saying, "His whole intellectual career was a rational-
ization of personal necessities." (TTJ, 145.) Both men over-
emphasized tMs factor. Cf. Riley, AT, 308-320.
2. Of. PRA, 35. "Temperaments with their craving and refusals
do determine men in their pMlosopMes and always will."
3. Grattan, TTJ, 198.
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can ever be achieved which will be thoroughly satisfactory
to everyone. The essay naoted above connects itself with
a definite view of the world, a pluralistic philosophy accord-
ing to which the facts of life need many cognizers to take
them in.
Neither the whole of truth nor the whole
of good is revealed to any single observer,
although each observer gains a partial
superiority from the peculiar position in
which he stands. 1
iv. Influence of Pragmatism
James T s conviction that beliefs are dictated by prefer-
ences of a practical nature resulted in his kind of pragmatism,
which in turn influenced the problem of the One and Many. For
pragmatism as a method and as a criterion of truth suggests a
pluralistic world. Both in his Pragmatism and his Pluralistic
Universe James applies the pragmatic method to the disproof
of monism and the proof of pluralism. Since practical conse-
quences are the test of truth, and consequences vary for all
men at all times, pluralism is suggested. Furthermore, prag-
matism suggests that possibilities are real, and novelties
possible. There is no "conjoined unity"; "the world is eter-
nally incomplete, and at all times subject to addition or
2
liable to loss." Such a world, in the making, unfinished,
gives individuals something to do.
1. W. James, EFM, 284.
2. W. James, PEA, 116.
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Pragmatist epistemology tells us, that in a certain
sense reality depends on the purposes which govern our wills,
that we can make things real by acting as though they were
real. Bergson, in his introduction to the translation of
James* s Pragmatism into French, pointed out that pragmatism
is in its implications already a metaphysics. It points to
a reality which is abundant, in which man participates. Truth
is not something merely to be found; in a certain sense, it
is created, and invention. James* s pragmatism is thus a live,
vital theory, conscious of metaphysical implications and
possibilities, allowing for growing truth in a pluralistic
environment. It brings truth down to individuals, as the
entire process of cognition is brought within the frame of
1
reference of man*s possible experience.
v. Mental Processes as Dynamic Activities
Under this heading we may include the many influences
found in James *s theory of the self, of mind, of consciousness,
of free-will, etc. — all indicative of, and resting back upon,
the essential activity of the mind. The emphasis in James's
psychology is on persons, on individuals with free will, on
selection, interest, teleology. His introduction of a spirit-
ual force— a fiat— into the causal chain did not only point
to a dualism, but opened up the road to pluralism, for the
moral will needs a pluralistic environment. His voluntarism
1. See W. James, MT, preface
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led Mm further to the oonoept of a finite God, who is worthy
of worsMp, a co-worker with individuals who are likewise im-
portant, in a pluralistic world,
5, Summary
In order that we may more clearly see the influences dis-
cussed thus far, our conclusions are listed "briefly below:
(1) James’s philosophical methodology reflects the same
esteem for facts and particulars as is displayed in his psy-
chology. Both are empirical.
( 2 ) His pragmatic method is an attempt to do justice both
to strict scientific method and to experience. It grants non-
sensory data a vital part in pointing to truth, and includes
many factors which would not be considered empirical by many
philosophers or psychologists, but which James believed to be
of an experiential nature.
(3) His essential pMlosophic method of radical empiri-
cism demanded that all experience — emotional, cognitive,
and valuational factors — be considered. As James discovered
relations given in consciousness, so he discovered the same
nextness of parts in the universe. As consciousness is itself
a multiplicity, so the universe is a world of parts related
loosely, moments of experiences connected by relations which
are also experienced.
,.
«
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(4) Within the psychological frame of reference, James
means "by "feeling” the transitive as opposed to the sub-
stantive parts of the conscious stream. In this feeling-
stream, ideo-motor activities perform the largest work, but
when feeling-forces are blocked, the mental fiat which intro-
spedtion reveals, adds its own weight. In relation to think-
ing, the function of the will is to attend and consent to an
idea, holding it before the mind. Will is neither feeling
nor thinking, but is essential to both.
Within the philosophical frame of reference, the will
continues to play a dominant part in the thought of James.
Peeling, however, means for him here intuitive experience,
which supplements reason. Interpretative reason is valued
as a critical evaluating activity, but it is an operation
after the fact. Logical reason does not move along with life,
and cannot be expected to interpret the moving, . dynamic nature
of the perceptual flux. In the last analysis, an intuition or
mystical experience is the only way in which life's heart may
be grasped. Interpretative reason constructs, evaluates, and
criticizes the findings of such an experience in view of the
whole funded body of truth.
(5) Psychological observation finds no peculiar self-
activity, but this does not indicate that there is no such
activity. There is always a "more”, and James’s philosophy
emphasizes real spiritual force and activity in the world.

163
(6) The unity of the self is to he found, within the
psychological universe of discourse, in the passing thought
as thinker, each thought transferring its ownership to the
next. In his psychological analysis James always found more
content, and never a mental act as an object of contemplation
or observation. This led him to his theory of consciousness
as an external relation only; consciousness is not an entity,
but a "pure” experience, an Absolute, a thought.
(7) The emphasis on the self as the immediate datum in
psychology, and on individuality and personality, permeates
his entire philosophy. It suggests a pantheism in which we
find a world of selves, individual, active, and free, each
with an external environment of its own. These selves, how-
ever, are not ultimate principles, as in personalism, but
apparently results of moments of experiences. This is further
clarified in our final chapter, where we find James changing
his views concerning the possibility of the compounding of
consciousness.
(8) Since the self is a whole involving many activities,
we should speak: of freedom of the self, and not of will alone.
The mental fiat of which we are conscious is not a part of
the feeling-force, but a sui generis activity in which the
will is engaged. On the question of freedom of the self, the
last word of psychology must be ignorance. But when we con-
clude by saying that psychology can operate with a postulate
of determinism we are not saying that this is the final word
on the issue. If our goal is truth then moral postulates
,'
'
.
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must be considered as well, and on moral and ethical grounds
indeterminism is a necessity. It is essential for sound ethics,
for true individualism, for the kind of a world where evil is
a fact and a moral will is essential.
(9) James's concept of the stream of consciousness led
him to reject the mind-stuff theory and panpsychism initially.
This, however, was not his final view. This concept led also
to his idea of ultimate reality as a stream whose parts are
drops or pulses of experience, a dynamic, living, on-going
continuity.
(10) The emphasis on personal form in consciousness, and
the concept of the focus-fringe situation is reflected in the
panpsychism to which he finally came, in which individuals are
co-conscious with God. For further discussion of this, the
reader is referred to the next chapter.
(11) The influence of James's concept of the will, that
of the self as a "fighter for ends"
,
and of the essential and
vital activity of the mind, led James to reject the automaton
theory as any explanation of the mind-body relation, and to
espouse an interactionistic view. Within the frame of refer-
ence of psychology, the methodological postulate of psycho-
physical parallelism is permitted.
(12) The following influences played a vital part in
determining the pluralistic philosophy to which James was led:
.:• j>
-
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fa) His emphasis on facts, particulars,
individuals.
ft>) His use of the word "reality" to mean
"sense of reality", thus indicating his
belief that reality in a certain sense is dependent on in-
dividuals.
(c) His emphasis on sensation and perception,
and on concepts as instruments leading to the perceptual flux,
leading him to find ultimate reality in the perceptual flux
itself, with all of the multiplicity which it reveals.
(d) His own emotional preferences for plural-
ism with its guarantee of freedom of the self, God, promise,
purpose, possibility, novelty.
fe) His conviction that the whole truth is too
great for any actual mind, even the absolute mind, to know all
of it, and thus many individuals are required to take all of
the facts in.
ff) His pragmatic method which stresses practical
consequences varying with individuals, the dependence of reality
upon us in some way, the reality of possibilities and novelties
in the world, and the fact that truth is not found only, but
is created in some way, always within the framework of possible
experience.
.*
,
.
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CHAPTER VI
INFLUENCE OF JAMES
1
S PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSES
UPON HIS PSYCHOLOGY
In this chapter we shall endeavor to trace the further
changes in James *s thought which necessitated vital revisions
in the answers which had been found within the psychological
frame of reference. We have already indicated how the prob-
lems raised there had taken him beyond the strict confines of
psychology. Many of the answers had been provisional; most of
them seemed inadequate, suggestive of further impossibilities
which led him into metaphysical considerations. As James wrote
in his preface to the Italian edition of the Principles in 1900
I have become more and more convinced of
the difficulty of treating psychology with-
out introducing some true and suitable phil-
osophical doctrine. 1
Since the thought to which we now direct our attention is un-
doubtedly the product of his mature philosophy, we may conclude
that the corrections and revisions of his earlier psychology
represent James* s final attempt to synthesize the two universes
of discourse.
As we consider these revisions, it is necessary to con-
sider once more James’s essential motive philosophically. We
have already suggested the possible influences leading to his
2
solution to the problem of the One and the Many. But what made
1.
Perry, TCWJ, II, 75
2. Cf. V, 4.
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this the central issue for him ? For many philosophers this
would not be deemed the central problem; whether ultimate
reality is many or one, they would be more concerned with
the kind of one or many which is found. But we must remember
that James ! s leading motive is his opposition to any absolu-
tism. This antipathy is the matrix in which his entire phil-
osophy was bom, and must be judged. The absolutists "wallow-
1
ing in a sense of unbridled unity," in a "block-universe,"
presented that sort of world in which many problems real for
men became merely speculative ones. Its solution of the border-
line problems of psychology lost too much that was meaningful.
He objected to its substantialism, its bad intellectual! sm, its
abstractionism, its loss of individuality and freedom of the
self. What was ultimate reality then ? James was forced to
a pluralism, in which somehow the many problems and paradoxes
which had troubled psychologists and philosophers would be re-
solved. Still these ancient dualisms were present in a plural-
istic world; was he then to reject it and espouse the very
monism and absolutism which he detested ? It was this that
probably forced him to his philosophy of pure experience.
On April 3, 1898, preparing his notes for his course on
2
"Philosophical Problems of Psychology"
,
James wrestled with
this problem; and in the time following, he continued the at-
tempt to find in the philosophy of pure experience the solution to
1. H. James, LWJ, II, 14.
2. In Perry, TCWJ, II, 368-371
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these border-line problems. It was his conviction on April
3 that it would solve the very issues which he had faced in
psychology and which he was now attempting to answer within
the framework of philosophy, the larger view:
The whole use of the ’change of base' to
pure experience is to see whether one may
thereby solve certain problems which are
stickers on the usual dualistic categories,
e ,g . :
(1) The paradox that though sensations
and sensible attributes are deemed inextensive,
the latter extensive.
(2) Psycho-physical causality.
(3) The idealistic paradox— brain being
a condition of consciousness, whose creature
brain nevertheless is.
(4) The discrepant cycles of activity
—
cerebral and psychological.
(5) The perceptual and conceptual worlds.
f 6 ) The composition of mental states. 1
The answers given in his psychology to some problems were
"provisional", sufficient for psychological analysis, but
2
throwing no light on the above. James often wondered through-
out this period of his struggle whether he was merely "chasing
fleas"; "doesnft it seem like the wrigglings of a worm on the
3
hook, this attempt to escape the dualisms of common-sense ?"
Yet he was certain that these paradoxes and dualisms were not
an adequate picture of the flux and process of life; if he
could work out a philosophy of pure experience, on the con-
trary, these problems would be answered. It is with this
background in mind that we turn now to the consideration of
some of these problems.
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 368.
2. Ibid., II, 369.
3. Ibid., 369, 370.
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1. Consciousness
Almost all of the difficulties which James faced cen-
tered around the concept of consciousness. His Principles
1
had rejected the mind-stuff theory as unintelligible; the
mind is a unity, not a growth by accretion of units. The
problem, however, would not be downed. Both his psychology
and his philosophy had to be squared with life as a whole.
Either his psychology must go, or a final synthesis must be
found somewhere. Two influences played the greatest part on
the re-opening of the problem for him: (1) the concept of
the subliminal self which James had always thought was pe-
culiarly significant; and (2) the doctrine of pure experi-
ence to which he had been forced in his fight against absolu-
tism.
In his presidential address before the American Psycho-
logical Association at Princeton in 1894, on "The Knowing
2
of Things Together", we catch the first glimpse of his
continuing trouble with the problem,— the same one which he
wrestled with in the course we have mentioned,— and the first
hint that a relaxation or compromise of his convictions about
non-compounding of mental states was necessary. Some of the
fields of consciousness, he said, may have simpler parts, but
certainly not all of them; and the larger number of higher
fields of consciousness do not contain lower states.
1. Cf. V, 2, ii.
2. Published in Psy. Rev . 2 (1894), 105-124.
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As we have seen, the doctrine of pure experience to
which he was led brought this problem into focus. In formu-
lating it he held that an identical part can belong to two
different fields. Two distinct changes occurred as a result
of this doctrine (not immediately, but over a period of years),
namely, (1) that mental states are capable of compounding;
and (2) that consciousness does not exist as an entity, but
1
only as a function in experience performed by concrete thoughts,
i. Can mental states be compounded ?
This then is the central issue. Are states of mind in-
divisible and unique ? Or may they unite with others in
various contexts without losing their uniqueness ? The
Principles had emphasized the unity of each field of con-
sciousness. The stream of consciousness is indivisible and
unique: each experience is an absolute unity with no part
present in other experiences. The conviction is established
that there is to be assumed an epistemological dualism of
2
thoughts and their objects. But this doctrine of pure ex-
perience asserts that the same part can be taken in different
contexts, that one and the same datum may become part of dif-
ferent experiences.
Por purposes of clarity let us distinguish between ’’pure”
experience and "compound" experiences. "Pure" experience is
1. W. James, ERE, 3,4.
2. Of. PP, I, 220.
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freed from its exclusive association with consciousness
in order that it may include physical things as well. In
the psychology James had meant hy "experience” what I attend
1
to; here "pure" experience is merely the "potentiality of
£
the mental and physical," co-extensive with the stuff of the
world, the immediate flux of feeling, indeterminate, furnish-
ing the material for all of our later reflections. When we
attend to these drops of experience, we make them "our" ex-
periences; it is only as we attend to them, become aware of
them, inrelation to us, that they may be called "ours*"
Returning now to our problem, we face this ambiguity:
on the one hand, a distinctness and unity of experiences, yet
the fact that they may contain a common part. The impasse
resulting from these views constituted the vital problem for
James from 1905 to 1906. Perry has brought together James’s
3
notes covering this period and this issue, and the reader is
4
referred to this or to Lowe’s briefer treatment for an in-
sight into the dramatic struggle through which the mind of
James was passing as he considered the apparent contradictions
which had been noted particularly by Dickinson S. Miller and
B*H. Bode. Was he to renounce his psychological or his phil-
osophical conviction ? His solution was in favor of pure
1. W. James, PP, II, 402.
2* Perry, ISWJ, 76.
3* Perry, TCWJ, Appendix, II, 750 ff.
4. Ill ICWJ, 157 ff.
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experience, because it formulated the ancient paradoxes
and dualisms in a new setting, and avoided the absolutism
which was incapable of resolving them in any meaningful way.
Mental facts can ... compound themselves
—
if you take them concretely and livingly,
as possessed of various functions. They
can count variously, figure in different
constellations, without ceasing to be
themselves* .. . *1* can be, and be known;
be and have another being not me; why cant
I have another being own and use me, just as
I am, for its purposes, without knowing any
of these purposes myself. 1
The solution to the compounding problem is to be found in
being able to say that a conscious state both is and is not
the same as another— the same objectively, but not subject-
ively. In the stream of pure experience all distinctions are
resolved. Both Bergson and Myers helped him to attain the
solution to his problem.
fl) Bergson T s Influence
2
His dilemma is described in his Pluralistic Universe .
logically the problem did not seem to admit of solution;
was he then to give up his soulless psychology, and be
forced to accept the substantialism of the absolutists, or
give up the logic of identity ? Was he to choose between
the dynamic flow of life, "face the fact that life is
3
logically irrational," or an intellectualistic logic which
1. Perry, TCWJ, II, 765, from James *s notes. (Cf. PP,I, 158).
2. W. James, PU, 207-208.
3. Ibid., 208.
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1
dealt with entities called concepts ? Here is the basic
struggle; and it is the Bergsonian view which is finally
adopted. Logical reason is inadequate to grasp the mean-
ing of life, unable to measure what can or cannot be. This
view is the impetus which led him to certain changes of
which psychological analysis did not give an adequate account.
How does this view agree, one may ask, with the psycho-
logical doctrine of the stream of consciousness ? The answer
is plain:
Every individual morsel in the stream takes
up the adjacent morsels by coalescing with
others. This is what we mean by the stream's
sensible continuity. 2
Logic segmentizes the stream, but the parts into which it
3
would divide the flux are just an "intellectual fiction."
Life is still a flux, a stream, a process, where "the simplest
4
bits of immediate experience are their own others," and all
5
"real units of experience overlap."
(2) Myers's Influence
Myers's concept of the subliminal self had much to do
with his final position. James's war against monism has been
sufficiently described. But this new concept of experience,
allying itself with Myers's contribution, led him to conclude
1* Cf. this chapter, 2, ii, on "Changing attitude toward
concepts."
2. W. James, PU, 287.
3. Ibid., 287.
4. Ibid., 282.
5. Ibid., 287.
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that "the absolute is not the impossible being I once
1
thought it." In Myers T s concept he found a solution
which still saved him from the worst in absolutism. Re-
calling the focus-fringe concept of consciousness outlined
in his psychology, he concluded that our present field of
consciousness is a "centre surrounded by a fringe that
2
shades insensibly into a subconscious more." Is it not
possible that our consciousness may not only have a nearer
side but a farther side ? On its nearer side this "more"
constitutes our own momentary margin.
Our full self is the whole field, with all
those indefinitely radiating subconscious
possibilities of increase that we can only
feel without conceiving, and can hardly
begin to analyze. 3
On its farther side, who knows what it may Be ? But it is
at least possible that our consciousness constitutes the
margin of a much wider self. Certainly he had found that
Myers T s concept was exceedingly useful in explaining ab-
normal, supernormal experiences, mystical ecstasies, etc.;
the facts seemed to testify to a superhuman consciousness.
Row, since we have admitted the possibility of the self-
compounding of mental states, such a further compounding
4
may be a "legitimate hypothesis."
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
W. James, PU, 29P2,
Ibid., 288.
Ibid., 289.
Ibid., 292.
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Just as we are co-eonscious with our own
momentary margin, may not we ourselves form
the margin of some more really central self
in things which is co-conscious with the
whole of us ? May not you and I he con-
fluent in a higher consciousness, and con-
fluently active there, though we now know
it or not ? 1
James was accused of being inconsistent at this point by
some of his critics. Miller has taken up the cudgels for
him, pointing out that "to say that I cannot have unfelt
feelings is not to deny that somebody else has feelings un-
£
felt by me." Uhat James means here is simply that man is
unconscious of his own momentary margin, and in the same way
he is unconscious of this other mind with which he is never-
theless continuous. The Absolute so conceived by James differs
from most Absolutes, however. It is not a deterministic sys-
tem— the parts are not determined; and it is consistent with
pluralism. Individuals remain as individuals, with their own
external environments, in an expansive world where they may
lose none of their freedom, nor determining, active powers.
ii. Does Consciousness Exist ?
The other change in his concept of consciousness, in-
fluenced likewise by his doctrine of pure experience, was
the revolutionary one presented in 1904, which denied the
existence of consciousness as an entity. The Principles
1# W. James, PU, 290.
2. In ICWJ, 26; article on " A Debt to James n
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had accepted the fact that consciousness is an entity, and
avowed that
any conception of consciousness as a purely
cognitive form of being... is thoroughly anti-
psychological. 1
James T s assertion in this year that he had mistrusted the
2
existence of consciousness for twenty years, is rather far-
fetched and exaggerated in view of the definite convictions
of the Principles (1890) and the Varieties of Religious Ex-
perience (1902). At any rate, we now, in the year 1904,
find him denying any peculiar quality of being to conscious-
ness. Such a position had been anticipated in the meaning
of truth, in an article formulated in 1884, in which he de-
4
fined a conceptual sign as a substitute for percepts, and
symbolic thought requiring no "mind-stuff that resembles
5
(particular realities) even in a remote degree." Now con-
sciousness-stuff is entirely repudiated. The field of con-
sciousness is not an object, but must be viewed from the
subjective point of view alone.
1. W. James, PP,I, 141.
2. EKE, 3.
3* Article on "The Function of Cognition," MT, 1-42.
4. W. James, MT, 39.
5. Ibid., 30.
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The moment you step aside from the purely
subjective point of view, the point of
view of the experient, and regard the fact
as an objective entity that may, like a
material thing, keep secrets from the ex-
perient,... you err, you are wandering.
1
Experience must be kept indeterminate
,
if it is to mean any-
thing. If we look at it with either a subjective or ob-
jective shade of meaning, we are sure, as he said in his
article in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology ,
2
"question-begging. . . and discussion grows impossible."
We have pointed out in our previous chapter the influence
which his psychological observation had upon the development
of this concept. Introspection reveals always more content,
never mental acts capable of being observed and studied. Holt
believes that such a concept of consciousness as James pre-
sents here traces back to his motor psychology, later developed
in his pragmatic theory, in which it is held that theories are
3
instruments and rules of procedure, and his Will to Beli eve
,
where cognition is considered to be "but a fleeting moment,
a cross-section at a certain point of what in its totality
4
is a motor phenomenon."
Thoughts in the concrete are by no means to be denied.
But, as in Cartesian epistemology, consciousness means "’cogi-
tatio." There is nothing in consciousness but the succession
of concrete thought, sensations, etc., and as mental facts
1. Article by Miller, "A Debt to James," in ICWJ, 27.
2. Baldwin, DPP, 361. (Article written in 1902).
3. ICWJ, 45,46. Cf. James, PRA, 46, 53.
4. W. James, WB, 84.
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1
these have "no qualities hut those experienced."
There is, I mean, no aboriginal stuff or
quality of being, contrasted with that of
which natural objects are made; but there
is a function in experience which thoughts
perform, and for the performance of which
this quality is invoked. That function is
knowing . 2
2. Influences of this concept on problems
This new concept of consciousness, and the entire phil-
osophy of pure experience, had its marked influences on other
vital problems which had been unsatisfactorily solved by abso-
lutism, only temporarily resolved in the psychological frame
of reference.
i. Epistemology
The epistemological change is most worthy of note. He
had been dissatisfied with the solution proposed in the
3
Principles
,
despite its usefulness for psychologists,— a
dualism between the thing known and the mind knowing. In
notes for his Psychology Seminary, 1895-1896, we find him
pondering over that doctrine which was to be presented as
his philosophy of pure experience. The world is just possibly,
he thought, a datum, a pure experience, within which are two
parts, objectivity and subjectivity, constantly shifting status,
1. Miller* s article on "A Debt to James," in ICWJ, 32.
2. W. James, ERE, 3, 4.
3. W. James, PP, I, 120.
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1
this becoming that. A statement like this would seem to
deny Perry
1
s statements concerning the neutral status of
the stream of experience. It is true that James himself
wavered in his convictions concerning the stream — at times
it appears that he thinks of it as neutral, as in his defini-
2
tion in Baldwin* s Dictionary
,
and at others, as in this
passage now under consideration, as psychic. The weight of
evidence is, as we have seen, in favor of a perhaps uncon-
3
scious Berkeleian idealism.
James found himself thus engaged in a war within over the
problem of monism; he was convinced that the world is somehow
homogeneous and continuous, yet he hated monism. So at length
he came to the conclusion that in that strange monism which
was yet a pluralism his problem could be resolved.
In that world, the dualism between objects and subjects
exists only in the perceptual situation. In the psychological
frame of reference, we can still speak of a dualism, but this
is not a sufficient analysis. There is no "numerical or meta-
physical disparateness."
1. Cf. notes in TCWJ, II, 365-366
2. Baldwin, DPP, 360, 361.
3. lovejoy, BAD, 47.
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les attributions sujet et objet, represents
et repr£sentatif
,
chose et pensee, signifient
done une distinction pratique qui est de la
demise importance, mais qui est d’ordre
FOTTCTIOMEL seulement, et nullement onto-
logique comme le dualisme classique se la
represents*.. In fin de compte, le^ choses
et les pensees ne sont point foncierement
h^t^rogenes, mais elles sont faites^d’une
m3me &toffe, Itoffe qu’on ne peut definir
comme telle, mais seulement eprouver, et
que I’on nomme
,
si on veut, I’etoffe de
1* experience en general. 1
Primal reality is composed of moments of pure experience,
and knowing is simply a particular kind of relation into which
parts of pure experience can enter. There is no need for pos-
tulating a matrix or transcendental self in which the dualism
is resolved; there is just a constant, continuing transition
in which one part of the stream comes to know another. Experi-
ence, i.e. "pure" experience, holds within itself a duplicity
of consciousness and content.
A given undivided portion of experience,
taken in one context of associates , (plays
)
the part of a knower, or state of mind, of
consciousness; while in a different con-
text, the same undivided bit of experience
plays the part of a thing known, of an
objective ’content’. 2
Hence we find in the knowledge-situation no such gap or
chasm as epistemological dualism asserts, but a "positively
conjunctive transition... the very original of what we mean
3
by continuity."
1. "La notion de Conscience" in ERE, 232, 233.
2. W. James, ERE, 9,10. Recall PP, I, 338 ff.
—
no knower
necessary other than the "passing thought."
3. W. James, MT, 117.
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(1 ) How may many minds know the same thing ?
The same object can figure in two different conscious-
nesses, so that many minds can know the same thing together.
To be conscious means simply to "be reported, known, to have
1
awareness of being added to that being." The experience is
made mine as it is felt to be mine ; it is another's as it is
felt to be that other's ; by itself it is indeterminate. This
does not mean that the mind merely copies the stream; it is a
function which concrete thoughts perform. Making an experience
mine does something to that experience; it means more than a
mere feeling of "mine-ness ," of having some relation to an ob-
ject; although James does not emphasize the fact at this point,
the essential activity of the mind in facing the stream of
consciousness must always be remembered.
(2) Objective reference
Objective reference is not denied by James, but such ref-
erence is never beyond experience; it is "only an incident of
the fact that so much of our experience comes as an insufficient,
2
and consists of process and transition." In the experience-
continuum we have a developing, dynamic situation, with the
knower as one terminus and the known another, not simply a
static relation out of time. The idea's working constitutes
1. W. James, EHE, 71.
2. Ibid., 201.
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its own self-transcendency. Though this would seem to
point to a dualism, it is not so for James. It is only
on the perceptual level that a dualism is apparent; it is
not true of the stream of "pure" experience itself.
Reality, however remote is always defined
as a terminus within the general possibilities
of experience, and what knows it is defined
as an experience that represents it, in the
sense of being substitutable for it in our
thinking, because it leads to the same associ-
ates, or in the sense of
1
pointing to it*
through a chain of other experiences that either
intervene or may intervene. 1
All objects of which we speak are in the present field of ex-
perience. That experience is one of physical things immedi-
ately present, of others beyond the margin of the personal
self there, and thoughts and feelings belonging to it, plus
other thoughts and feelings connected with what I call other
personal selves. Some of these are "sufficients"; others
—
physical things beyond, and the thoughts and feelings con-
nected with these other selves— are "insufficients", con-
nected with the "more." All of this is contained in the
notes for James 1 s course in the Philosophical Problems of
Psychology in 1897 to 1898.
(This) marginal 'more' is part of the ex-
perience under description. Ho one can
use it mystically and say that self-
transcendency or epistemological dualism
is already involved in that description
1. W. James, ERE, 201.
2. In Perry, TCWJ, II, 371
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.
.
..
.
183
that the 'more' is a reference beyond the
experience . The ’more' is more than the
vividly presented or felt; the 'beyond
1
is beyond the centre of the field. 1
So "conterminousness" of physical things and concepts is the
answer to the absolutist’s one field . My ’more' is con-
terminous with yours, both as regards physical things and
2
concepts. "Minds meet in truth as well as in fact."
(3) Knowledge of other minds
In such an experienceable environment, how may we know
other minds ? We seem to have a situation governed by the
rule that there is nothing which is actually known until it
is presented to someone, and owned by him. Mainly it must be
true that we know the thoughts and experiences of others by
3
representation alone. But in this "conterminous" view we
see the foreshadowing of James’s final view of the problem of
the One and the Many, where the ownership idea proposed in the
Principles is no longer deemed necessary, and immanence of
4
monads in each other is admitted by him.
ii. Changing attitude toward concepts
The change in James's attitude toward concepts is a pro-
gressively developing one. Sometimes, to be sure, we find
1. In Perry, TCWJ, II, 371.
2. Ibid., II, 370.
3. Cf. ICWJ, 27; Miller’s article which mistakenly suggests
that this is James's final view.
4. See this chapter, section 2.
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conflicting statements concerning their place and importance
in the same hook, hut they represent James’s attempt to justi-
fy conceptual thought, while at the same time recognizing the
injustice it does to reality.
In the Principles James seems at times to adopt a partially
conceptual! stic view, despite his extreme nominalism.
Mind can conceive any quality or relation
it pleases, and mean nothing hy it, in
isolation from everything else in the
world. 1
However, conception always takes place for a subjective in-
terest, and is a teleological instrument for dealing with the
data of the senses. Universal-worship n can only he called a
hit of perverse sentimentalism, a philosophical idol of the
2
cavei” The scientific emphasis throughout the Principles re-
mains on things concrete and singular. And in James’s postu-
3
late of the stream of thought with given connecting relations,
we catch a glimpse of that attitude which later developed into
a denunciation of concepts as adequate in any respect to grasp
the nature of reality.
As we trace his growth through the years, ambiguities are
noted. In his Pragmatism percepts are held to he the only
realm of reality. In The Meaning of Truth he held that sub-
5
jective additions to facts do extend and enlarge reality.
1. W. James, PP, I, 470.
2. Ibid., I, 480.
3. Ibid., I, 243.
4. U. James, PHA, 39.
5. W. James, MT, 94.
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concepts are "genuine additions,. • made "by our intellect
to the world of fact. Hot additions of consciousness only,
1
hut additions of
1
content I" Yet, despite the fact that
concepts seem to be given a co-ordinate realm with percepts,
the latter remain more significant, and are given more emphasis.
They are continuous, a common possession of all men; they possess
novelty, and allow room for action. Conceptual knowledge has
as its sole function to guide ub to a terminus "in a percept
that operates on or resembles the reality, or is otherwise
2
connected with it or its context." This same ambiguity is
to be found in Some Problems of Philosophy
,
where James allows
conceptual knov/ledge to be self-sufficing, though its main
value is in getting us back to the perceptual flux again, and
then indicates that both perceptual and conceptual experiences
3
are essential, and neither can be thought of as supreme.
It is in the Pluralistic Universe and Some Problems of
Philosophy that we find the denouement , the denial of the
efficacy of concepts in adding to facts, or in interpreting
4
facts. Conceptual thought is sufficient for the purposes of
study, but it has been over-emphasized in the history of thought.
Its significance lies in the consequences it achieves in the
perceptual order. It cannot understand or describe the reality
of things, for it omits, falsifies and distorts. Concepts are
secondary, bom in the perceptual order of events, but they
1. W. James, MT, 94.
2. W. James, MT, 38.
3. Cf. SPP, 50-57; 67-70; also MT, 42,195n; PTJ, 339, 340.
4. At least the reality of subjective additions to facts is
denied "inferentially"
,
as Holt suggests in ICWJ, 43.
.'
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make that order seem contradictoiy because (1) they sub-
stitute relations when they become substitutes for percepts,
and these relations become static, no longer dynamic; (2) the
conceptual scheme is discontinuous and cannot measure the con-
tinuous. All of the problems which have seemed insoluble to
philosophers in trying to represent an absolutistic world, and
led men like Bradley to call this a world of "appearances”,
are the result of conceptual thinkring, and its nature. Activity
and causation become incomprehensible; the possibility of knowl-
edge is denied because we have mutually transcendent and dis-
crete knowers and things; personal identity is impossible, for
ideas are discrete; motion and change are impossible; resem-
blance is an illusion. These are the impossibilities and contra-
dictories in any absolutism which render philosophic thought so
inadequate.
What shall be our solution ?
Take reality up bodily and integrally into
philosophy in exactly the perceptual shape
in which it comes. 1
Only concrete percepts are primordial, and concepts are secondary.
The latter are mere tools of logic for handling things.
I have finally found myself compelled to
give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and
irrevocably... Reality, life, experience,
concreteness, immediacy , • • • exceeds our
logic, overflows and surrounds it.
2
3
Reality is at least non-rational
,
if not completely irrational.
1. W. James, SPP, 95
2. W. James, PU, 212
3. Ibid., 213.
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In this way the solution is found to the epistemological
problem. Conceptual thought seems different from the world,
the reality to which it applies. Epistemology can distinguish
between concepts and the datum to which they point. But these
concepts are simply cuts from the plenum of reality by interest-
ed selection.
Being selected, they are not removed or set
apart in any spatial or ontological sense.
They are not entities by themselves, or
duplications of perception. They are not
’really
1
separate... They are real in their
concreteness, at the same time that they
are unreal when ’taken’ by themselves. i
Both Bergson and James then cast their vote for temporality,
process, and activity, and against absolutism and any atomistic
point of view. Both were interested in concrete existence , and
the logic of identity which solved few problems and created many
was denounced.
iii. The Mind-Body Problem
The philosophy of pure experience would also, James thought,
help to solve the ’’idealistic paradox— brain being a condition
2
of consciousness, whose creature brain nevertheless is.” We
have already suggested the central place which the problem of
the freedom of the self occupied in James’s psychology and
philosophy. It was through this problem that he was origin-
ally led to the vital issue of the mind-body relation, for
oijff’s view of this relation is basic to one’s view of life.
1. Perry, ISWJ, iii.
2. notes for Philosophical Problems of Psychology
,
1897-98, in
Perry, TCWJ, II, 368.
3. See Chapter Y, 2, iii; also III, 6.
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It holds within itself the answer to the dilemma between
mechanism and teleology, between behaviorism and purposive
psychology. His investigation of physiological conditions had
led him to conclude that mind is essentially teleological, and
to reject the automaton theory, accepting at least partially the
interaction! Stic position* However, he had left for the psy-
chologist the methodological postulate of psycho -physical para-
allelism, assuming a state of brain or nervous system for every
state of mind. The metaphysical postulate to which this pointed,
a dualism of body and mind, was denied by that philosophical po-
sition to which he finally came.
Let us briefly trace the growth of James’s philosophical
treatment of this problem. In 1878, in a Lowell Institute Lecture,
he had offered as reason for accepting an interactionistic view
the significance which such a view held for the moral and re-
ligious life. A strict physiological determinism denied to
consciousness any purpose or spiritual activity, and the result
1
was a philosophical materialism which James abhorred.
In Myers’ s doctrine of the subliminal self we find the
basis of his "transmission theory" of consciousness. In his
concept of the wider self with which we are continuous, James
found the answer to this problem of mind and body. The body
or brain merely lets through the mind from the great mother-
sea beyond. The dependence of mind on brain is purely a
1. Cf. VRE, 14
,8
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functional one. Consciousness does not cease when the body
and brain die. In this he discovered some reason for belief
in immortality. The body, he wrote his sister, Alice, in 1891,
prevents the mind from coming to its fullest powers.
When that which is you passes out of the body,
I am sure that there will be an explosion of
liberated force and life, till then eclipsed
and kept down. 1
Death does not mean the end of consciousness. Consciousness
may return to the mother-sea, therein to be absorbed in the one;
or it may conceivably find another instrument through which it
may continue to work.
How is this to be related to the discussion of epistemo-
logical monism above ? The final break with dualism came with
his denial of consciousness as an entity. Mind and nature are
no longer regarded as discrete substances. Mind is merely a
relation, and consequently we have no need for any distinct
and interacting orders. The brain is "a terminus (which)
causes the thought-field of which entitatively it forms a
8
portion.” It is extremely difficult to say what James* s final
word would have been on this problem, for the whole question
of the nature of ultimate reality is once again involved. If
the stream of pure experience is mental, then his solution
3
would be that of panpsychism. If, on the contrary, it is
neutral, it would have to be that of the neo-realists, in
1. H. James, LWJ, II, 181.
8. Hotes for his course in 1897-98, "Philosophical Problems of
Psychology," in TCWJ, II, 369.
3. See Chapter IY, 2, iii; also, Y, 2, iii.
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which mind and body are manifestations of a third reality
1
which is neither. Self-identity v/ould depend on this reality
being "’owned 1 by our... several remembering experiences."
It is doubtful whether the third possibility, that of a material
stream of experiences, is even a possibility. Confusion and
ambiguity is rife, for James did not spend much time consider-
ing this question; in view of the whole, this third possibility
must be excluded from consideration, since it would deny so
much that is truly Jamesian philosophy
—
purposes, causes,
everything mental and supernatural.
Our final conclusion has to be simply this— cut short by
death, James did not live to tell what part the brain and the
nervous system did play in the stream of pure experiences. That
the dualism is brought within the experience-continuum is certain,
but there is no final answer.
iv. The Will
Another problem that remained unsolved is that of the will.
For the psychologist James had asserted the methodological postu-
late of complete determinism as admissible, though the fact of
indeterminism was to be established on other grounds— mainly
ethical, moral, and religious ones. Of one thing we may be
certain, that his concept of the will was interactionistic and
dualistic. Man interacted with his environment; he could intro-
X. On the whole at this point James seems to favor the neutral
concept of reality— experiences neutral in themselves , taken
in one context appearing as mental, in another, as physical.
The problem, however, remains unsolved in any of his notes
or writings.
. ,
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duce into the causal chain a fiat which would change things;
the feeling of effort and of the will’s activity is a fact.
In the light of the philosophy of pure experience, however,
some changes were essential. It must be assumed that the dual-
ism is likewise brought into the experience-continuum. The
will is itself a part of the same world, of the same reality
as the world upon which it brings to bear its living effort.
Although the problem is not finally considered and re-
solved, we can indicate the path it might have taken, in view
of what we have already discovered. Moments of experiences in
the great primordial stream compound themselves into ever higher
grades of unity. They are free. V'hat James has done is to
develop the doctrine of freedom of the self from the psycho-
logical framework to cosmic beings. In the universe James
found no closed, determined system; tyehism is a fact; novelties
occur. The world is tychistic and pluralistic; chance is an
objective reality, operating in the cosmos. Each monad or self
compounded of moments of experiences is immanent to a certain
extent in other selves, and continuous with a much wider self
which we call God. But freedom is still an integral part of
each of these moments, or compounds of moments, novelties
arise by the influence which these moments of experience exert
on each other.
The fundamentally non-rational or irrational character of
James’s universe permits of no further exposition than this.
.»
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James had never formulated completely the problem entailed
in his new philosophy. Many of the things he had held as
convictions might have had to he dropped. When he died, he
was convinced of one thing, namely, that the paradoxical
nature of the stream of life could never be adequately treated
by logical reason alone. His system is in the last analysis
one which presents suggestions and possibilities for develop-
ment along various lines; but within the extant writings no
solution is proposed.
3* The Problem of the One and Many
Any reader of James must always find himself brought at
last to a consideration of James's pluralism, no matter what
subject he is considering. We have suggested the development
of his pluralistic system, and the psychological and other
1
influences operating upon the development of this problem.
He began, as we have seen, by objecting to Absolutism, was
forced to pluralism, and then found in pure experience the
answers to the ancient problems.
One thing further remains to be considered, which resulted
in the rejection of an earlier psychological view. Originally
he had tried to make his world out of pure experiences or moments
of experience related only externally. In 1908, he began to
develop his compenetration view. The Principles had endeavored
1. See Chapter IY, 2, i; Y, 4
*'
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to find the answer to the unity and identity of the self
in passing thoughts which qualify and are qualified by each
1
other. The passing thought is the owner, and ownership is
transferred or passed on from one thought to another in the
stream. How James began to see that the Principles was in
error. There is no necessity for any "owning” experience,
for immanence is possible. The succession of perishing pulses
of thought is due to the immanence of these pulses in each
other, of the part that one thought possesses in common with
the constitution of another.
In this view of experience, relations are conceived as
"vectors”, "transforming thrusts conveying something of one
thing into various other things, as common sense supposes the
light of the sun 'related 1 to growing plants. A relation dif-
2
fuses the first thing and affects the others." Thus we find
ourselves led again to the conclusion that James's ultimate
metaphysical position may have been a panpsychism. It does
not, however, appear to be a panpsychistic absolutism, for
the droplets of experience are distinguishable and free, though
immanent. James could not entirely solve this problem by
postulating a system in which all selves, monads, of higher
grades of moments of experience, have an external environment.
At this point again we are forced to the belief that, in order
to save individuality from absolutism, he foreswore intellectual
-
!• W. James, PP, I, 338 ff.
2. From an entry in James T s notes, in 1908; Perry, TCWJ,II,762.
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istic logic; logical reason cannot grasp reality as it is.
It is in a feeling, an intuition, a mystical insight, that
this problem is seen in its proper place.
4. Summary
(1) The motivating factor in all of James's philosophy
is his opposition to absolutism, and its solution to the
ancient paradoxes and dualisms of experience. He was forced
to a pluralism, and then beyond it to a concept of pure ex-
perience, in which the border-line problems of philosophy and
psychology were to be resolved.
(2) The philosophy of pure experience solved the problem
of the compounding of mental states. In the stream of experi-
ence mental states can compound themselves, figuring in differ-
ent contexts without losing their distinctness; both unity and
distinctness are thus saved.
(a) Bergson's influence is marked in leading James
to resolve the dilemma between absolutism (particularly sub-
stantialism) and the irrationality of life, by giving up in-
tellectualistic logic.
(b) Myers's concept of the subliminal self enabled
James to espouse a monism which is still free of the objection-
able features of most absolutism. In his notion of our con-
sciousnesses constituting the margin of a wider self with
which we are always continuous, James found a place for his
,c
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pluralism— a universe which is a collection of eaches,
units, moments of experience, All-forms and each-forms; God
himself is one of the "eaches."
(3) The doctrine of pure experience, along with his motor
psychology and the results of introspection, led James finally
to deny consciousness as anything hut a succession of con-
crete thoughts, sensations, etc. It is not an entity, and
has no peculiar quality of its own.
(4) The epistemological dualism which psychology notes
is the result of insufficient analysis; it is to he found on
the perceptual level alone, hut cannot he said to he true
metaphysically. In pure experience there is no epistemo-
logical gap; physical things and concepts are in the same field
of experience, which contains within itself a duplicity of
consciousness and content. There is no objective reference
heyond the experience.
(5) In the main the thoughts and experiences of others
are known hy representation alone; hut in the stream of ex-
perience my thoughts and feelings are conterminous with others'
thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, the separate monads are
immanent in each other in this stream.
(6) Throughout most of his writings James vacillates be-
tween granting to concepts a coordinate realm of being with
percepts as self-sufficing and capable of extending and en-
larging reality, and denying to them any function save that of
leading hack to the perceptual flux. His final view follows
,; ;
-
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the same line as Bergson’s. Concepts are necessary, bom
in the perceptual order of events, cuts from the plenum of
pure experience. They are real only in their concreteness,
but unreal when taken by themselves; dependence on them for
grasping reality is futile because of their static nature
which makes the perceptual order seem self-contradictory.
(7) There is no final solution to the part which the
brain and the nervous system play in the stream of pure ex-
perience. The dualism originally held is brought within the
experience-continuum in some way, but the final solution de-
pends on the nature of the stream, concerning which there are
various opinions.
(8) The problem of the will is never finally considered
or resolved, but a definite trend is indicated. We may postu-
late that James developed the concept of freedom from its place
in psychology, dealing with human beings, to a cosmic status.
The universe is a tychistic one, in which moments of experience
and their compounds are free, and, in exerting an influence
upon each other by reason of their immanence and their freedom,
cause novelties to occur.
(9) James's final "eompenetration” view of experience,
conceiving the pulses of experience as immanent in each other,
denied the concept of "ownership” of thoughts which the Prin-
ciples had proposed. In this way, which we may suppose repre-
sents James's final, mature thought, monads, all of the same
substance, influence each other in the stream. It is a monistic
view consistent with pluralism, with individuality and freedom
sacred

197
5. Conclusion
This final chapter suggests the difficulties involved
in any attempt to point the way to a final metaphysical posi-
tion which James might have held. It is with these paradoxes
and problems that any student of James must wrestle if he is
to make any attempt to understand him. The neo-realists may
claim him as their forerunner; the panpsychists may find in
him an ally. Perhaps James would not recognize himself in
either.
We have made the attempt in this dissertation to resolve
some of the ambiguities and paradoxes in the light of James’s
own development. Many difficulties remain unsolved, and it is
not easy to trace the path his thoughts might have taken. His
anti-intellectualism did not deny the power of reason to con-
struct, criticize, evaluate; but the highest truths are in-
capable of demonstration by purely intellectual processes
alone. It is in direct, immediate experience that truth is
found in its totality, and it is possible that the idea of
"pure experience” in which all paradoxes and ambiguities are
finally resolved is one which is best understood by feeling.
It is doubtful whether even feeling or mystical insight would
ever give us a thoroughly consistent Jamesian metaphysical
system.
». .
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ABSTRACT
The problem of this dissertation is two-fold: (1) to
determine the influences which led James first into psy-
chology and then into philosophy, and (£) to consider some
interrelations between his psychological and philosophical
analyses of border-line problems, with a view to clarify or
resolve apparent paradoxes and inconsistencies.
James T s interests and abilities led him from medical
training to physiology, and finally to psychology as a natural
science, based on observation and controlled experimentation,
in contrast to the purely speculative psychology which had
held sway from the time of Aristotle. In his Principles of
Psychology , (1891) he rejected any elementaristic view of con-
sciousness, emphasized the biological concept of the mind as
teleological, and indicated his conviction that the views of
scientific psychology were essential, but not ultimate. The
shift in interest and emphasis to philosophy was not sudden
or arbitrary; psychology and philosophy are never wholly di-
vorced in any of his writings. Pour factors were mainly
responsible for the change: (1) the difficulties attending
psychology, which involved time and interest that he lacked,
and extensive laboratory work that he disliked; (£) his dis-
content with merely establishing physiological or psycho-
logical data, and his conviction that psychology must look to
epistemology and metaphysics for its deeper meaning; (3) the
illnesses which constantly plagued him, throwing him back upon
<T
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Ms own moral and Intellectual resources, and forcing Mm
to seek some meaning in life "beyond the mechanistic world
portrayed by science; and (4) Ms opposition to absolutism
as a betrayal of experience and its problems. His philo-
sophical thought is considered in its three phases: episte-
mology, metaphysics, and philosophy or religion.
The presentation of the main psychological and philo-
sopMcal doctrines in James’s writings concentrates our
attention on specific problems to which different answers
are given in his psychology and pMlosophy. Prom the con-
sideration of interrelations existing between the different
analyses within the two frames of reference, the following
conclusions emerge:
Methodology :
1* His philosophical and Ms psychological method-
ology are both empirical, reflecting the same esteem for facts
and particulars.
2. His empiricism is not, however, positivistic.
His pragmatic method represents his attempt to do justice to
strictly scientific method and to experience, granting non-
sensory data a vital part in pointing to truth, and including
many experiences ordinarily denied empirical standing by some
psychologists and philosophers. James’s radical empiricism
demanded that all experience — cognitive, emotional, and
evaluational— be considered.
..
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Epistemology :
1. As a criterion of truth, pragmatism asserts that
an idea is true if it works or has practical consequences.
There are, however, indications that James actually referred
to a higher criterion of truth, empirical consistency or co-
herence, of which the pragmatic value of truth is an integral
constituent.
2. The epistemological dualism noted by psychology
is true on the perceptual level alone, but not metaphysically.
In pure experience, physical things and concepts are in the
same field of experience; ultimate reality contains within it-
self an inner duplicity of consciousness and content, and there
is no objective reference beyond the experience.
3. James vacillated between granting concepts a co-
ordinate status with percepts, and denying them anything but
an instrumental function. His final view follows Bergson
—
conceptual entities are cuts from the plenum of reality, real
in their concreteness but unreal taken by themselves, and the
source of many apparent contradictions in the perceptual order.
Self :
1. Although psychological analysis discovers no
peculiar self-activity, there is always a "more” which, in
James 1 s philosophy is emphasized as real spiritual force.
2. Within the psychological universe of discourse
the self's unity is found in the transfer of ownership from
each passing thought to the next. James's final compenetration
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view in philosophy denied such ownership, conceiving each
pulse of experience immanent in others in vector fashion.
3. The self is a whole involving many activities.
Will is neither feeling nor thinking,hut is essential to both.
Within the psychological frame of reference "feeling" means
the transitive parts of consciousness as opposed to the sub-
stantive parts of the stream. In the feeling-stream, ideo-
motor activities figure largely, but the will adds its weight
when feeling-forces are blocked. In relation to thinking,
the will*s function is to attend to and hold ideas before the
mind... In James* s philosophy the will continues to play a
dominant part. Feeling, however, means intuitive experience,
and is a supplement to reason. Logical reason cannot, James
holds, grasp the dynamic nature of reality; intuitive experi-
ence is the key. Interpretative reason is, however, valued
as a constructive, critical agency, relating the findings of
intuitive experience to the funded body of truth.
4. Psychology can give no final answer to the prob-
lem of the freedom of the self, although introspection reveals
a sense of being free, bringing effort to bear on situations
where feeling forces are blocked. Within his frame of refer-
ence the psychologist may operate with a methodological postu-
late of complete determinism. Moral postulates, however, must
be considered, if truth is the goal, and indeterminism is
necessary for sound ethics, true individualism, and a world
where evil is more than a speculative problem. James developed
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his concept of freedom among human selves to spontaneity
in the cosmos; the universe is tychistic, and novelties
arise by the influence of cosmic beings upon each other, by
reason of their immanence and their freedom.
5* James’s emphasis on the self, the personal form
of consciousness, the focus-fringe situation, and the sacred-
ness of individuality, permeates his psychology and philosophy,
suggesting a panpsychism in which selves are co-conscious with
the mother-sea of consciousness while retaining their freedom
and distinctness.
Mind (Consciousness) :
1. The psychological concept of the stream of con-
sciousness influenced James’s view of reality as a dynamic,
continuous stream. As relations are given in consciousness,
so the universe is a world of multiple parts connected by re-
lations which are also experienced.
2. Although James initially rejected panpsychism
and the mind-stuff theory, his philosophy of pure experience
re-opened the problem. Mental states can compound themselves,
coalescing with each other, figuring in different contexts
without losing their unity and separateness. Forced to a
choice between substantialism and the irrationality of life,
James accepted the latter. Myers’s concept of the subliminal
enabled him to espouse a monism free of the objectionable
features of most absolutism; in the continuity of conscious-
ness with a wider sea, pluralism is still true, and individual-
ity is saved.
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3. Psychological analysis always reveals more
content, and never mental activity as an object of observa-
tion. This fact, together with the development of his phil-
osophy of pure experience, forced him to deny to conscious-
ness any peculiar quality of its own, and to describe it as
an external relation between concrete thoughts.
4. Within the psychological frame of reference,
James permits the methodological postulate of psycho-physical
parallelism, although his concept of the will, self, and
activity of mind was in favor of interactionism. His later
philosophy of pure experience never finally considered and
resolved this dualism. That it is brought within the experi-
ence-continuum is certain, but his final view depends on the
nature of the stream, whether mental or neutral.
The Idea of God ;
1. James 1 s philosophy of religion may be considered
a developing one. The earlier point of view stresses the sub-
jective value of the idea of God as a stimulus to human action;
later, in the Varieties of Religious Experience
,
God is repre-
sented as an actual, saving power. His final philosophical
view achieves the synthesis, God as a finite personality of
wider conscious time-span, influencing other personal centers
of energy, and drawing strength from them. Man is co-conscious
with God, not, however, in the sense of fusing with an Absolute
Mind; both are quantitatively distinct, though qualitatively
the same.
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2, James's wide view of experience is well-
illustrated in Ms defence of fideism— the right and
reasonableness of going beyond the evidence, though always
directed by it, when intellectual grounds alone do not justify
conclusions, and such a step is essential for a more rational
system.
Problem of the One and Many :
1. The motivating factor in James's philosophy is
Ms opposition to absolutism and its solution to the ancient
paradoxes and dualisms of experience. Other factors operated
to force Mm to a pluralism —Ms empiricism, his emphasis on
sensation and perception, his conviction that reality is in a
certain sense dependent on individuals, his own personal pref-
erence for a world which guaranteed freedom, promise, possibil-
ity, novelty, and his pragmatism which stressed varying prac-
tical consequences, the belief that troth is too great for any
mind, even an Absolute Mind, to know all of it, and the fact
that troth is always found or created within the framework of
possible experience.
2. Pluralism itself did not solve all of his prob-
lems, however; and it is in the matrix of pure experience that
Ms pluralism must be understood. The universe is a fluent,
dynamic experience-continuum, qualitatively one, quantitatively
many. Reality is a monism, in wMch a multiplicity of moments
of experiences, to some extent immanent in each other, yet free,
form the one. Though James vacillates in his description of the
,.
'
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stream of pure experience, the evidence seems to point to
the mental, not neutral, character of this stream.
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